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I. INTRODUCTION
The author has twice previously summarized the community property
law of Washington.1 In the eleven years since the most recent effort there
have been enough changes to warrant a repetition of the task. Much of the
discussion in the 1974 article is still appropriate, needing only reference to
any later cases; accordingly, some parts of this article will essentially be an
updated and revised version of the earlier article. There are also areas,
however, in which the more recent cases prompt a new, more extensive, or
modified analysis. The article undertakes that new analysis as well as
incorporating the appropriately revised material from 1974, to provide a
comprehensive discussion.
Community property law in the United States is principally of Spanish
origin.2 Washington, however, has no history of significant contact with
Spanish culture, as do many of the original "old line" community property
states.3 Nonetheless, Washington's community property system may de-
rive from a Spanish source, via California, whose laws apparently fur-
nished the principal model for the territorial laws in Washington. 4
In contrast to the philosophical premise of the common law system, in
which the wife's juridical personality is submerged into that of her husband
at the time of marriage, 5 the marital property relationship in the community
1. Cross, The Community Property Law in Washington, 15 LA. L. REv. 640 (1955) [hereinafter
cited as Cross (1955)]; Cross, The Community Property Law in Washington, 49 WASH. L. Rev. 729
(1974) [hereinafter cited as Cross (1974)].
2. W. DE FUNiAK & M. VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY, ch. 4 (2d ed. 1971). See also
W. MCCLANAHAN, COMMUNrIY PROPERTY LAW IN THE UNITED STATES, ch. 2 (1982).
3. The other states are Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, and Texas.
The community property system exists in various forms in many other countries. See W. DE FUNIAK &
M. VAUGHN, supra note 2, §§ 13-18. There was a flurry of adoptions of community property laws in
other states during a decade in which income tax advantages were sought, followed by repeals when the
federal tax laws permitted splitting income by means of joint returns. Id. § 53.1.
There may be more "community property" states by reason of adoption of the Uniform Marital
Property Act proposed in 1983 by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.
Wisconsin adopted a modified version in 1984 to take effect on January 1, 1986. Brief, useful comments
can be found in W. MCCLANAHAN, supra note 2, §§ 14.4-.5 (Supp. 1984). See also Reppy, The
Uniform Marital Property Act: Some SuggestedRevisionsfor a Basically SoundAct, 21 Hous. L. Rev.
679 (1984), reprinted in 12 COMM. PRoP. J. 163 (1985); Taylor & Raabe, Wisconsin's Uniform Marital
Property Act: Community Property Moves East, 12 COMM. PRoP. J. 83 (1985) (analysis of the
Wisconsin Act).
4. See generally W. DE FUNIAK & M. VAUGHN, supra note 2, § 24, at46-47. The 1869 Washington
statute was repealed in 1871 and a marital partnership act substituted; the latter was repealed in 1873 and
five days later the 1869 act was restored. Principal modifications were made in 1879 creating the form
that remained substantially unchanged until 1972 (minor modification was made in 1881). The historical
development of Washington community property law is summarized in Hill, Early Washington Marital
Property Statutes, 14 WASH. L. REv. 118 (1939).
5. For example, Blackstone wrote in 1765 that: "By marriage, the husband and wife are one person
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property system may be regarded as a type of partnership. 6 Although
spouses in the community property system are not possessed of the rights
and liabilities of ordinary business partners, each spouse is regarded as
contributing equally to and sharing equally in the economic well-being of
the marital enterprise. 7 The fundamental principle of the community prop-
erty system is thus more in line with the principle of an Equal Rights
Amendment8 than is the "unity of husband and wife" principle of the
common law system. While the detailed operations of the rules in the
community property states before statutory changes in the seventies may
not have met an "equal rights" standard, the 1972 changes in Washington, a
purpose of which was "to establish equality between the husband and wife
in regard to their community property," 9 probably do.
Washington's present community property regime, with the majc ex-
ception of the 1972 amendments, has remained largely unchanged in its
basic structure since enactment by the territorial legislature in 1879.10 The
statutes, in two separate sections," provide that property and pecuniary
rights owned by each spouse at the time of marriage, any property there-
after acquired lucratively, 12 and the rents, issues, and profits therefrom
constitute separate property. All property acquired after marriage that is
not separate property is community property. 13
in law; that is, the very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage, or at
least is incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband .. " I W. BLACKSTONE, COMMNIEN-
TARIES *442 (citation omitted). See generally W. DE FUNIAK & M. VAUGHN, supra note 2, § I. 2.
6. See W. DE FUNIAK & M. VAUGHN, supra note 2, § 1; W. MCCLANAHAN, supra note 2, § 2:27.
7. A leading commentator writes:
Equality is the cardinal precept of the community property system. At the foundation of this
concept is the principle that all wealth acquired by the joint efforts of the husband and wife shall be
common property; the theory of the law being that, with respect to marital property acquisitions,
the marriage is a community of which each spouse is a member, equally contributing by his or her
industry to its prosperity, and possessing an equal right to succeed to the property after its
dissolution.
W. DE FUNIAK & M. VAUGHN, supra note 2, § 1, at 2-3.
8. The equality requirement exists locally through WASH. CONST. art. XXXI, 99 1, 2 (adopted in
the November 1972 election as Amend. 61):
§ I Equality of rights and responsibility under the law shall not be denied or abridged on account of
sex.
§ 2 The Legislature shall have the power to enforce by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this
article.
Articles on the impact of the then proposed federal equal rights amendment on community property
jurisdictions are cited in Cross (1974), supra note I, at 734 n.10.
9. Cross, Equality for Spouses in Washington Community Property Law-1972 Statutory
Changes, 48 WASH. L. REV. 527, 531 (1973). The amendments appear at Act of Feb. 23, 1972, ch. 108,
1972 Wash. Laws 2d Ex. Sess. 244.
10. See generally Hill, supra note 4.
11. WASH. REV. CODE§§ 26.16.010, .020 (1983).
12. See infra note 70.
13. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.030 (1983).
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Under the 1972 changes each spouse has equal management power over
the community property. Each spouse has a general inter vivos power to
dispose of the community personal property,14 but neither alone can
acquire, convey, or encumber community real property, 15 convey or en-
cumber community household goods,16 or purchase or transfer community
business assets in some situations. 17 Each spouse may devise or bequeath
his or her half of the community property 8 and may deal in all respects with
his or her separate property as if unmarried. 19
The statutory skeleton outlined above is supplemented, of course, by a
large body of case law that interprets and fills in the lacunae between these
statutes. Before launching into the body of this article, the author feels
obligated to comment generally on several themes underlying the develop-
ment of this case law. One rather constant theme is the solicitude with
which the Washington court has viewed the community property position,
manifested in various rules and presumptions: acquisitions by a spouse are
presumptively community property; separate property commingled with
community property becomes community property by operation of law;
obligations incurred by a spouse are presumptively community in
character; separate property agreements between spouses must be estab-
lished by a higher standard of proof than that required to establish com-
munity property agreements, and so forth. Another theme, or perhaps more
of an observation, is the relative independence and self-reliance of the
Washington court in generating this body of case law. Only infrequently
has the Washington court relied upon or even cited precedents from other
community property jurisdictions. This inbreeding may help to account for
the relative stability which Washington's community property system has
enjoyed. However, in the last ten years there have been a number of
instances in which a "community property" preference has been given less
weight, as the discussion hereafter will reveal. 20
II. THE NECESSARY RELATIONSHIP
The Washington Supreme Court has said that for an asset to be com-
munity property it is first necessary that a lawful marital relationship exist
14. Id. But neither spouse can make a gift of community property, personal or real, without the
express or implied consent of the other. Id. § 26.16.030(2).
15. Id. § 26.16.030(3), (4).
16. Id. § 26.16.030(5). Or mobile homes, under a 1981 amendment.
17. Id. § 26.16.030(6). See infra notes 315-417 and accompanying text (Parts IV.A, B).
18. WASH. REv. CODE § 26.16.030(l) (1983).
19. Id. §§ 26.16.010,.020.
20. See, e.g., infra notes 249-59, 667-708 and accompanying text.
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between the owners. 21 This proposition is inherent in section 26.16.030 of
the Revised Code of Washington, which defines community property.22
The validity of the marriage is determined by the law of the jurisdiction
where the marriage occurred. 23 Thus, while Washington law does not
recognize a common law marriage, such a marriage validly established in
another jurisdiction is recognized in Washington as creating the necessary
marital relation. 24
The division of property acquired during cohabitation of a man and
woman who are not validly married, either under Washington law or the
law of another jurisdiction, raises special problems.25 Such property is not
community property, but nonetheless it frequently would be inequitable to
deny that both parties to the relationship may possess interests in their
acquisitions. Although some community property jurisdictions solve such
problems by means of a "putative marriage" doctrine, 26 Washington does
not. Under existing Washington rules, the nonacquiring or nontitle-holding
party to an innocent or to a meretricious relationship may be able to assert
an interest in the acquisitions of the other.
Recently, the court has made a substantial change in its analysis of the
property rights of unmarried persons living together in a "meretricious"
relationship, as is discussed below, 27 but it is probable that some of the
situations previously involved will still be resolved as they were before the
change. Therefore, attention is paid to the distinction drawn by the court
between innocent and meretricious relationship cases.
21. Poole v. Schrichte, 39 Wn. 2d 558,236 P.2d 1044(1951);In re Estate ofSloan, 50 Wash. 86,96
P. 684 (1908).
22. The source, Spanish law, is the same. W. DE FUNIAK & M. VAUGHN, supra note 2, § 55, at 94.
23. See generally H. CLARK, LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS 55-57 (1968); H. GOODRICH & E.
SCALES, CONFLICT OF LAWS 380 (1962); R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW §§ 220-21 (1968); R.
WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 168-70 (1971); Taintor, Marriage in the Conflict
of Laivs, 9 VAND. L. REV. 607 (1956).
24. See State ex rel. Smith v. Superior Court, 23 Wn. 2d 357, 161 P.2d 188 (1945); Stans v. Baitey,
9 Wash. 115, 37 P. 316 (1894).
25. Cohabitation contemplates a relationship continuing over a period of time and not a short term
"affair." See, e.g., Creasman v. Boyle, 31 Wn. 2d 345, 196 P.2d 835 (1948), where the relationship at
issue spanned seven years.
26. See W. DE FUNIAK & M. VAUGHN, supra note 2, §§ 55-56.8. "A putative marriage... is a
marriage which is forbidden but which has been contracted in good faith and in ignorance of the
impediment on the part of at least one of the contracting parties." Id. § 56, at 96. See also H. CLARK,
supra note 23, at 52-55; W. MCCLANAHAN, supra note 2, §§ 5:7-:24 (1982 & Supp. 1984); Luther &
Luther, Support and Property Rights of the Putative Spouse, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 311 (1973); Comment,
Rights of the Putative and Meretricious Spouse in California, 50 CALIF. L. REv. 866 (1962); Comment,
The Putative Marriage Doctrine in Louisiana, 12 Loy. L. REV. 89 (1965); Comment, Right of a De
Facto Wife to Obtain a Share of Jointly Accumulated Property, 2 WILLAMETTE L.J. 207 (1962).
27. See infra notes 38-64 and accompanying text (Parts II.B, C).
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A. The Innocent Relationship
In Creasman v. Boyle28 the court defined and stated the principles
governing innocent relationships:
[E]ven though there be no lawful marriage. . . if either or both of them in
good faith enter into a marriage with the other, or with each other, and such
marriage proves to be void, a court of equity will protect the rights of the
innocent party in the property accumulated by the joint efforts of both. 29
A relationship thus may be defined as innocent if the party to be protected
believed in good faith that a valid marriage existed.
In Poole v. Schrichte,30 Mrs. Poole contended that her relationship with
Mr. Schrichte was innocent, rather than meretricious, since she believed
that a common law marriage occurred while the two lived together in
Illinois during the first seven years of their thirteen-year relationship. The
court held that sufficient evidence had been presented to support her
contention and that an innocent relationship had been established.
At issue in Poole were the rights of the parties in a tavern and in personal
property acquired in Washington where they had lived together for six years
without a formal marriage. The court found authority to divide the property
acquired during their relationship upon the following reasoning:
We agree. . . that the authority and jurisdiction of the court to divide the
property accumulated during such a relationship is in consequence of the
court's inherent equity power, and not because of the divorce statute. It is
likewise our view that the court is not limited, under an equal partnership
concept, to an even division of the property accumulated, but that the
innocent party may be awarded such proportion of the property accumulated
as would under all the circumstances be just and equitable. 31
Mrs. Poole was held to be owner of a half interest in the personal property
and was allowed $5000 for her interest in the tavern, apparently an evalua-
tion of a half interest.
Equitable division of the accumulated property between the parties to the
pseudo-marital relationship reflects the fact that in effect the innocent party
28. 31 Wn. 2d 345, 196 P.2d 835 (1948), noted in 24 WASH. L. REv. 164 (1949). The plaintiff,
Harvey Creasman, had lived meretriciously with Caroline Paul for a period of seven years until her
death. Mr. Creasman was the breadwinner, but he left the management of their financial affairs to her.
After her death, he sought to be adjudged the owner of real estate purchased with his funds. Title was
placed in Mrs. Paul's name. The court held she was the owner.
29. 31 Wn. 2d at 352, 196 P.2d at 838.
30. 39 Wn. 2d 558, 236 P.2d 1044 (1951).
31. Id. at 569, 236 P.2d at 1051. Other possibilities include application of trust principles or an
analysis on the basis of a quasi-marital partnership.
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is a tenant in common in such property with the other party, but this fact
does not necessarily establish the size of the parties' respective shares. In
other ordinary situations of multiple party acquisitions, a tenancy in
common results when property is acquired with multiple contributions,
and "courts will presume they intended to share the property, in proportion
to the amount contributed, where it can be traced, otherwise they share it
equally." 32 This presumption could furnish a controlling analogy but it is
not clear that it will or should. Under the cases, when the innocent party has
directly contributed to the acquisition of the property before the court,
apparently a precise measurement of the amount of the contribution is not
required in order to conclude that the innocent party should be awarded at
least one-half.33
Special difficulty arises, however, where the contribution of the innocent
party is indirect, for example, where one party has merely "run the home"
and has not directly furnished the consideration for the asset. That such
indirect contributions as "running the home" must be weighed in making
the property division was recognized in Knoll v. Knoll: "So long as the
parties lived together as husband and wife both labored in their respective
fields, and the property acquired during this time was the result of their
joint efforts." 34 The weight to be accorded such a contribution, however, is
unclear; is it an equal "contribution," as it would be under the community
property rules for married persons? 35
It seems reasonable to start with the assumption that a proper division of
the accumulated property would give the innocent party a half interest
without particular regard to the nature of the "contribution." The final
equitable division, however, will also reflect consideration of each party's
future needs and continuing ability for self-support. For example, in
Buckley v. Buckley, 36 where the man had deserted his wife and cohabited
with another woman, and thus could hardly be considered the innocent
party in the pseudo-marital relationship, the court said: "Bearing in mind
that appellant Buckley accumulated this property, and that he is now 66
years old, in feeble health, requiring support, medical attendance, and
32. West v. Knowles, 50 Wn. 2d 311, 313, 311 P.2d 689, 691 (1957) (citing Iredell v. Iredell. 49
Wn. 2d 627, 305 P.2d 805 (1957)).
33. See Powers v. Powers, 117 Wash. 248, 200 P. 1080 (1921) (proceeds from sale of her property
furnished part of funds to buy property awarded to her); In re Estate of Benchley, 96 Wash. 223, 164 P.
913 (1917) (woman kept boarders at a lodging house, and was a nurse and midwife; her earnings
contributed to payment of purchase obligations).
34. 104 Wash. 110, 115, 176 P. 22, 24 (1918). The case was returned to the trial court, which had
refused to rule on property rights, to permit the defendant to be heard on the question of proper
disposition of the property.
35. See supra note 7.
36. 50 Wash. 213, 96 P. 1079 (1908).
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nursing, we cannot say that the disposition of the property, as made by the
trial court, was erroneous, inequitable, or unjust. " 3 7 (Buckley received half
of all the real property accumulated during the relationship. Each of the two
women received one-fourth of the real property.)
The infirm, needy innocent party should not fare less well. There is,
however, no certainty about the factors to be considered or the weight to be
given them in the court's equitable division of the property.
B. The Meretricious Relationship
In contrast to an innocent relationship, in which at least one party
possesses a good faith belief that a valid marriage exists, a meretricious
relationship exists when both parties cohabit with knowledge that a lawful
marriage between them does not exist. 38 Prior to In re Marriage of
Lindsey39 the court treated acquisitions during a meretricious relationship
differently than those during an innocent relationship, declaring in
Creasman v. Boyle that "property acquired by a man and a woman not
married to each other, but living together as husband and wife, is not
community property, and, in the absence of some trust relation, belongs to
the one in whose name the legal title to the property stands." 40 The court
stated what became known as the Creasman presumption: "[W]e think
that, under these circumstances and in the absence of any evidence to the
contrary, it should be presumed as a matter of law that the parties intended
to dispose of the property exactly as they did dispose of it." 41
Various routes were developed to rebut the Creasman presumption 42 but
the court waited until there was the "appropriate set of circumstances" in
Marriage of Lindsey43 to abandon and explicitly overrule the presumption.
The court stated: "In its place we adopt the rule that courts must 'examine
37. Id. at 223, 96 P. at 1083.
38. See H. CLtRK, supra note 23, at 52-54; W. DE FUNIAK & M. VAUGHN, supra note 2, § 56; W.
MCCLANAHAN, supra note 2, § 5:26 (1982 & Supp. 1984); Comment, Rights of the Putative and
Meretricious Spouse in California, 50 CALIF. L. REv. 886, 873 (1962). If one was innocent, but the
other not, protection in the other's acquisitions was afforded the innocent one but not vice versa. W. DE
FUNIAK & M. VAUGHN, supra note 2, § 56, at 97. For a provocative discussion of developments in the
meretricious relationship generally, see Note, Meretricious Relationships-Property Rights: A Mer-
etricious Relationship May Create an Implied Partnership, 48 WASH. L. Rev. 635 (1973).
39. 101 Wn. 2d 299, 678 P.2d 328 (1984).
40. 31 Wn. 2d 345, 351, 196 P.2d 835, 838 (1948) (emphasis in original).
41. Id. at 356, 196 P.2d at 841 (emphasis in original). The court concluded the couple intended
Mrs. Paul to possess and own the property since title was taken in her name. Chief Justice Mallery, in
dissent, argued that it was obvious from the record that the couple intended to enjoy and possess the
property in common. Id. at 362 (Mallery, C.J., dissenting).
42. See infra notes 49-55 and accompanying text.
43. I01 Wn. 2d at 304, 678 P.2d at 331.
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the [meretricious] relationship and the property accumulations and make a
just and equitable disposition of the property.' "44
In Lindsey, rights in a barn/shop were disputed. The structure was built
prior to the marriage, while the two lived in the meretricious relationship,
on land the husband owned separately. As the barn/shop was built on land
in the husband's name, the trial court relied on the Creasman presumption
and made no evaluation of the wife's premarriage interest in the barn/shop
(and the proceeds from the insurance on the building). Apparently, only
community property was divided. The case was remanded for the trial court
to determine under the "just and equitable" approach whatever property
interest the wife might have in the barn/shop. Thereupon the trial court
directed the husband to pay the wife $1200, calculated at $6.00 an hour for
her work in building, but did not award her any share in the proceeds of the
insurance on the building.45
The abandonment of the Creasman presumption is welcome. The adop-
tion of a rule requiring a just and equitable disposition suggests application
of the approach used in marriage dissolution cases; the trial court's deter-
mination on remand seems to require some sort of durable relationship
before any equity arises in the nontitled partner,46 even though the supreme
court specifically indicated that a family-type relationship was not re-
quired. 47 Although their relationship did develop into a "permanent" one
by the subsequent marriage, apparently it did not start with any such
mutual intention. Suppose there had never been a marriage but the co-
habitation had continued for several years. 48 At what point in time, if ever,
would there be some sharing in the accumulations? It may be that unless
there is proof of an intention to have a long-lasting relationship the sharing
under a just and equitable disposition will only occur if a family-type
relationship can be inferred from a long-continued cohabitation. Even so,
as Lindsey implies, it may be that there will be no automatic "relation
back" to the beginning of the cohabitation to create a sharing of rights in
any acquisitions.
The above discussion suggests that although Creasman no longer gives
us the starting point, the cases in which the Creasman presumption was
found to have been rebutted have continuing importance because in them
the court essentially gave relief on equitable grounds, and that now in
similar situations a comparable result ought to be reached. Thus the
44. Id. (quoting Latham v. Hennessey, 87 Wn. 2d 550, 554, 554 P.2d 1057, 1059 (1976)).
45. Seattle Times/Post Intelligencer, Nov. 18, 1984, at C15, col. 1.
46. Letter from Douglass A. North, counsel for the wife, to author (May 3, 1985) (copy on file with
the Washington Law Review) also reflects this appraisal.
47. Lindsey, 101 Wn. 2d at 305, 678 P.2d at 331.
48. In Lindsey, the cohabitation began in 1974, they married in 1976, and divorced in 1982.
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cohabitor who does not have legal ownership should share if the property
was acquired through a joint venture 49 or an implied partnership, 50 and
should be permitted to show a right either on a resulting51 or constructive52
trust basis. In addition, through tracing 53 it should be possible to show a
tenancy in common property relationship. 54
In a special concurring opinion to West v. Knowles, Judge Finley urged
that a fair and equitable distribution of property should be made:
A fair and equitable distribution of property does not imply an accounting
operation with the precision and delicacy of a surgeon's scalpel. It merely
connotes a reasonable and rough approximation and appraisal of earnings and
other factors, and a division of property that will in a general way be
reasonable, fair, and equitable by the standards of just, tolerant, and under-
standing individuals. 55
This and other passages in the cases rebutting the Creasman presumption
suggested there might be three standards for disposition of property ac-
quired by unmarried persons living together: (1) a refined protection of the
equities for the innocent relationship cases; (2) a rough, equitable measure-
ment in the meretricious relationship intended to be a stable, continuing
"family-type" arrangement; and (3) no sharing merely by reason of a short
term meretricious relationship not intended to be a stable continuing
relationship.
C. Meretricious and Innocent Relationships After Marriage of Lindsey
There is nothing to suggest that there will or should be any change in the
innocent relationship situations. While the court has expressly denied that
the divorce statute controlled in these situations,56 there probably is guid-
ance to be found in the cases of property disposition under the current
marriage dissolution law which directs "such disposition . . . as shall
appear just and equitable after considering all relevant factors." 57
The meretricious relationships may still pose problems, particularly
whether there must be something more in the relationship than mere
49. Poole v. Schrichte, 39 Wn. 2d 558, 236 P.2d 1044 (1951).
50. In re Estate of Thornton, 81 Wn. 2d 72,499 P.2d 864 (1972), noted in Note, supra note 38; see
also Comment, The Meretricious Relationship in Washington: A Survivor's Interest in Common
Property, 9 WnIAmE= L.J. 102 (1973).
51. Walberg v. Mattson, 38 Wn. 2d 808, 232 P.2d 827 (1951).
52. Omer v. Omer, 11 Wn. App. 386, 523 P.2d 957 (1974).
53. West v. Knowles, 50 Wn. 2d 311, 311 P.2d 689 (1957).
54. Shull v. Shepherd, 63 Wn. 2d 503,387 P.2d 767 (1963); Iredell v. Iredell, 49 Wn. 2d 627,305
P.2d 805 (1957); Hynes v. Hynes, 28 Wn. 2d 660, 184 P.2d 68 (1947).
55. 50Wn. 2d at 321, 311 P.2d at 695 (Finley, J., concurring).
56. Poole, 39 Wn. 2d 558, 236 P.2d 1044.
57. WASH. REv. CODE § 26.09.080 (1983).
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cohabitation. If there must be more, there would appear to be the three
types of relationships between unmarried persons living together men-
tioned above. The trial court in In re Marriage of Lindsey did not award the
wife any share in the improvement made on the husband's separate prop-
erty prior to the marriage, apparently because the relationship was too
casual. 58 This suggests that in order to invoke the equities, there would
need to be proof of some intention (at the time of the acquisition) to have a
more durable arrangement, even though the relationship subsequently
became "durable" or of a family type, as reflected in the subsequent
marriage. 59
On the other hand, it would be an easier rule to apply if the factual
situation of Lindsey were held to be enough to necessitate an equitable
division. The "relation back" quality of this approach would provide a
certain simplicity and the risk of an unreasonable result is minimized by the
court's unquestioned power to award the property in the marriage dissolu-
tion action. In those situations in which there is no marriage, it seems to this
writer that the conduct of the parties during the relationship and its duration
would be essential elements in the reasoning, which comes close to
requiring a family-type relationship before any equities would arise against
the legal owner.
If the controversy is between the parties at the end of the relationship,
there would be testimony from both that should indicate whether there
should be a sharing. If the controversy arises after the death of one, the
matter may be more difficult, 60 but if in fact there was a family-type
relationship, sharing should follow. No sharing should result, however, if
there was an adequate showing that a different result was in fact intended by
the parties, as in Latham v. Hennessey.61
58. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
59. In a factual situation as to time of acquisition much like that in Lindsey, the trial court found
there was a long term, stable relationship from the outset which preceded the acquisition of the
property, and that the Creasman presumption had been rebutted. It held that there was co-ownership of
the property. The court of appeals affirmed, noting that it was not necessary to decide whether Lindsey
should be applied retroactively. In re Marriage of Hilt, 41 Wn. App. 434, 704 P.2d 672 (1985).
60. Warden v. Warden, 36 Wn. App. 693, 676 P.2d 1037, review denied, 101 Wn. 2d 1016 (1984).
The court of appeals approved the trial court's division in a manner which was "just and equitable after
considering all relevant factors" and stated, "We believe the time has come for the provisions of RCW
26.09.080 to govern the disposition of the property acquired by a man and a woman who have lived
together and established a relationship which is tantamount to a marital family except for a legal
marriage." Id. at 698, 676 P.2d at 1039. A narrow reading of this proposition would not answer the
division problems for a survivor after the death of one cohabitor, or the problems arising in situations
other than a breakup of the relationship between the two persons. A better reading is that the statute
furnishes an analogy which can be applied in the death or other situations. This approach is, in the
author's opinion, the one likely to be used.
61. 87 Wn. 2d 550, 554 P.2d 1057 (1976).
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Under the Lindsey rule a different result (favorable to the surviving
woman) would have been reached in West v. Knowles.62 The same is
probably true for In re Estate of Thornton,63 which involved active par-
ticipation by the surviving woman in the development of a ranching
enterprise to which the decedent had held title.
The Washington courts have not yet presented information for related
areas not involving property claims of the cohabitants. Some are explored
by McClanahan in his treatise.64
III. CHARACTER OF OWNERSHIP OF PROPERTY
A. Statutory Scheme and Basic Presumptions
As noted previously in the introduction, the statutory scheme controlling
the character of ownership of property acquired by either or both spouses
has remained unchanged since territorial days. "Property and pecuniary
rights" owned by either spouse at marriage, or thereafter lucratively
acquired, and the rents, issues and profits thereof constitute separate
property of that spouse.65 All assets otherwise acquired after marriage by
either or both spouses are community property.66 In ascertaining whether
assets fall within the separate or community property section of the stat-
utes, the Washington court frequently has emphasized the rule that the facts
existing at the time of acquisition control: "[The status of property...
becomes fixed as of the date of its purchase or acquisition; and . . . the
status, when once fixed, retains its character until changed by agreement of
the parties or operation of law." 67
The fundamental premise of the community property system is that both
spouses contribute to property acquisitions in a joint effort to promote the
welfare of the relationship. 68 Hence, an asset onerously 69 acquired during
62. 50 Wn. 2d 311,311 P.2d 689.
63. 81 Wn. 2d 72, 499 P.2d 864 (1972). The Lindsey rule probably would have changed the result in
Thornton, even though on remand the trial court concluded, and the court of appeals affirmed, that the
woman was an employee rather than a partner in the ranching enterprise. In re Estate of Thornton, 14
Wn. App. 397, 541 P.2d 1243 (1975), review denied, 86 Wn. 2d 1009 (1976).
64. See W. MCCLANAHAN, supra note 2, § 5:24 (wrongful death, workers' compensation, etc.);
id. § 5:27 (1982 & Supp. 1984) (loss of consortium et al.).
65. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 26.16.010, .020 (1983).
66. Id. § 26.16.030. The extensive changes in this section in 1972 affect management and
disposition but not the character of ownership of community property.
67. In re Estate of Binge, 5 Wn. 2d 446, 484, 105 P.2d 689, 705 (1940); see also In re Estate of
Madsen, 48 Wn. 2d 675, 296 P.2d 518 (1956).
68. Togliatti v. Robertson, 29 Wn. 2d 844, 852, 190 P.2d 575, 578 (1948).
69. Onerous acquisition is by labor or industry or other valuable consideration. W. DE FuNAK &
M. VAUGHN, supra note 2, § 62.
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marriage is presumptively community property whereas one lucratively 70
acquired ordinarily is not. The Washington court's preference for com-
munity property is clear, however, and this preference permeated the
court's basic statutory analysis that property acquired by a spouse is
community property unless the transaction falls within a separate property
section. 71 Recently the court has retreated from this "wastebasket" 72
definition to emphasize the factor of onerousness, holding that a fortuitious
acquisition through tortious personal injury can be separate property. 73
1. The Basic Presumption
In Yesler v. Hochstettler,74 the Washington court stated the basic pre-
sumption that an asset acquired during marriage is community property
and, if the transaction indicates a valuable consideration was paid, the
presumption can be overcome only by clear and convincing proof that the
transaction falls within the scope of a separate property section. If nothing
indicates the circumstances of an acquisition during marriage or whether a
valuable consideration was paid, the basic presumption may not be so
strong, but practically speaking, at least a recited valuable consideration
can be shown in most instances. Even if one cannot be shown, the Yesler
proposition that the basic presumption can be weighed against and will
control over doubtful proof that the transaction falls within the separate
property section probably means that to prevail the separate property
proponent's proof must be persuasive, not merely plausible.
Application of the basic presumption that assets acquired during mar-
riage are community property assumes the existence of the marital rela-
tionship at the time of acquisition, and, if that assumption is challenged, the
fact of marriage must be established. 75 Probably in most contested situa-
tions the relationship is shown by testimony or documentary evidence of
70. Lucrative acquisition is by gift, succession, inheritance, or other nonvaluable means. See W.
DE FUNIAK & M. VAUGHN, supra note 2, § 62. Gift, inheritance, devise and bequest involve lucrative
(donative) acquisitions which usually are not but may be community property. Id. A gift to both spouses
normally creates community property. See infra notes 85-97 and accompanying text (Part II.B).
71. See, e.g., Stephens v. Nelson, 37 Wn. 2d 28,221 P.2d 520(1950); In re Estate of Witte, 21 Wn.
2d 112, 150 P.2d 595 (1944); In re Estate of Slocum, 83 Wash. 158, 145 P. 204 (1915).
72. That is, the community property section or category is a wastebasket in which falls all property
not within the separate property sections.
73. In re Marriage of Brown, 100 Wn. 2d 729, 675 P.2d 1207 (1984). The case is discussed infra
notes 249-59 and accompanying text (Part III.H.J).
74. 4 Wash. 349, 30 P. 398 (1892). In the Yesler case land was acquired by ordinary deeds
expressing a valuable consideration. The court held that if proof against the presumptive community
character left the matter in doubt, the presumption controlled. This principle was applied in Woodland
Lumber Co. v. Link, 16 Wash. 72, 47 P. 222 (1896).
75. Chase v. Carney, 199 Wash. 99, 90 P.2d 286 (1939).
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marriage prior to the time of acquisition, but circumstantial evidence can
be sufficient. 76 Of course, if the acquirer was unmarried, the character of
the asset at the time of acquisition is necessarily separate.
A presumption that an assetpossessed by a married person is community
property may arise even though the particular time of acquisition has not
been established. 77 This presumption may be a reflection of the commin-
gling and tracing rules hereafter discussed which tend to induce the
conclusion that an asset in dispute is community property. This presump-
tion is unlikely to arise, or to have much strength, however, until the marital
relationship has existed for a substantial period of time.78
2. Rebutting the Basic Presumption
The basic presumption of the community character of a postnuptial
acquisition can be rebutted by evidence putting the acquisition transaction
into a separate property section (e.g., gift, bequest); it can also be rebutted
by showing, through tracing, that the asset used to acquire the one in
question was separate property. As the court has said, "Separate property
continues to be separate property through all of its changes and transitions
so long as it can be clearly traced and identified. . . . ,79 Mere assertion
that the acquisition was by use of separate funds does not overcome the
basic presumption, however; rather, there must be clear tracing of the
separate funds into the asset in controversy. 80 Placing the title in the name
of one of the spouses neither controls nor has any particular significance in
determining the character of ownership; therefore, it is of little use in
rebutting the Yesler presumption. 81 If community funds are used to pur-
chase property by the husband with title taken in the wife's name, he
76. Proff v. Maley, 14 Wn. 2d 287, 128 P.2d 330 (1942).
77. State ex rel. Marshall v. Superior Court, 119 Wash. 631, 206 P. 362 (1922) (presumption of
community property character of all assets possessed by married men supports finding they were
insolvent as regards separate liability).
78. See, e.g., In re Jolly's Estate, 196 Cal. 547, 238 P. 353 (1925); Riddle v. Riddle, 62 S.W. 970
(Tex. Civ. App. 1901). The longer the marital relationship has continued the greater the likelihood that
the time of acquisition was after marriage or that commingling has made a source asset community
property.
79. In re Estate of Witte, 21 Wn. 2d 112, 125, 150 P.2d 595, 601 (1944).
80. Hamlin v. Merlino, 44 Wn. 2d 851,272 P.2d 125 (1954); Berol v. Berol, 37 Wn. 2d 380, 223
P.2d 1055 (1950). Nor does the husband's testimony of acquisition by gift rebut the presumption, when
the deed recites valuable consideration. Abel v. Abel, 47 Wn. 2d 816, 289 P.2d 724 (1955).
81. Merritt v. Newkirk, 155 Wash. 517, 520, 285 P. 442, 444 (1930). The matter was neatly stated:
Under our somewhat perplexing statutes relating to the acquisition of property, title to real
property taken in the name of one of the spouses may be the separate property of the spouse taking
the title, the separate property of the other spouse, or the community property of both of the
spouses, owing to the source from which the fund is derived which is used in paying the purchase
price of the property.
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intending that she own separately, it may be necessary, and certainly it is
safer, that he also execute a quitclaim deed to her. 82 With the equal
management rules 83 the same possibility and problem will exist if the wife
is the actor and the husband the grantee.
Tracing to determine the character of the funds used to purchase an asset
often is necessary to establish its character. If the acquisition funds were the
earnings of a spouse, that normally would be the end of the search-the
source asset would have been identified and since earnings of spouses while
living together are community property, the acquired asset would be a
community asset. 84 However, if the acquisition funds were acquired by sale
of an asset, analysis of the ownership character of that asset would be
necessary, and so on, until a source either in a spouse's earnings or within
the separate property section is identified. Only the latter source will rebut
the basic presumption.
B. Acquisition by Gift
An acquisition by one spouse by gift, or otherwise within the separate
property section, will apparently, but not necessarily, be separate property.
The substance rather than the form of the transaction will control so that an
acquisition which appears to be lucrative can be found to be onerous. Thus
in Andrews v. Andrews85 the court concluded that a devise to the husband,
had it been made, would have been in performance of a contract to devise in
return for services to the decedent, and thus an onerous acquisition of
community property in which the wife would have an interest. The inten-
tion of the transferor is probably determinative of whether an acquisition
that in form fits within the separate property section is in fact lucrative. If a
donation is not intended, the acquisition falls within the language of the
community property section, 86 even though it might be difficult to conclude
the acquisition was "onerous." 87
82. The court indicated the statute of frauds applied in In re Estate of Parker, 115 Wash. 57, 196 P.
632 (1921). The author believes this is unsound because it jumps over the problem of the character of the
acquisition. The use of the quitclaim deed is important to change, or raise the presumption of change, to
separate ownership. In re Estate of Carmack, 133 Wash. 374, 233 P. 942 (1925).
83. See infra notes 315-469 and accompanying text (Part IV).
84. It is sometimes helpful to think of a spouse's productive or earning capacity as the basic
community property asset (it is, of course, the basic source of community property). This approach
would present a two-step rather than a one-step tracing-tracing to earnings, then to earning capac-
ity-but of course with the same result.
85. 116 Wash. 513, 199P. 981 (1921).
86. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.030 (1983).
87. See United States v. Elfer, 246 F.2d 941 (9th Cir. 1957); In re Estate of Gold, 170 Cal. 621, 151
P. 12 (1915). W. de Funiak and M. Vaughn criticize the sweeping inclusion within the community
property section as a failure to recognize that the system contemplates onerous acquisition through
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A special problem arises where a gift is not to one, but to both of the
spouses. In substance, the community property statutes establish permissi-
ble types of property ownership, rather than solely specifying particular
means by which community property may be acquired.88 Thus, despite the
language of the separate property sections, which could be interpreted to
mean that a gift to both spouses necessarily creates a separate property
ownership in each, the court in In re Estate of Salvini89 held that such a gift
creates community property in the donee spouses.
However, the sweep of the concluding statement in Salvini that "[a] gift
to a husband and wife is a gift to the community under our statutes," 90
needs clarification. This statement may announce a flat rule that when the
donees are husband and wife the asset acquired is necessarily community
property; but preferably the statement should be considered as the expres-
sion of a presumption which will control in the absence of proof of a
different intention in the donor. The donor, if he so intends, should be
permitted to create in his donees some recognized form of common law
(separate property) co-ownership. Although in Salvini both spouses were
named as grantees and were in fact identified as "husband and wife," the
presumption of a gift to the community should arise, even though the
transfer instrument does not indicate the marital relationship of the donees.
Avoiding a flat rule and permitting a presumption of community property
character to arise would recognize "[t]he policy of the law. . . in favor of
community property," 91 but still permit the intention of the parties to
control.
In In re Marriage of Martin,92 the trial court divided community prop-
erty between the parties, including the home built on a lot conveyed "in
consideration of love and affection" to "Paul Logan Martin and Gloria
Martin, his wife,"' 93 and concluded the lot was the husband's separate
property. The appellate court determined the facts and the deed did not
support the conclusion, and therefore remanded for the entry of additional
findings. After reference to Salvini, the court explained:
industry, labor, or talent of the spouse(s). W. DE FUNIAK & M. VAUGHN, supra note 2, §§ 62, 76. The
statutory language does support the inclusion: "Property not acquired ... as prescribed in [the
separate property sections] acquired after marriage by either [spouse or both] is community property."
WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.030 (1983).
88. In Stockstill v. Bart, 47 F 231 (C.C.W.D. Wash. 1891), the federal court concluded the
Washington statutes had the latter effect. The Washington court rejected this view in In re Estate of
Salvini, 65 Wn. 2d 442, 397 P.2d 811 (1964).
89. 65 Wn. 2d 442, 397 P.2d 811 (1964). The Spanish law is the same. W. DE FutnIAK & M.
VAUGHN, supra note 2, § 69.
90. 65 Wn. 2d at 448, 397 P.2d at 814.
91. Id. (quoting Volz v. Zang, 113 Wash. 378, 383, 194 P. 409, 410 (1920)).
92. 32 Wn. App. 92, 645 P.2d 1148 (1982).
93. Id. at 94, 645 P.2d at 1149.
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We agree that a gift to a married couple should only be presumed to be
community property. The presumption is a rebuttable one. We hold that clear
and convincing evidence that the property is separate is required to overcome
the presumption that it is community in character. On remand for the entry of
findings, the trial court should be careful to distinguish whether Mr. Martin's
mother and stepfather intended at the time the gift was given by transfer of the
deed (1) to convey the land to him as his separate property or (2) to convey the
land to both spouses, but on the unstated condition, expectation, or desire that
the parties would remain married or (3) to convey the land to both as
community property outright. Further, on remand for the entry of additional
and consistent findings, the trial court should consider that in order for a gift
to be found, there must exist (1) an intention on the part of the donor presently
to give, (2) a subject matter capable of passing by delivery, and (3) an actual
delivery. An executed gift becomes effective and irrevocable upon delivery
and divests the donor of all present control. If the court finds that the parents
intended to convey the land to both spouses, the land must be characterized as
a community asset. Including both Paul and Gloria on the deed and the
stepfather's testimony lend support to the second or the third proposition. 94
At first blush the direction to consider three possible variations of the
donors' intent seems unusual, but it may be prompted by the proposition
that the location of the title does not necessarily control the character of
ownership, 95 and the discretion that the dissolution court has to consider
the circumstances surrounding the acquisition, even conceding the com-
munity character of the asset at the time of the action. 96 If the land became
the community property of the two "outright," there would appear to be no
purpose to seek additional information on the origin of the acquisition.
Another gift transaction should be mentioned. When one spouse uses
separate property to acquire an asset, title to which is taken in the name of
the other spouse, there is under Washington law a rebuttable presumption
of gift.97
C. Acquisition While Living Separate and Apart: Marriages That Are
No Longer Accompanied by Community Relationships
As previously discussed, the existence of the marital relationship is
prerequisite to a finding that an acquisition is community property, and an
94. Id. at 96, 645 P.2d at 1150 (emphasis in original; footnote and citations omitted).
95. See supra notes 79-84 and accompanying text (Part III.A.2).
96. See infra notes 541-49 and accompanying text (Part V.D).
97. Scott v. Currie, 7 Wn. 2d 301, 109 P.2d 529 (1941) (husband bought with separate funds, took
title in wife's name; presumption not rebutted, she owned as her separate estate); Plath v. Mullins, 87
Wash. 403, 151 P. 811 (1915) (presumption of gift by wife not overcome); Denny v. Schwabacher, 54
Wash. 689, 104 P. 137 (1909) (presumption of gift by wife found rebutted; husband held under resulting
trust for wife).
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asset acquired onerously during the marital relationship will ordinarily be
presumed to be community property. Such an acquisition may be found to
be the separate property of the acquirer, however, by reason of the "living
separate and apart" provisions of section 26.16.140 of the Revised Code of
Washington. 98 Prior to the 1972 amendments, that section provided only
that the wife's earnings and accumulations while "living separate from her
husband" were her separate property.99 However, the case law had de-
veloped the requirement that a community relationship-as distinguished
from merely a marital relationshipl°--exist between the husband and wife
to establish his onerous acquisitions to be community property. The prin-
cipal case enunciating this proposition is Togliatti v. Robertson, 101 in which
savings bonds acquired by the husband, after a long separation during
which neither spouse relied on the efforts of the other, were found to be his
separate property. The court's conclusion was reached on the dual bases
that (1) neither spouse had contributed to the acquisitions of the other,
contrary to the fundamental theory of community property, and that (2) a
separate property agreement could be inferred from their conduct during
the long and permanent separation. 102 The Togliatti rules apply only to a
"defunct marriage" and not merely to a physical separation of the spouses,
however, as the court explained in Rustad v. Rustad,103 which held that
acquisitions by the husband during the long separation of the spouses by
reason of the wife's confinement in a mental institution outside of Washing-
ton were community property. 0 4
Whether the inclusion of the husband in the 1972 amendments to section
26.16.140 is essentially a codification of the Togliatti rules or whether it
effects a change from them to a different pattern previously limited to the
wife's acquisitions is uncertain. Unquestionably both spouses should have
98. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.140 (1983) states:
When a husband and wife are living separate and apart, their respective earnings and accumula-
tions shall be the separate property of each. The earnings and accumulations of minor children
shall be the separate property of the spouse who has their custody or, if no custody award has been
made, then the separate property of the spouse with whom said children are living.
99. Plus, of course, those of minor children living with her. See id. (1958), amended by Act of Feb.
23, 1972, ch. 108, § 5, 1972 Wash. Laws 2d Ex. Sess. 244, 246.
100. Existence of the marital relationship depends upon the legal requirements for marriage.
Existence of the community relationship depends upon facts in addition to the marriage.
101. 29 Wn. 2d 844, 190 P.2d 575 (1948).
102. The first rationale was applied in In re Estate of Armstrong, 33 Wn. 2d 118, 204 P.2d 500
(1949), and the second in In re Estate of Janssen, 56 Wn. 2d 150, 351 P.2d 510 (1960).
103. 61 Wn. 2d 176, 377 P.2d 414 (1963).
104. Mere physical separation similarly does not terminate the "family" relationship necessary to
the three-way liability of the family expense statute, WASH. REv. CoDE § 26.16.205 (1983). See, e.g.,
Russell v. Graumann, 40 Wash. 667, 82 P. 998 (1905) (husband worked in Spokane for three years prior
to his death there while wife continued to reside in Pennsylvania). Contrast Yates v. Dohring, 24 Wn. 2d
877, 168 P.2d 404 (1946).
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identical positions, not only by reason of the new phraseology of the
section, but also because of the thrust of the 1972 amendments for equality
between the spouses. 105 The problem, however, is to identify that position.
Nothing in earlier Washington cases establishes the content of the
"living separate" language of the pre-1972 statute, but "living separate and
apart" in the amended version obviously should have the same meaning. In
Kerr v. Cochran10 6 the defendant wife testified she was living separate and
apart from her husband; the court said mere separation would not dissolve
the community, and that:
The statute merely states that the earnings of the wife are her separate
property while she is living separate and apart from her husband. It has no
effect on the status of property acquired prior to the separation, nor does it
dissolve the marital community. The statute operates while the spouses are
living separate and apart, and is effective regardless of whether there has been
a dissolution of the community. 107
It is unclear whether the court in that case made the distinction between
continued existence of a marital relationship and termination of a "com-
munity relationship" as we have used that term above.108
The preferable analysis of "living separate and apart" is that the statute
contemplates a permanent separation, which may be established by factual
patterns such as those existing in the Togliatti line of "defunct marriage"
cases. Permanent separation, in essence, exists when both spouses no
longer have the will to continue a "community relationship. "10 9 A deserted
spouse who desires that the relationship continue despite desertion or
abandonment by the other-a frustration of the deserted spouse's com-
munity expectations-should remain protected by the community property
rules and should be able to assert an interest in the deserting spouse's after-
acquired property. In no event, however, should the deserting spouse be
105. See Cross, 1972 Amendments to the Washington Community Property Law, 26 WASH. ST. B.
NEWS, Apr. 1972, at 9.
106. 65 Wn. 2d 211, 396 P.2d 642 (1964).
107. Id. at 225,396 P.2d at 650 (emphasis added). This last sentence does indicate mere separation
brings the statute into play even though there is not a "defunct marriage." Note, however, the
proposition is not essential to the holding of no community liability. Similarly, the statement in Rustad
that the spouses were living separate and apart (she being confined in an out-of-state mental hospital)
does not compel a determination that mere physical separation, even though long continued, brings the
statute3 into operation. See also Oil Heat Co. v. Sweeney, 26 Wn. App. 351, 613 P.2d 169 (1980), in
which husband's contract created community liability even though he was home only infrequently and
there was no normal marital relationship; there was no clear and convincing evidence that they were
living separate and apart or that the marriage was then defunct, although he later disappeared.
108. The holding in the case, however, is that the plaintiff in the tort action had failed to prove that
defendant wife had incurred any community liability on any possible theory.
109. In Peters v. Skalman, 27 Wn. App. 247, 617 P.2d 448 (1980), the permanent separation and
defunct marriage situation was adequately shown so that husband could adversely possess against wife.
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able to assert an interest in the deserted spouse's after-acquired property. 110
This approach accords with the Spanish rules.111 There is also support for
this approach both in the rule that the husband loses his managing power
upon his abandonment of the wife, 112 and in the inference in Hicks v.
Hicks'"3 that the deserting husband's acquisitions subsequent to separation
but prior to his divorce are community property to be divided between him
and his former wife. When the deserted spouse accepts the futility of hope
for restoration of a normal relationship, the marriage should be considered
"defunct" or the separation permanent so that the statute applies. 114 Find-
ing the statute applicable when the deserted spouse accepts, or perhaps just
acquiesces, in the separation seems to be in philosophical harmony with
the dissolution of marriage act;115 to dissolve a marriage the act does not
require affirmative concurrence in the other spouse's allegation that the
marriage is "irretrievably broken," but only that the spouse does not deny
the allegation. 116 A decree of separate maintenance likewise should invoke
the "living separate and apart" language of section 26.16.140.117
D. Acquisitions From or Through the Federal Government
If a particular asset is acquired from or through the federal government,
federal law may intervene and control by virtue of the supremacy clause of
the federal Constitution,"18 effecting a result contrary to that dictated by
ordinary community property rules. If the source of the acquisition is
community property funds or the labor of a spouse, the ordinary rule would
establish the community character of the asset, and the dispositive and
succession rights to the asset would be controlled by local law.
110. This analysis is more fully explored in Cross, supra note 9, at 531-33.
111. W. DE FUNIAK & M. VAUGHN, supra note 2, § 57. The problem not having been resolved in
Washington, the Spanish law should be persuasive. See In re Estate of Salvini, 65 Wn. 2d 442,397 P.2d
811 (1964); see also G. McKAY, COMMUNITY PROPERTY § 299 (2d ed. 1925).
112. Wampler v. Beinert, 125 Wash. 494, 216 P. 855 (1923).
113. 69 Wash. 627, 125 P. 945 (1912).
114. This should be established by the deserting spouse and not be merely a matter of elapsed time.
Cf Johnson v. Department of Labor & Indus., 3 Wn. 2d 257, 100 P.2d 382 (1940) (separation for two
years without attempt to enforce stpport obligation is abandonment; wife abandoned for more than one
year is ineligible for benefits under the workman's compensation statute).
115. WASH. REV. CODE ch. 26.09 (1983).
116. Id. § 26.09.030(l).
117. This would be so even though the formerly limited purpose of the action for separate
maintenance did not permit the decree to fix the character of property held or which may be acquired in
the future. Cohn v. Cohn, 4 Wn. 2d 322, 103 P.2d 366 (1940). In the present separate maintenance
action the court has power to dispose of property. WASH. REv. CODE § 26.09.080 (1983).
118. U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cI. 2.
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In the early federal homestead cases, federal law controlled with whom
the federal government would deal,119 but when a patent was issued the
nature of the ownership of the land was determined by local law. 120
However, in Wissner v. Wissner121 the United States Supreme Court held
that federal law controlled the effectiveness of the beneficiary designation
of national service life insurance even though the result was contrary to
state community property law. In In re Estate of Allen, 122 the Washington
court held that ownership in United States savings bonds was determined
by state community property law; the applicable federal regulations, in the
Washington court's view, were a matter of administrative convenience only
and did not control substantive rights in the bonds. The United States
Supreme Court subsequently rejected the position of the Washington court
in Allen, and held that federal law governs substantive rights of power of
disposition of United States savings bonds. 123 The Supreme Court's inter-
ference in Yiatchos v. Yiatchos 24 with local rules also reversed the state
burden of proof in gift transactions by holding that to successfully attack
the husband's disposition of the bonds the wife must show she had not
concurred in his donative transfer. The local rule, on the other hand, puts
the burden on the proponent of a "separate" property claim when the wife
has not participated in the gift. 125
The federal intrusion through the supremacy clause into areas previously
thought to be controlled by local law expanded in marriage dissolution
cases involving retirement pay or pensions covered by federal statutes. In
Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 126 involving Railroad Retirement Act benefits,
119. G. MCKAY, supra note 111, §§ 547-49, at 555-57, explained the result on the basis of a
federally created right of survivorship.
120. Buchser v. Buchser, 231 U.S. 157 (1913); McCune v. Essig, 199 U.S. 382 (1905). See
generally Evans, Community Property in Public Lands, 9 CALIF. L. REV. 267 (1921).
121. 338 U.S. 655 (1950). A particularly interesting reaction to this holding is Davis, The Case of
the Missing Community Property, 5 Sw. L.J. 1 (1951).
122. 54 Wn. 2d 616, 343 P.2d 867 (1959).
123. The cases are Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663 (1962) (Texas law) and Yiatchos v. Yiatchos, 376
U.S. 306 (1964). The latter reversed the Washington court's holding in In re Estate of Yiatchos, 60Wn.
2d 179, 373 P.2d 125 (1962), as to the husband's half interest and remanded for further clarification of
the Washington law on the wife's interest in community property. The court concluded it was uncertain
whether the wife's vested half interest in community property applied to all community property in the
aggregate or inhered in each item. The item theory of community property ownership is reflected in the
holdings discussed infra notes 315-417 and accompanying text (Parts IV.A, B) on transfers and infra
notes 550-672 and accompanying text (Part VIA) on availability to reach of creditors. There was no
direct holding as regards death succession prior to In re Estate of Patton, 6 Wn. App. 464,494 P.2d 238
(1972), in which the court of appeals concluded the item theory was applicable there also.
124. 376 U.S. 306 (1964).
125. See infra notes 315-469 and accompanying text (Part IV) for discussion of the transfer power.
The author has never been reconciled to the idea that a debtor (U.S.) should be able to tell a creditor
(bond holder) how the bond is owned, as distinct from with whom the debtor will deal.
126. 439 U.S. 572 (1979).
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the Court held that the California court could not divide the pension and
further, could not offset its value by awarding a larger part of community
property to the nonemployed spouse. In McCarty v. McCarty, 127 the Court
extended the reasoning of Wissner and Hisquierdo in concluding that
military retired pay could not be treated as divisible community property
by the state courts, despite a vigorous dissent. In Hisquierdo the Court had
indicated that the supremacy clause would apply only if the federal law
"positively required by direct enactment" that state law be preempted (a
mere conflict in words would not be sufficient) and state family and family
property law did "major damage" to "clear and substantial" federal
interests. 128 In McCarty the Court applied a less rigorous test, apparently
only requiring some conflict in words. This latter analysis was used in
Ridgway v. Ridgway, 129 which held that a state court could not make the
beneficiary widow hold insurance proceeds, under Servicemen's Group
Life Insurance Act, in trust for children to accomplish the purpose of an
earlier divorce decree requiring the husband to keep the children of the
earlier marriage as beneficiaries of the policy.130
The direct result of McCarty has been eliminated by the 1982 enactment
in Congress of the Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act. 131
Under 10 U.S.C. § 1408(c)(1), a court may treat nondisability military
retired pay "either as property solely of the member or as property of the
member and his spouse in accordance with the law of the jurisdiction of
such court." If the marriage had existed for at least ten years during
military service, there may be direct payment to the spouse (or former
spouse), under sections 1408(d)(1) and (2),132 but not after the death of the
member or spouse (or former spouse), under section 1408(d)(4). The
transition provisions of the law eliminate the possible retroactivity of
127. 453 U.S. 210 (1981).
128. 439 U.S. at 581 (quoting Wetmore v. Markoe, 196 U.S. 68, 77 (1904); and United States v.
Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 352 (1966)).
129. 454 U.S. 46 (1981).
130. Those, such as the author, who believe the federal law should not supplant local law any more
than necessity requires, have concern that McCarty and Ridgway have created a new standard reflecting
an increased willingness to find state domestic relations law (or other law) preempted. See Hershberger,
Federal Preemption of State Family Property Law: The Marriage of McCarty and Ridgway Has Not
Been Dissolved by Congress, 9 COMM. PROP. J. 259 (1982). Thus far, at least, the Washington court
applies the more rigorous Hisquierdo test. See Purser v. Rahm, 104 Wn. 2d 159,702 P.2d 1196 (1985)
(no preemption of Washington community law which controls what part of community income is to be
considered in determining eligibility for federal Medicaid benefits).
131. Pub. L. No. 97-252, §§ 1001-1006, 96 Stat. 730, 730-38 (1982) (codified in scattered
sections of 10 U.S.C.). The effect of the Act is illustrated by In re Marriage of Smith, 100Wn. 2d 319,
669 P.2d 448 (1983).
132. In re Marriage of Wood, 34 Wn. App. 892, 664 P.2d 1297 (1983) (indicating the contrary
clearly was a misreading of the statute); see In re Marriage of Konzen, 103 Wn. 2d 470, 693 P.2d 97,
cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 3530 (1985).
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McCarty as to decrees final before June 26, 1981, the date of the McCarty
decision, and the law is not to be interpreted as permitting reopening of
decrees which did not divide retirement pay. 133
If the federal law completely occupies the area the conflict is such that
there is no room for a contrary state rule. This is reflected in the comprehen-
sive scheme for social security benefits with provisions for former wives in
some instances as well as survivors. 134 As to a survivor's benefit acquired
through the military retirement program, provision is made for a surviving
spouse or children, and a former spouse (not the widow) cannot suc-
cessfully claim a share in the benefit. In Barros v. Barros, 135 the court of
appeals reasoned that the survivor's benefit acquired through the retirement
program is community property but by reason of the federal law only the
person designated by the retiree can have an interest. The Barros court
pointed out that the Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act
clearly so provides in 10 U.S.C. § 1448(b), and only permitted division of
retired pay to avoid the effect of McCarty.
Benefits under the Railroad Retirement Act no longer are fully con-
trolled by Hisquierdo since the 1983 amendment of 45 U.S.C. § 231m,
and are now subject to division except for that part which is a substitute for
social security benefits.
Disability benefits are not covered by the federal statute which nullified
McCarty and there continues to be a problem as to whether local law can
control. While McCarty still had force, the Washington court had con-
cluded in In re Marriage ofDessauer that rights in military retired pay were
an economic circumstance which could be considered when dividing
property in the dissolution action. 136 While the Dessauer holding was
abandoned 37 because of the change in the federal statutes pertaining to
military pensions, the Dessauer rationale was applied to railroad retire-
ment rights in In re Marriage of Roark.138 Similar reasoning could be
133. See Graham, State Marital Property Laws and Federally Created Benefits: A Conflict of Law
Analysis, 29 WAYNE L. REV. 1,48 (1982); Quirk, State CommunityPropertyLaws: Coping with Federal
Tal and Pension Laws, 19 GoNz. L. REV. 481 (1984).
134. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Hillerman, 109 Cal. App. 3d 334, 167 Cal. Rptr. 240 (1980).
135. 34 Wn. App. 266,660 P.2d 770 (1983). Somewhat similar is Estate of Hanley v. Andresen, 39
Wn. App. 377, 693 P.2d 198 (1984), in which the court held that a divorce decree clause which
purported to divest the former wife of her interest in a Federal Employees Life Insurance policy was
ineffective because the procedures for changing beneficiaries set forth in the applicable federal
regulations were the sole mode of effecting a change. Contra Barden v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 41
N.C. App. 135, 254 S.E.2d 271, cert. denied, 297 N.C. 608, 257 S.E.2d 216 (1979).
136. In re Marriage of Dessauer, 97 Wn. 2d 831, 650 P.2d 1099 (1982).
137. In re Marriage of Smith, 100 Wn. 2d 319, 669 P.2d 448 (1983).
138. 34 Wn. App. 252, 659 P.2d 1133 (1983). Roark was decided only several months before the
above-described 1983 amendment to 45 U.S.C. § 23 Im that allowed states to treat the railroad workers'
pensions as divisible community property.
Vol. 61:13, 1986
Community Property
applied to federal disability retired rights. The reasoning in Dessauer may
be unsound, however, in light of the impermissibility under Hisquierdo of
offsetting the retirement right against available community property to give
the nonemployed spouse a larger share in those other assets.
In California there is authority that military disability retired pay (al-
though separate property there and thus not in conflict with federal con-
trol), to the extent it is a substitute for longevity retired pay, may be held to
be community property. The reasoning is that there is no federal law to the
contrary and the exclusion of such income from the federal statute is
irrelevant. 139
There are, apparently, more than two dozen federal retirement sys-
tems,140 so which standard of preemption is used may be important. Rights
under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 141
may be affected but it is riot believed that a community/separate property
problem exists in this instance. 142
E. Time of Acquisition: Inception of Title or Apportionment-Fully
Financed Acquisitions (e.g., by mortgaging or using borrowed
funds), Installment Purchases, Life Insurance, Pensions, Goodwill,
and Professional Degrees
The ownership character of an asset is determined "at the time of
acquisition" which has posed no problem in cash purchases, nor in fully
financed purchases in which the legal title is transferred at the time. On the
other hand, the life insurance asset and assets acquired through payments
on an installment contract where transfer of legal title (and ownership) is
postponed have presented problems. Installment acquisitions of retirement
or pension rights have recently been before the courts and have usually been
resolved on the basis of deferred compensation, resulting in an apportion-
ment by time of the ownership rights, ignoring for the moment the federal
139. In re Marriage of Stenquist, 145 Cal. App. 3d 430, 193 Cal. Rptr. 587 (1983), cert. denied,
465 U.S. 1101 (1984);In re Marriage of Cullen, 145 Cal. App. 3d 424, 193 Cal. Rptr. 590 (1983), cert.
denied, 465 U.S. 1102 (1984). Both cases are noted in 11 COMM. PRoP. J. 63 (1984).
140. See Graham, supra note 133, at 1, 3 & n.12. See generally Schwartz & McClure, Division of
Federal Pension Benefits, It CoMM. PROP. J. 165 (1984).
141. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461(1982).
142. See CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC. COMM., WASHINGTON STATE BAR ASS'N, WASHINGTON COM-
MUNI-Y PROPERTY DESKBOOK, § 14.2 (1977) [hereinafter cited as DEsKooK]; Doyle, ERISA and the
Non-Employee Spouse's Community Interest in Retirement Pay, 4 CoMM. PROP. J. 3 (1977); Reppy,
Community and Separate Interests in Pensions and Social Security Benefits after Marriage of Brown
and ERISA, 25 UCLA L. REv. 417 (1978); Note, ERISA Preemption of Community Property Law, 55
WASH. L. REv. 443 (1980).
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supremacy problems discussed above in Part III.D.143 Professional good-
will and the professional degree, both developed or acquired over a period
of time, have also been recently analyzed.
1. Mortgages
In a mortgage financing situation, 144 where the buyer acquires legal title
at the outset in exchange for a cash payment and an obligation to pay the
remainder of the purchase price, the fractional share of the ownership
represented by the cash payment will be owned as the cash was owned, 145
and the character of ownership of the balance will be determined by the
character of the credit pledged to secure the funds to pay the seller or to
secure payment to the seller.146 It does not matter that funds of a different
character are subsequently used to pay the obligation; 147 the character of
the asset is determined by the character of the cash and of the obligation at
the time legal title (and ownership) is obtained. In three factual situations,
however, difficulty arises in ascertaining, as between husband and wife, the
character of the obligation and thus of the credit acquisition.
If legal title is secured by partial payment without any personal obliga-
tion to pay the remainder of the purchase price, for example, when taking
title subject to a mortgage, the basic community or separate property
presumptions will clearly apply as to that fraction for which payment then
has been made. However, the effect of payment for the fraction represented
by the unassumed mortgage debt with funds not having the same character
as the presumption is unclear. 148
143. See supra notes 118-42 and accompanying text.
144. Financing through a deed of trust should be similarly treated.
145. Ownership of the cash is determined by application of the source doctrine, i.e., by tracing to
the original source.
146. See, e.g., In re Estate of Dougherty, 27 Wn. 2d 11, 176 P.2d 335 (1947). See infra notes
550-761 and accompanying text (Part VI) for further discussion of the character of obligation question.
There has long been a presumption that the husband's contract obligation is community in character.
See Bryant v. Stetson & Post Mill Co., 13 Wash. 692, 43 P. 931 (1896); Oregon Improvement Co. v.
Sagmeister, 4 Wash. 710, 30 P. 1058 (1892). Under the 1972 changes the same presumption should
apply to the wife's obligation. An obligation by assuming an existing mortgage should be similarly
treated. The requirement of joinder in acquiring real estate may mean that a promissory note executed
by one spouse in the purchase of real estate will, in the absence of proof of participation by the other
spouse in the acquisition transaction, create only separate liability and therefore only separate property
in that portion. See Colorado Nat'l Bank v. Merlino, 35 Wn. App. 610, 668 P.2d 1304, review denied.
100 Wn. 2d 1032 (1983), discussed infra text accompanying note 761.
147. In re Estate of Finn, 106 Wash. 137, 179 P. 103 (1919).
148. Finn involved payment of the unassumed mortgage debt with community funds which, as the
court said, supported the presumption of the community character of that share (Dawson tract).
However, in Merkel v. Merkel, 39Wn. 2d 102,234 P.2d 857 (1951), land conveyed to the husband prior
to his marriage, subject to a mortgage, was held to be his separate property though the mortgage debt
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If the security given for the obligation is the asset acquired and the
credit's character is uncertain, it may be difficult to avoid a result based
upon the basic community property presumption. In Walker v. Fowler, 149
the court held the wife owned a quarter of the land in question separately
because she had used her separate funds to pay that portion of the purchase
price, but the balance was owned as community property because there was
nothing to overcome a presumption that it was acquired by use of com-
munity credit.150 If the asset acquired is income producing and in fact
produces the funds to discharge the acquisition obligation, it is arguable
that the character of the funds used to make the initial payment ought to
control the character of the obligation and hence the ownership as between
the spouses. There is some support for this argument in the proposition that
similar funds, if available, are presumed to have been used to pay similar
obligations; for example, separate funds pay separate obligations. 151
There is nothing in the Washington cases that indicates clearly that the
expectation of the creditor is controlling on the question of the community
or separate character of the funds or other asset acquired on credit. An
intra-family loan (e.g., parent to child) might indicate that only separate
credit was extended if no family or community purpose was advanced.152
Also, it would not be unreasonable to permit the separate claimant to
prevail by showing a pattern of investing or borrowing and the existence of
was discharged with community funds. The community interest was protected by an equitable lien but
was not an ownership share. See infra notes 269-314 and accompanying text (Part 111.1) for discussion
of the equitable lien right. If the unassumed debt is paid with funds of the same character as the down
payment, the asset should have that character entirely.
149. 155 Wash. 631, 285 P. 649 (1930).
150. Even though part of the debt was subsequently paid by use of the wife's separate funds, the
community creditor was able to reach the three-quarters community property ownership. Both spouses
were bound on the note and mortgage. Note that under the 1972 changes the act of either spouse will be
presumptively community in character, unless, of course, the statute requires joinder of both.
151. See, e.g., Guye v. Guye, 63 Wash. 340, 352, 115 P. 731, 735 (1911). The argument is
obviously circular, the character of the credit is determined by the character of the security given which
is determined by the character of the credit by which the asset (used as security) is acquired. This may
mean that the presumption of community credit must prevail when there are no other available facts to
consider.
152. The closest to a test is the statement by Judge Horowitz in National Bank of Commerce v.
Green:
The "acid test" for determining whether the obligation or liability is separate or community in
nature is the purpose for which the note is executed. If the note is executed for the benefit of the
marital community, the presumption of community obligation is not overcome. Thus money
borrowed to pay off a community debt or to acquire a community asset is for a community purpose.
If the debt is separate in character, the note is collectible only out of separate property. The wife's
signature presumptively does not create a community obligation and hence such a signature is not
necessary to the creation of a community obligation. The husband's act or signature is enough. The
purpose or proposed benefit may be evidenced by the community or separate uses to which the
proceeds of a note or other obligation are put.
I Wn. App. 713, 717, 463 P.2d 187, 190 (1969) (citations omitted).
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sufficient separate assets to support the credit extended even though none
were used directly as security. Commingling of community skill and
separate credit or the possibility of an inadequacy in "paying" for the
community contribution, however, militates against finding that the com-
munity presumption has been overcome.
As between the husband and wife, the controlling character of the
obligation to pay the balance of the purchase price is not necessarily
determined by the extent to which the creditor could enforce payment. The
obligation may be separate primarily because one of the spouses provided
his or her separate property as security even though it could be enforced
against either spouse or the community property. For example, in In re
Estate of Finn,153 the wife's obligation, secured by a mortgage on other
separate property of the wife, involved her separate credit and was the
character-controlling obligation even though the husband (and thereby
presumptively the community) was also bound by his signature on the note,
the husband apparently having signed at the insistence of the creditor. 154 As
between the spouses a primary-secondary debtor's relationship may be
established that is relevant to the determination of the character of the credit
used in acquisition, without necessarily creating a principal-surety rela-
tionship affecting the creditor. Query whether the assertion by the claiming
spouse, without at least some corroborative evidence, is or should be
enough.
Since knowledgeable creditors are unlikely to accept a transaction that
clearly creates only a separate liability, it may be impractical to attempt to
characterize a transaction by the recitals in the documents. The spouses
may have to fix the transaction's character by independent, contemporary
interspousal documents, if the separate character as between them is to be
unequivocally established.
2. Life Insurance Policies
Until the decision in Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Wadsworth, 155 the rules
with reference to the ownership of life insurance policies and their proceeds
were clear and involved only tracing to determine the character of the funds
used to pay the premiums. The previous holdings 156 prorated the ownership
and hence the proceeds according to the separate or community character
of the funds used to pay the premiums, without regard to the nature of the
153. 106 Wash. 137, 179 P. 103 (1919) (Drew tract).
154. See also Auernheimer v. Gardner, 177 Wash. 158, 31 P.2d 515 (1934), in which under similar
borrowing conditions community liability was enforced by the creditor.
155. 102 Wn. 2d 652, 689 P.2d 46 (1984).
156. This history is presented in Wadsworth.
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policy (e.g., endowment, ordinary life, group term, etc.). In Wadsworth the
court held that only the most recent premium was to be considered for a
group term policy and therefore the policy provided by the employer as a
fringe benefit of the employment was acquired by the husband's earnings
and was entirely community property of the deceased husband and his
second wife, the surviving widow, against the claim of his previous wife
that a substantial portion was separate property.157 In a sense this does not
adopt a new principle in that the tracing controls the ownership character of
the policy and its proceeds, but in Small v. Bartyzel,158 the previously
controlling case, the court had prorated the proceeds according to the
number of premiums paid before the marriage (separate) and those paid
during the marriage (community). The explanation lies in the adoption by
the Wadsworth court of the "risk payment" theory by which each premium
buys protection for a fixed period of time so that the source of ownership of
the policy (and hence, the proceeds) is the premium which paid for the
period of time during which the insured died. In its analysis the court
distinguished between the policy (i.e., the inter vivos contract right) which
could be community property, and the proceeds which result from perfor-
mance of the company in paying. 159
While there are many forms of life insurance, the court indicated it was
enough to recognize only two: term insurance and cash value insurance.
The court carefully limited its decision to term policies, 160 but noted that
there is argument to support applying the risk payment theory in part to
policies which also have elements in addition to the bare protection against
death of term insurance.
At the moment, then, for all term policies, whether group term or not,
apparently the risk payment theory is to be applied. For all other policies,
the rule to be applied involves prorating or apportioning according to the
separate or community character of the funds used to pay the premiums
since the inception of the life insurance contract.
The insurance, that is, the contract right reflected in the policy, is itself
an asset, not a mere expectancy, 161 and is the immediate source of proceeds
payable on the death of the insured. If there is a partial or total community
property ownership of the policy and the noninsured spouse dies, the
decedent's community property interest is necessarily owned by the dece-
dent's successors, with the consequent possibility of liability for death
157. The dispositive power of the insured is discussed infra notes 374-78 and accompanying text
(Part IV.B.1.a).
158. 27 Wn. 2d 176, 177 P.2d 391 (1947). Wadsworth expressly overrules Small.
159. The proceeds obviously are not community property because the insured spouse is dead.
160. Wadsnvorth, 102 Wn. 2d at 659 n.2, 689 P.2d at 50 n.2.
161. In re Estate of Coffey, 195 Wash. 379, 81 P.2d 283 (1938).
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succession tax. 162 Of course subsequent premium payments will reduce the
community percentage of the ownership. 163 As an asset, the policy needs to
be taken into account in marriage dissolution property arrangements. 164
3. Installment Contracts
Earlier cases involving installment purchases stated the basic rule that
the ownership is determined at the time of acquisition, but the cases were
not always consistent in identifying that time. 165 There are two principal
possibilities: 166 (1) an inception of title approach by which the time of
acquisition is at the signing of the contract (i.e., the rule in Washington for
the mortgage acquisition cases); and (2) an apportionment rule under
which the ownership is prorated between the community and separate
162. In re Estate of Leuthold, 52 Wn. 2d 299, 324 P.2d 1103 (1958). The value at death is held to be
the cash surrender value. For federal tax purposes the value is the interpolated terminal reserve plus the
unearned part of the last premium paid. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-8(a)(2), T.D. 7319, 1974-2 C.B. 297.
Absence of cash surrender value is irrelevant on the question of ownership and succession rights in the
contract right reflected in the policy itself.
163. Scott v. Commissioner, 374 .2d 154 (9th Cir. 1967).
164. See, e.g., Note, Insurance-Effect ofa Divorce Decree, 31 WASH. L. REv. 146 (1956). This is
particularly important with the new rule adopted in Wadsworth as to the continuing effect of designation
of the former spouse as beneficiary. The matter is discussed infra notes 541-49 and accompanying text
(Part V.D).
165. The cases are discussed in an earlier article, Cross (1974), supra note I, at 758-60.
166. A third possibility would be to determine ownership when legal title is transferred in
performance of the seller's obligation. Under this possibility the ownership character would be
controlled by the marital status at the time legal title is acquired. This result is wholly unsatisfactory and
totally ignores the source doctrine, but remains as a slight possibility because of the holding in In re
Estate of Kuhn, 132 Wash. 678, 233 P. 293 (1925). The land conveyed to a widower was his separate
property even though the contract to buy had been made while he was married. The result was that his
children by his deceased wife had no ownership share despite payment of a quarter of the price with
community funds. The children were protected by a right to reimbursement in the amount of one-half of
the payment made with community funds. The particular result followed from a strange proposition
then extant in the Washington cases that the purchaser of land under an executory, forfeitable contract
had no title or interest, legal or equitable. Obviously if nothing had been acquired by the time of the
mother's death there was nothing for her children to inherit; but as later recognized in Norman v.
Levenhagen, 142 Wash. 372, 253 P. 113 (1927), a contract right had been acquired and was property, the
community or separate character of which would be determined by the usual rules. See, e.g., Farrow v.
Ostrom, 16 Wn. 2d 547, 133 P.2d 974 (1943); Meltzer v. Wendell-West, 7 Wn. App. 90,497 P.2d 1348
(1972). When the contract purchaser's right has been involved the court has held it to be community
property when acquired during marriage, i.e., the contract obligation to buy has been created by the
purchaser's signing the contract, even though some separate funds were used in part payment. Farrow,
16 Wn. 2d 547, 133 P.2d 974. Similarly, the court held land deeded to the husband after separation but
before divorce was entirely community property even though he had completed the purchase by
payment of the balance of the contract price after the separation with his separate funds. Half of his
excess (separate property) contributions were charged as a lien against her half. Fritch v. Fritch, 53 Wn.
2d 496, 335 P.2d 43 (1959).
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estates according to the character of the funds used to make the successive
payments (the former life insurance rule in Washington). 167
Prior to the 1972 amendments problems were the same for real and
personal property acquisitions. There are now additional problems in real
property purchases which will be discussed later.168
The previous uncertainty as to the character of ownership of an asset
acquired through an installment purchase contract has, apparently, been
removed by the application of an inception of title concept (i.e., the
mortgage rule) in Beam v. Beam. 169 The Beam court quoted from In re
Estate of Binge170 as follows:
Property acquired through contractual obligation, as between husband and
wife. . . has its origin and is acquired as of the date when the obligation
becomes binding, and not as of the time when the money is paid or the thing is
delivered or conveyed. The fruit of the obligation is legally acquired as of the
date when the obligation becomes binding.171
In Beam, the husband and the wife had signed a contract to purchase
land. The down payment was made in part from a bank loan secured by a
pledge of the wife's separate stock. The agreement and general pledge to
the bank to secure the loan for the partial down payment was signed by both
parties, the note to the bank was signed by the husband, and an unidentified
amount of the down payment apparently came from the husband's separate
property. The husband testified that the balance of the contract was paid
with separate funds. The trial court held the land was the husband's
separate property and awarded the wife a lien because of the pledge of her
separate stock. The court of appeals concluded the holding was erroneous
and reversed.
After pointing out that previous decisions left unclear the ownership
character of such installment purchases and quoting, as above, from Binge,
the court said:
The ownership of real property becomes fixed when the obligation becomes
binding, that is, at the time of execution of the contract of purchase, and the
167. Note the change to the "risk payment" approach for term life insurance, discussed supra notes
155-64 and accompanying text (Part HI.E.2).
If funds of the same character are used to make all payments, the ownership of the asset will, by
ordinary tracing rules, be the same as that of the acquiring funds. There is a presumption that, if both
separate and community funds are available, payment of an obligation was made from the proper fund.
In re Estate of Finn, 106 Wash. 137, 179 P. 103 (1919); Guye v. Guye, 63 Wash. 340, 115 P. 731 (1911).
168. See infra notes 205-10 and accompanying text (Part ILF).
169. 18 Wn. App. 444, 569 P.2d 719 (1977), review denied, 90 Wn. 2d 1001 (1978).
170. 5 Wn. 2d 446, 105 P.2d 689 (1940).
171. Beam, 18 Wn. App. at 452-53, 569 P.2d at725 (quotingBinge, 5 Wn. 2d at 484, 105 P.2d at
705) (emphasis omitted).
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community or separate estates which subsequently make payments on the
obligation have the right of reimbursement or equitable lien. 172
The court reasoned that since there was a community obligation for the
down payment loan and, although both the husband and the wife had
contributed separately, it was impossible to distinguish or apportion the
relative amounts contributed to the down payment, the property must be
deemed community property.
The author believes the adoption of the inception of title approach (the
mortgage rule) is commendable. As was previously stated, 173 this rule has
the attractiveness of certainty and permits similar resolution of ownership
questions in credit acquisitions, rather than variations based on the par-
ticular sort of credit transactions involved. If the spouses desire a different
result, that is, an apportionment of ownership, present rules permit them to
change the character by agreement. 174
There would still remain acquisitions by a process extending over some
time which would not necessarily involve any obligation, and the question
arises whether an inception of title approach should control. An important
asset of this sort is life insurance, other than term life insurance now
governed by the risk payment theory and not involving an installment
acquisition. Since there is no obligation on the insured to continue to pay
premiums, apportioning rights in the policy according to the character of
funds used to make the "voluntary" payments is not inconsistent with a
general applicability of the "mortgage" rule. 175 In substance the "mort-
gage" rule (i.e., the inception of title concept) is that an asset acquired
through a transaction requiring the payment of installments over a period of
time has the ownership character of the initial obligation and the "time of
acquisition" is when the initial obligation is incurred, regardless of when
legal title actually passed. Similarly, the pension or retirement rights cases
do not involve any obligation, and apportionment between the separate and
community income which is deferred is appropriate. Other acquisitions
taking time are mentioned in the notes. 176
172. Id. at 453, 569 P.2d at 725.
173. Cross (1974), supra note 1, at 762.
174. See infra notes 470--549 and accompanying text (Part V) for further discussion of interspousal
agreements.
175. Note that the court in Binge stated, "The fruit of the obligation is legally acquired as of the
date when the obligation becomes binding." 5 Wn. 2d at 484, 105 P.2d at 705; see also supra text
accompanying notes 170-71. The idea that there was no community interest in an insurance policy from
payment of premiums with community funds because that payment was not voluntary, and that
therefore apportionment should not be made, was controlling in Porter v. McLeod, 15 Wn. App. 650,
553 P.2d 117 (1976) (husband required to maintain insurance for a child of previous marriage).
176. Another situation of possible mixed-separate community ownership can be resolved by this
approach: an encumbered asset or a contract purchaser's interest is devised to one spouse. The devisee
is not obligated to pay, remove the encumbrance, or pay out the contract, nor is the testator's estate.
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4. Pension and Retirement Plans
Analysis of the character of pension and retirement income rights is
complicated by the wide variation in retirement income programs, con-
cepts of "vesting" which affect the time of "acquisition" of rights, mixed
separate and community labor sources, and valuation questions. McGough
suggested four categories for the pension relationship: a mere expectancy,
contingent (not vested but with contract right to continue in the plan),
vested and unmatured (nonforfeitable right to future payment which could
terminate by death prior to retirement), and vested and matured (nonfor-
feitable right to immediate payment). 177
It is common to classify pension plans as either defined-benefit or
defined-contribution plans. In the former type there may be only an
undertaking by an employer that a certain percentage of the employee's pay
will continue after retirement, with no current payments into pension fund
by either the employer or employee. It is easy to recognize that in such an
arrangement there could be a period during which the employee's "right"
could be fairly characterized as a mere expectancy not yet rising to the
dignity of "property." On the other hand, if the plan requires current
contributions by the employee it would be surprising to discover that the
employee's right to those contributions was lost or became contingent, even
if return of them (with, probably, earnings produced) was postponed to a
"retirement" age. In between is an arrangement in which the employer
makes payments into a pension fund; in this situation a requirement that the
employment continue for a number of years, or that the employee reach a
WNASH. Rev. CODE§ 11.12.070 (1983);In reEstateofCloniger, 8 Wn. 2d 348, 112P.2d 139 (1941);In re
Estate of McNulta, 168 Wash. 397, 12 P.2d 389 (1932). The suggested rule would apportion the
ownership between the separate estate (by devise, WASH. REv. CoDE §§ 26.16.010, .020 (1983)) in the
fraction of the then net equity and the estate from which the subsequent payments were made. If the
devised asset produced the income to pay out, the whole should be separate property, but to the extent
that the community estate of the devisee and spouse paid, there should be a community property
ownership share.
Such a rule will not accommodate the federal homestead cases in which an entryman was not
required to complete the performance, the antenuptial entry ripening into legal title (ownership) during
marriage created separate property, and entry during marriage with title acquired by final proof after
marriage also created separate property. The rules are stated in Teynor v. Heible, 74 Wash. 222, 133 P. 1
(1913). The latter situation is explicable on the basis of supremacy of federal law dictating who could
acquire, thereby creating a special federal succession to the whole right. McCune v. Essig, 199 U.S.
382 (1905); see 0. McKAY, supra note 111, §§ 547-49, 555-57.
A title, defective for some reason, but cured by adverse possession, can fit within such a rule by the
analysis of relation back making the time of acquisition of the defective title the relevant time. It will not
accommodate a title based only on adverse possession if that title is flatly concluded to be acquired
when the statute of limitations has run. Ownership of such a title could be apportioned; if it is not, the
result should be treated as exceptional. See also W. DC FuN AK & M. VAUGHN, supra note 2, § 65; G.
McKAY, supra note 111, §§ 585-99.
177. DEsKBoOK, supra note 142, § 14.4.
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certain age, or both, before claims may be made against the fund would not
be surprising. Of course the pension plan may be a mixture of some or all of
the three patterns mentioned (e.g., contribution to a fund by both the
employer and employee to create the accumulation from which the retire-
ment income will come, supplemented by additional payments by the
employer to reach some identified percentage of recent pay).
It is possible to conclude that a spouse's relationship to a pension scheme
is too ephemeral to be called "property" and thereby remove the rela-
tionship from community property considerations or analysis. On the other
hand, since the relationship has economic elements it is not inappropriate
to treat it as involving property, thereby pushing the attention to difficult
valuation questions. In the mere expectancy category it probably does not
matter; even if there is "property," its value is probably nothing or
unmeasurable. In any more substantial relationship, attention can properly
go directly to questions of value. It seems preferable to the author to
determine the community or separate character of the anticipated retire-
ment income on the basis of community property rules, recognizing that
there may be difficult problems of valuation which necessarily must affect
the solution of any ownership question that may arise. The Washington
position recognizes that the employee has a vested right in such programs,
regardless of their forms. 178
Divorce (dissolution of marriage) is a common arena in which the
complications surface. If division of the present value of the "asset" (i.e.,
the rights in the retirement program) is the only method to eliminate the
complications, the valuation difficulty may be insurmountable, or at least
undesirable, because of the uncertainty as to whether and how much
income finally will be received. If the economic consequences of a long
relationship with a retirement program can be reflected in a contingent
award of maintenance or alimony, much of this valuation difficulty can be
eliminated. 179 Adjusting alimony to reflect the amount of retirement
178. The Washington court has concluded that there is a vested right and not a mere expectancy:
[lit is now firmly established in this jurisdiction that retirement provisions are in the nature of
deferred compensation; and, as such, the employee has a vested right in the system which cannot
be altered to his detriment, whether such system be a public plan, a private, employee contributory
plan negotiated through the collective bargaining process, or a voluntary, noncontributory
(employer financed) plan.
DeRevere v. DeRevere, 5 Wn. App. 741,743,491 P.2d 249,251 (1971) (emphasis in original; citations
omitted): see also Payne v. Payne, 82 Wn. 2d 573, 512 P.2d 736 (1973).
179. See, e.g., Hughes, Community Property Aspects of Profit-Sharing and Pension Plans
in Texas-Recent Developments and Proposed Guidelines for the Future, 44 TEX. L. REV. 860
(1966).
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income being received may also ameliorate valuation difficulties. 180 Proba-
bly a sounder solution to this problem would be to award to the non-
employed spouse an appropriate share of the retirement income if, as, and
when it is received (or presently payable) to the employed spouse. 181 The
Washington court's flexibility in these situations is reflected in In re
Marriage of Jacobs.182
If retirement income is already being received at the time its separate or
community character must be determined, there normally will not be any
difficulty other than determining whether it is all community income. If
part of the labor by which the retirement income right was acquired
occurred while the employee spouse was unmarried, the corresponding
part of the retirement income would be separate property. In other words,
the ownership of deferred compensation is the same as it would have been
had it not been deferred. In addition to the marital or nonmarital quality of
the labor, the character of the retirement right is affected by the domicile of
the employee spouse in a common law or community property law state
while the labor was performed, because the deferred compensation accu-
mulated while domiciled in a common law state would not be community
property. 183
When the employed spouse dies, any continuing rights probably will not
involve valuation problems, and the funds can be apportioned according to
the above rules. Upon the death of the nonemployed spouse, however,
problems of succession and valuation, complicated by the uncertainty of
receipt of future income and the length of time of such receipt, will arise.
The Washington court rejected a terminable interest concept applied in
California and held the successors of the nonemployed (former) spouse
owned her share of the retirement income. 184
If retirement is from federal employment, there may be complications
under the federal supremacy doctrine. The matter is discussed above in Part
III.D.
180. Edwards v. Edwards, 74 Wn. 2d 286, 444 P.2d 703 (1968).
181. Obviously the nonemployed spouse, awarded a share in the retirement payments, would
prefer to have those payments made directly rather than having to pursue a retired spouse who might not
voluntarily pay over the share.
182. 20 Wn. App. 272, 579 P.2d 1023 (1978).
183. Id.; see also In re Marriage of Landry, 103 Wn. 2d 807, 699 P.2d 214 (1985).
184. Farverv. Department of Retirement Sys., 97 Wn. 2d 344,644 P.2d 1149 (1982). The difficulty
of collecting that share is reflected in the case. The court held that the employed spouse must pay over
the share of the retirement income as it was received, but refused to order the state to pay that share
directly. The statute which appeared to terminate any obligation to pay after the death of the
nonemployed spouse (a terminable interest concept) was held to be administrative, only relieving the
state of direct payment but not eliminating the ownership interest, now inherited.
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5. Professional Goodwill and Professional Degree or Education
While the development of professional goodwill or the acquisition of a
professional education or degree involves activity extending over a period
of time, the Washington cases have not yet considered whether there is need
to apportion the identified value between separate and community catego-
ries, inasmuch as the particular facts in each case developed during a
marriage. It must be recognized, however, that goodwill or a degree is not
instantaneously acquired and undoubtedly some apportionment problems
will someday be presented. Since there is no obligation that the spouse
continue the effort that produces the goodwill or the degree, apportioning
would be appropriate rather than concluding that no separate but only a
community category would apply. If the spouse's accomplishment is not
characterized as creating "property," then there may not be anything to
divide or, more accurately, for which to account at the dissolution of the
marriage, but the earning potential of that accomplishment and the cost of
its acquisition can be considered in the dissolution settlement or awards.
In In re Marriage of Fleege,185 the court adopted the position that
professional goodwill is a marital asset, holding that although professional
goodwill is not readily salable, the important consideration is not whether
the goodwill of the practice could be sold without the personal services of
the professional, but whether it has value to him.
In In re Marriage of Hall, 186 further clarification of the problems of
goodwill was given. The case involved married professionals who had
married in 1963 while both were in medical school, received their medical
doctorates in 1966, served internships and pursued specialized training
before returning to Seattle in 1972 where he entered private practice and she
became a member of the University of Washington Medical School faculty.
After observing that professional goodwill is recognized as property in
Washington and is often defined as "the expectation of continued public
patronage" 187 the court quoted Justice Story's more thorough definition of
goodwill:
[T]he advantage or benefit, which is acquired by an establishment, beyond the
mere value of the capital, stock, funds, or property employed therein, in
consequence of the general public patronage and encouragement, which it
receives from constant or habitual customers, on account of its local position,
or common celebrity, or reputation for skill or affluence, or punctuality, or
185. 91 Wn. 2d 324, 588 P.2d 1136 (1979); noted in Note, Divorce and Dissolution: Goodwill, 15
GONZ. L. REV. 243 (1979).
186. 103 Wn. 2d 236, 692 P.2d 175 (1984).
187. Id. at 239,692 P.2d at 177 (quoting In re Marriage of Lukens, 16 Wn. App. 481,483,558 P.2d
279, 280 (1976)).
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from other accidental circumstances, or necessities, or even from ancient
partialities, or prejudices.188
The trial court had found that the husband had goodwill but the wife did
not. In supporting this conclusion, the supreme court distinguished be-
tween earning capacity and goodwill, stating:
Goodwill is a property or asset which usually supplements the earning
capacity of another asset, a business or a profession. Goodwill is not the
earning capacity itself. It is a distinct asset of a professional practice, not just
a factor contributing to the value or earning capacity of the practice ...
Discontinuance of the business or profession may greatly diminish the value
of the goodwill but it does not destroy its existence. When a professional
retires or dies, his earning capacity also either retires or dies. Nevertheless,
the goodwill that once attached to his practice may continue in the form of
established patients or clients, referrals, trade name, location and associa-
tions which now attach to former partners or buyers of the practice. 89
The Hall court further stated that while the salaried professional also
brings earning capacity comprised of skill and education to her position,
upon leaving the position she would take everything to the new position.
"There is nothing that increased [her] earning capacity in the old salaried
position that cannot be taken to the new position.'190 The court concluded,
"We. . .hold that as amatter of law a salaried employee such as [the wife]
cannot have goodwill. "191 This conclusion precluded a finding that the wife
had an asset which could be offset against the husband's goodwill, even
though she had acquired a good reputation and had received offers from
other institutions for employment at a considerably higher salary.
The court held that the wife's earning capacity, however, was a factor to
be considered in the property distribution in Hall, as it had previously held
in connection with a professional degree in In re Marriage of Washburn, 192
and the court directed that on remand the trial court should articulate its
reasoning in taking into account this substantial factor.
The court also reversed and remanded with reference to the determina-
tion that the husband had goodwill worth $70,000 for lack of adequate
proof to support the figure. The valuation process must utilize what has
188. J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF PARTNERSHIP § 99, at 147-48 (3d ed. Boston 1850),
quotedinHall, 103 Vn. 2d at 239,692 P.2d at 177 andLukens, 16Wn. App. at483-84,558 P.2d at 281.
(Story is slightly misquoted in the cases; the version in text above is from the edition cited.)
189. 103 Wn. 2d at 241, 692 P.2d at 178 (emphasis in original; citations omitted).
190. Id. at 242, 692 P.2d at 178.
191. Id. Under this reasoning there probably is no goodwill asset in In re Marriage of Kaplan, 23
Wn. App. 503, 597 P.2d 439 (1979), involving a "special partner" in a law firm.
192. 101 Wn. 2d 168, 677 P.2d 152 (1984).
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become known as the Fleege factors: the practitioner's age, health, past
demonstrated earning power, reputation in the community for judgment,
skill, and knowledge, and the practitioner's comparative professional suc-
cess. 193 The court added: "Two areas surrounding the Fleege factors must
be clarified: (1) the first step in evaluation under the Fleege factors is the
determination of the existence of goodwill and (2) several accounting or
appraisal methods may be used by the trial court in conjunction with the
Fleege factors. " 194
In another case, after a similar remand so that the Fleege factors could be
taken into account, the trial court concluded goodwill could not exist in the
husband's solo practice because it could not be sold, but made an award to
the wife as her "spouse's economic benefit expectancy" (SEBE). 195 At the
earlier stage of the same case the trial court had included goodwill of
$100,000, which on remand was to be reconsidered with further testimony
on the Fleege factors.196 The court of appeals affirmed, stating that re-
gardless of the name used, the Fleege factors had been considered, but did
not analyze the nature of SEBE or consider the correctness of the finding of
193. See Fleege, 91 Wn. 2d at 326, 588 P.2d at 1138.
194. Hall, 103 Wn. 2d at 242, 692 P.2d at 179. The court described the various accounting methods
as follows:
In valuing goodwill five major formulas have been articulated. . . . There are three accounting
formulas. Under the straight capitalization accounting method the average net profits of the
practitioner are determined and this figure is capitalized at a definite rate, as, for example, 20
percent. . . .
The second accounting formula is the capitalization of excess earnings method. Under the pure
capitalization of excess earnings the average net income is determined. From this figure the annual
salary of an average employee practitioner with like experience is subtracted. The remaining
amount is multiplied by a fixed capitalization rate to determine the goodwill.
The IRS variation of capitalized excess earnings method takes the average net income of the
business for the last five years and subtracts a reasonable rate of return based on the business'
average net tangible assets. From this amount a comparable net salary is subtracted. Finally, this
remaining amount is capitalized at a definite rate. The resulting amount is goodwill.
The fourth method, the market value approach, sets a value on professional goodwill by
establishing what fair price would be obtained in the current open market if the practice were to be
sold . ..
The fifth valuation method, the buy/sell agreement method, values goodwill by reliance on a
recent actual sale or an unexercised existing option or contractual formula set forth in a partnership
agreement or corporate agreement ...
These five methods are not the exclusive formulas available to trial courts in analyzing the
evidence presented. Nor must only one method be used in isolation. One or more methods may be
used in conjunction with the Fleege factors to achieve ajust and fair evaluation of the existence and
value of any professional's goodwill.
Id. at 243-45, 692 P.2d at 179-80 (citations omitted).
195. In re Marriage of Freedman, 35 Wn. App. 49, 665 P.2d 902 (1983) (Freedman I/). A strong
argument against the existence of professional goodwill and distinguishing SEBE is made in Scribner,
Professional Goodwill in Dissolution Proceedings: the Personification of Property, 17 GONZ. L. REV.
303 (1982).
196. 23 Wn. App. 27, 592 P.2d 1124 (1979) (Freedman I).
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lack of goodwill. 197 To the author SEBE appears to be just an ingenious
label for goodwill.
The difficult question of how to treat the financing by one spouse of the
education of the other apparently posed no problem in Hall, probably
because both were medical students at the time of their marriage and were
on essentially parallel tracks throughout their educations. However, the
question did arise in In re Marriage of Washburn.198 Although an argument
was made (and supported by Judge Rosellini in dissent) that the profes-
sional degree (doctor of veterinary medicine) was property to be taken into
account in the division at the dissolution of the marriage, the supreme court
declined to reach that conclusion. Instead, the court said that if one spouse
supports the other through professional school in the mutual expectation of
future financial benefit to them, the supporting spouse is entitled to com-
pensation through a division of property, an award of maintenance, or a
combination of both.
Two cases were consolidated for review in Washburn. In one of the cases
(Gillette) the trial court awarded the wife $19,000 as "an equitable right to
restitution" and $1.00 per year maintenance. In approving the award of
$19,000 the supreme court directed that a trial court should consider four
factors, among others, in determining the proper amount of compensation
for the supporting spouse: (1) community funds expended for direct educa-
tional costs (excluding living expenses); (2) amount which would have
been earned had the efforts of the student spouse not been directed toward
the studies, that is, income foregone; (3) educational or career oppor-
tunities which the supporting spouse gave up; and (4) future earning
prospects of each spouse, including the earning potential of the student
spouse with the professional degree. 199 This case was affirmed except that
the $1.00 maintenance award was reversed as unnecessary, since the
$19,000 was to be paid over a period of years and was in effect mainte-
nance. In the other case (Washburn) the trial court had made no award to the
supporting spouse (the wife) for lack of identified authority to do so. The
supreme court reversed and remanded for consideration of compensation
due for the wife's contribution toward the cost of the husband's education.
197. Freedman 11, 35 Wn. App. at 51-52, 665 P.2d at 904.
198. 101 Wn. 2d 168,677 P.2d 152 (1984). In re Marriage of Gillette was combined with Washburn
in the supreme court. The case is noted in Note, Community Property: Spousal Compensation, 19
GoNz. L. REv. 749 (1985); Note, Equitable Interest in Enhanced Earning Capacity: The Treatment of a
ProfessionalDegree at Dissolution, 60 WASH. L. REv. 431 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Note, Equitable
Interest]; see also Comment, A Property Theory of Future Earning Potential in Dissolution Proceed-
ings, 56 WASH. L. REv. 277 (1981).
199. The factors are more fully stated in the opinion, 101 Wn. 2d at 179-80, 677 P.2d at 159.
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In In re Marriage of Fernau,200 the court of appeals found that the trial
court had properly considered the analysis. and rules of Washburn in
providing the wife temporary maintenance to secure additional graduate
training rather than put a value on the husband's medical education which
had been acquired through support by the wife, and in other ways, while
she also pursued her education.
A degree cannot be community property in the sense of being owned by
two persons since it is awarded to an individual, 20 1 but the earning capacity
presumably represented by a degree may have been developed by the efforts
of both spouses-the supporting spouse providing the livelihood enabling
the student spouse to devote efforts to increase the earning capacity and
acquire the degree. Earning capacity, as such, cannot be divided any more
than a degree can be nor can it be separated from the person who has it; it
thus requires an untraditional analysis, leading to a more equitable result, if
it is to be classified as property. Assume it is property enhanced by
community effort during the marriage-would not there be an analogy in
the reimbursement/equitable lien concept? If the enhanced earning capac-
ity (the "degree") is considered a separate thing (not merely a contribution
to an existing asset) it has at least the potential to produce income through-
out the lifetime of the person; to deny the other spouse, who has also
contributed to its acquisition, continued sharing in the income produced
would be a different result than reached with ordinary assets. 20 2 The results
in Washburn (as to the degree) and Hall (as to the earning capacity) have
established rules with only a minimum flexibility, in that they can accom-
modate an opportunity for the supporting spouse to acquire an enhanced
earning capacity, as was done in Fernau.20 3
It appears to the author that both Washburn and Hall reflect that earning
capacity rather than a professional degree is the subject matter of the
controversy. It follows that increased earning capacity acquired under
comparable circumstances should be similarly treated even if no profes-
sional (or any) degree is involved. 20 4
200. 39 Wn. App. 695, 694 P.2d 1092 (1984).
201. It has been held that a medical license is not community property because it cannot be the
subject of joint ownership. Muckleroy v. Muckleroy, 84 N.M. 14, 498 P.2d 1357 (1972).
202. Note that in Washburn the court points out that "the supporting spouse may already have
benefited financially from the student spouse's increased earning capacity to an extent that would make
extra compensation inappropriate." 101 Wn. 2d at 181, 677 P.2d at 159.
203. 39 Wn. App. at 705, 695 P.2d at 1098-99.
204. An additional point can be made: the supreme court may have made a major change in
potential consequences in Washburn by eliminating the $1.00 maintenance award because the $19,000
(Gillette) award was "in effect maintenance" even though the court affirmed the portion of the order
providing "that the award shall not terminate upon [the wife's] remarriage or death, so that her right to
receive the full $19,000 may be preserved." 101 Wn. 2d at 183, 677 P.2d at 160. Does that not open up
that award to modification in the future whereas the trial court's decree would not have done so? See
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F. Acquisition of Real Property
The 1972 amendments added a new paragraph to the basic community
property statute requiring both husband and wife to join in the purchase or
contract to purchase community real property.205 Previously the husband as
manager acting alone could contract to buy community real property, even
though the wife might disagree, 206 but joinder of both husband and wife
was required to transfer or encumber community real property.207 The
earlier law made "participation" (less than actual signing) by the one
spouse in the act of the other spouse sufficient "joining" to transfer or
encumber the community real property.20 8 The same position has been
taken by the court under the new "acquisition" requirement. 20 9
The statute does not preclude the acquisition of separate real property by
either spouse; hence a problem of practical importance to the seller will be
whether a contract with only one spouse will be treated as a community
property acquisition by the buyer with corresponding community liability,
or rather as a separate property acquisition with only separate liability. The
possibilities and suggestions for solution have been explored previously.
210
G. Tracing and Commingling
The basic presumption that an asset acquired during marriage is com-
munity property can be overcome through use of the source doctrine, that
is, by tracing to a separate property origin or source.21' Sometimes the
Note, Equitable Interest, supra note 198, at 436-38.
205. WASH. REv. CODE § 26.16.030(4) (1983): "Neither spouse shall purchase or contract to
purchase community real property without the other spouse joining in the transaction of purchase or in
the execution of the contract to purchase."
206. Baker v. Murrey, 78 Wash. 241, 138 P. 890 (1914).
207. See Act of Feb. 23, 1972, ch. 108, § 4, 1972 Wash. Laws 2d Ex. Sess. 244, 246 (amending
WASH. REv. CODE § 26.16.040 (1958); current version at id. § 26.16.030(3) (1983)).
208. See discussion infra notes 315-59 and accompanying text (Parts IV.A.1, 2, 3). The new
language of the statute on transfer should not change the analysis. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.030(3)
(1983).
209. Daily v. Warren, 16 Wn. App. 726,558 P.2d 1374, review denied, 88 Wn. 2d 1017 (1977). In
Reid v. Cramer, 24 Wn. App. 742, 603 P.2d 851 (1979), husband unsuccessfully asserted the lack of
wife's signature as a defense to an action on the promissory note for the earnest money in a land
purchase contract. See also Smith v. Hamilton, 26 Wn. App. 633, 613 P.2d 567 (1980), in which
malpractice liability was not found for advice that wife's "participation" was sufficient in exercise of an
option, even though in the subsequent action to enforce the option the court had held wife's signature
was necessary. The dissenting judge believed the attorney had committed malpractice because he was
negligent in giving advice and permitting the question to arise in the action to enforce the option.
210. Cross, supra note 9, at 534-37. In Colorado Nat'l Bank v. Merlino, 35 Wn. App. 610, 668
P.2d 1304, review denied, 100 Wn. 2d 1032 (1983), a mixture of thejoinder requirement for acquisition
and conflict of laws rules resulted in only separate liability when husband contracted to buy Colorado
land without wife's participation.
211. It has previously been pointed out that the proof (i.e., the tracing) must be clear and
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process is reversed chronologically and the attempt is to show that an
admittedly separate property asset has maintained its separate character
despite mutations and is the source of the present asset.212 If the links of the
chain back to, or forward from, a separate property source can be clearly
established, there will be separate property ownership of the disputed asset.
However, if the character of one of the links is confused or uncertain, the
basic community property presumption, in the form of the commingling
doctrine or rule, breaks the chain. When this break occurs, the uncertain
link will be found to be community in character and to be the origin or
source with respect to any subsequent change in form: "Where separate
funds have been so commingled with community funds that it is no longer
possible to distinguish or apportion them, all of the commingled fund, or
the property acquired thereby, is community property." 213 As this author
has previously stated, the commingling doctrine is simply another form of
the basic presumption that an asset on hand during marriage is community
property; tracing is simply a method of asserting the clear evidence re-
quired to overcome the community presumption. 214
There is one situation which may be of particular importance in deter-
mining the character of the "source" asset-the acquisition through the
federal government. To the extent that the supremacy doctrine prevents the
ordinary application of community property law, 215 the question is pre-
sented whether that interference controls the character of acquisition so that
the property is separate, or rather controls the manipulation of the asset
(e.g., prevents assertion of a community property succession or inter vivos
interest against the wish or direction of the spouse the federal law recog-
nizes). For instance, in Barros v. Barros, 216 the court of appeals held that
even though the survivor's benefit being paid to the husband's widow,
acquired through his retirement program, was "community property" of
the husband and his former wife, she could not successfully assert an
convincing. See, e.g., Yesler v. Hochstettler, 4 Wash. 349, 30 P. 398 (1892). The burden of proof rests
upon the proponent of the separate property claim. See, e.g., In re Estate of Witte, 21 Wn. 2d 112, 125,
150 P.2d 595, 601 (1944).
212. The burden is on the proponent, similarly, to prove by clear and satisfactory evidence that the
separate property asset in its changes in form has become the disputed asset (or is its product under the
rents, issues, and profits category). See In re Estate of Witte, 21 Wn. 2d 112, 150 P.2d 595 (1944).
The separate property source may be from individual ownership in a noncommunity property state.
Brookman v. Durkee, 46 Wash. 578, 90 P. 914 (1907).
213. In re Estate of Witte, 21 Wn. 2d 112, 125, 150 P.2d 595, 601 (1944). However, if the
community property contribution can be shown to be inconsiderable as compared with the separate
property contribution, the "commingling" will not make the whole community property.
Undoubtedly the doubts as to proportions of contributions would be resolved against the separate
claim, in accordance with the preference given community property by the basic presumptions.
214. Cross (1955), supra note 1, at 652-56.
215. See supra notes 118-42 and accompanying text (Part lIi.D).
216. 34 Wn. App. 266, 660 P.2d 770 (1983).
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interest in that survivor's benefit because the federal statute217 clearly
provides that only the person designated by the retired person can have any
interest in the survivor's benefit.218
If, as the author believes should be so, the federal supremacy doctrine
does not make military retired pay, for example, separate rather than
community property, then an asset acquired with such funds would be
community or separate under ordinary tracing analysis untrammeled by the
manipulative control which federal supremacy provides for the military
retired pay, as such. This position is recognized in Yiatchos v. Yiatchos, 219
in which the Court notes that the United States savings bonds were
community property, and had they been cashed before the husband's death
there would have been no attempted invasion of the wife's community
property interests.
1. Community Labor on Separate Assets
The commingling doctrine is applicable if income is comprised of both
community property and separate property ingredients. Such a pattern
frequently occurs when separate property is managed by a spouse to
produce income. The fruits of a spouse's personal efforts are community
property, 220 but, by statute, 221 rents, issues, and profits of separate property
are separate property. Thus, if a spouse produces income by working with a
separate asset, the resulting income will be partly community and partly
separate unless the asset can be established to be sterile, that is, nonproduc-
tive.
If the income is not consumed and is allowed merely to accumulate, the
size of the respective separate and community parts in the accumulation
could be identified and determined by some formula, such as the rela-
tionship of interest return on the given separate investment to reasonable
pay for the stated amount of community labor.222 Such a formula should
allow the possibility of proving that the income from the separate asset or
the community labor had in fact produced a larger share than the formula
217. 10 U.S.C. § 1448(b) (1982).
218. See also In re Marriage of Williams, 39 Wn. App. 224, 692 P.2d 885 (1984), in which a
division of military retired pay was upheld but the trial court's decree in the marriage dissolution that
wife be continued as beneficiary under the survivor's benefit plan was reversed because the decree
would not amount to the statutorily authorized voluntary designation.
219. 376 U.S. 306 (1964). See the discussion of Yiatchos supra notes 123-25 and accompanying
text.
220. As suggested supra note 84, the income-producing capacity of a spouse is the basic source of
community property.
221. WASH. REv. CODE §§ 26.16.010, .020 (1983).
222. Possible formulas or approaches are identified and discussed in King, The Challenge of
Apportionment, 37 WASH. L. REV. 483 (1962).
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would indicate. Periodic accounting, such as for income tax purposes, must
focus on this sort of approach.
However, the more common problem between the spouses (or their
successors) is likely to be determining respective shares in an accumulation
of income remaining after current consumption or use of part of the
income. Ordinarily the inquiry must consist of two steps: (1) determination
of what part of the current income is fairly to be allocated to the separate
and to the community "accounts" and (2) determination of how much and
from which account the current income has been expended, permitting the
remaining balances of the separate and community property accounts to be
established. The second step usually will not be solved by application of
any formula, but there are rules which assist in making the determination.
A particularly important rule is that if funds of both kinds are available, the
appropriate fund will be presumed to have been used to discharge an
obligation or to pay an expense. 223 Thus, separate funds are presumed to
discharge separate obligations and community funds are presumed to
discharge community obligations. The normal running expenses of the
marriage (including family expenses) are to be charged principally to
community property income. Thus it can easily develop that all of the
community income has been currently consumed so that the accumulation
can be identified as entirely separate.224 If the purposes for which income
expenditures were made can be identified, and the extent of consumption of
income for community and separate purposes thereby established, it should
be possible to determine the character of the remaining unexpended in-
come.
It is probable, however, that the use made of withdrawn and consumed
income cannot be determined in the absence of some adequate recordkeep-
ing or initial separation of the income into its component parts.225 This
probability was stated by the court in Hamlin v. Merlino:
[I]t is clear that, where the separate property in question is real estate or an
unincorporated business with which personal services ostensibly belonging
223. In re Estate of Kruse, 52 Wn. 2d 342, 324 P.2d 1088 (1958); In re Estate of Finn, 106 Wash.
137, 179 P. 103 (1919); Guye v. Guye, 63 Wash. 340, 115 P. 731 (1911).
224. Concluded in Hamlin v. Merlino, 44 Wn. 2d 851, 272 P.2d 125 (1954); erroneously found in
Pollock v. Pollock, 7 Wn. App. 394,499 P.2d 231 (1972). See also State ex rel. Van Moss v. Sailors, 180
Wash. 269, 39 P.2d 397 (1934). Such exhaustion of community property might cause near disaster in a
death succession situation; in dissolution the power to allocate separate property minimizes the danger
of "disaster" for the nonowning spouse.
225. Factually this is the circumstance, for instance, in Pollock v. Pollock, 7 Wn. App. 394, 499
P.2d 231 (1972), in which the court stated the "rule" requiring contemporaneous segregation, quoted
infra in text accompanying note 226, then concluded there had been no adequate tracing to separate
sources and added that "[flurthermore, because of 'the absence of a contemporaneous segregation of
the income' "the particular assets must be deemed to have been acquired with community income. Id. at
402, 499 P.2d at 237 (quoting In re Estate of Smith, 73 Wn. 2d 629, 631, 440 P.2d 179, 181 (1968)).
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to the community have been combined, the rule is that all the income or
increase will be considered as community property in the absence of a
contemporaneous segregation of the income between the community and the
separate estates. Salisbury v. Meeker, 152 Wash. 146, 277 Pac. 276; In re
Witte's Estate, 21 Wn. 2d 112, 150 P.2d 595.
On the other hand, where, as in the instant case, the husband at the time of
marriage owned all or substantially all of the stock of a corporation, some-
what different principles are applicable. In such cases, where a salary is paid
to the husband by the corporation, it is reasoned that the community is
thereby compensated for his services, and that any dividends paid or any
enhanced value of the stock resulting from profits reinvested in the corpora-
tion are separate property. 226
The author has previously criticized the suggestion in Hamlin that
contemporaneous segregation is required to avoid the conclusion that all
income is community property because of commingling, even though such
a rule would fit the result in at least most of the earlier cases, and as a
prediction of a result such a rule is likely to be highly reliable. 227 The
necessity for contemporaneous segregation was reiterated in two subse-
quent cases, In re Estate of Smith228 and Pollock v. Pollock.229 However, in
both cases the holding turned on the conclusion that the commingling of
funds was so complete that there was no possibility of apportionment to the
respective sources. In the Pollock case the facts also indicate that business
and personal expenditures, including household expenditures, were rather
indiscriminately made from the particular accounts.
In In re Marriage of Harshman,230 Justice Callow, speaking at that time
for the court of appeals, said:
We do not agree that the contemporaneous segregation is the only way to
maintain and prove the separate status of income. . . . [T]his concept was
stated as dictum. The presumption may be overcome by clear and satisfactory
evidence tracing the property to its origin or source as separate property. An
owner of separate property should not be prohibited from proving the source
of an increase in value of the separate estate because contemporaneous
segregation did not take place if other admissible evidence is available to
surmount the presumption. . . .Upon remand, the husband has the burden
of establishing that the increase in the value of the property was due to the
rents, issues, and profits of the separate estate as opposed to community
labor. If the husband is unable to sustain this burden, the entire increase in
226. 44 Wn. 2d 851, 858-59, 272 P.2d 125, 129 (1954) (emphasis in original).
227. Cross (1974), supra note 1, at 770.
228. 73 Wn. 2d 629, 440 P.2d 179 (1968).
229. 7 Wn. App. 394, 499 P.2d 231 (1972).
230. 18 Wn. App. 116, 125-26, 567 P.2d 667, 673 (1977).
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value is presumed to be community, and the community would be entitled to
an equitable lien or right of reimbursement as to the increased value. 23
This last statement as to the character of rights in the increase in value
will be discussed below, but now it is useful to comment further on the
necessity of contemporaneous segregation.
A requirement of contemporaneous segregation unreasonably and un-
necessarily deprives the separate owner of property; community property is
adequately protected by the difficulty of overcoming the basic presump-
tion. In the two cases cited in the above quotation from Hamlin v. Merlino,
the commingling resulted from an inability to segregate. Thus in Hamlin
the court was not compelled by precedent to impose such a requirement. In
Salisbury an antenuptial tort liability232 was sought to be enforced against
funds paid to the tortfeasor husband for work performed during the mar-
riage. The husband at marriage had assets used in his roofing business,
consisting of shovels, brooms, wheelbarrows, office furniture, and the like,
valued at $500. The business itself, as the court said, did not have the
potential power to produce rents, issues, or profits and thus essentially all
income was the result of the personal efforts of the spouses. Even if it were
conceded that part of the money was the earnings of his established separate
business, the court continued, the funds were beyond the reach of the
separate creditor because there was no way to segregate the earnings of his
separate business from the earnings of his community labor. The Salisbury'
court relied on In re Estate of Buchanan,233 in which the original invest-
ment of separate funds was small and a large increase in value of the
property was due principally to personal efforts of the husband; the whole
was held to be community property, even though the asset was in fact shares
in a corporation largely run by the husband as if it had been a partnership
enterprise. In the other case referred to in the Hamlin quotation above,
Witte's Estate, the court concluded that the attempt to trace farm income to
"rents" (the landlord's share) rather than labor (the tenant's share) did not
meet the required standard of a clear showing of the separate "rents" share;
therefore, all of the accumulation had to be community property by reason
of the commingling-not because of the absence of contemporaneous
segregation:
[S]ince it is now impossible [not impermissible] to disentangle, separate, or
apportion the component parts of the mass and thereby designate how much is
separate property and how much is community property, it must all ... now
be considered as community property.234
231. Id. at 125-26, 567 P.2d at 673 (citations omitted).
232. At that time such a liability was enforceable only against separate property.
233. 89 Wash. 172, 154 P. 129 (1916).
234. 21 Wn. 2d at 128. 150 P.2d at 602, 603.
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Thus the author believes the position stated by Justice Callow in the
quotation from Harshman above is sound, and there is no requirement of
contemporaneous segregation to avoid commingling of the separate and
community parts of an accumulation.
There was disagreement between the courts of appeal on the character of
the rights in the increase in value of separate property to which there was a
community contribution, 235 but it has now been resolved by In re Marriage
of Elam,236 which held that there is a presumption that any increase in value
of separate property is separate property. The Elam court added:
This presumption may be rebutted by direct and positive evidence that the
increase is attributable to community funds or labors. This rule entitles each
spouse to the increase in value during the marriage of his or her separately
owned property, except to the extent to which the other spouse can show that
the increase was attributable to community contributions. Moreover, the
community should be entitled to a share of the increase in value due to
inflation in proportion to the value of community contributions to the prop-
erty. See McCoy v. Ware, 25 Wn. App. 648, 608 P.2d 1268 (1980) (Roe, J.
concurring). 237
The husband was awarded a lien for half of the community contribution
plus the share in the inflationary increase. The idea that there should be a
sharing in the increase in value from inflation is discussed below in Part
m.I, Right to Reimbursement: The Equitable Lien.238
2. Commingling of Separate Assets with Community Assets
Commingling can, of course, totally submerge the separate property
income ingredient of the commingled mass of separate and community
income not only in situations involving a spouse's operation of a separately
owned business but also in the ordinary management of separate assets. 239
Further, it is possible that the separate property itself, as distinguished from
its income, can be submerged by commingling. 240 Such a result has been
reached even where the commingled separate assets were shares in a
corporation, 241 though this result would be unlikely if at least minimal
235. Compare McCoy v. Ware, 25 Wn. App. 648, 608 P.2d 1268 (1980) (Division III) with In re
Marriage of Johnson, 28 Wn. App. 574, 625 P.2d 720 (1981) (Division II).
236. 97 Wn. 2d 811,650 P.2d 213 (1982), noted in Note, Community Property-Characterization
of the Inflationary Increase in the Value of Separate PropertyImproved by CommunityFunds, 59 WASH.
L. REV. 341 (1984).
237. 97 Wn. 2d at 816-17, 650 P.2d at 216.
238. See infra notes 270, 299-303 and accompanying text.
239. Pollock v. Pollock, 7 Wn. App. 394, 499 P.2d 231 (1972), is an illustration.
240. In re Estate of Allen, 54 Wn. 2d 616, 343 P.2d 867 (1959), involving a stock brokerage
account, is an illustration.
241. In re Estate of Buchanan, 89 Wash. 172, 154 P. 129 (1916).
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corporate records were kept. 242 The usual problem, however, involves
commingling of income rather than the asset, and although the whole of the
incremental increase in value and all income from the separate asset may be
found to be community as a result of commingling, the original value or
amount of separate property may still exist in the unsegregated total. 243 But
separate property will not continue to exist if during the commingling
process all value of separate property is dissipated. 244
3. Commingling and the Time of Acquisition
The rule that the ownership character of an asset is determined at the time
of its acquisition may create special problems in the commingling context.
If, for example, there has been mixing of separate and community funds in
a single bank account, it may still be possible to show the respective
amounts deposited in the account, and to show that the use made of
withdrawals was separate or community in identified amounts. This type of
identification should be sufficient to avoid a commingling conclusion as to
the account itself, but when an asset is acquired with funds from the bank
account it will nonetheless be necessary to show the character of the
respective parts of the account at the time the particular asset was acquired
to rebut the presumption that the asset is community property. For instance,
to establish that the separate property part of the account was used to make
the acquisition, it will not be sufficient merely to show that the total
community expenditures for the operating expenses of the family exceeded
the total of the salary or wage income of the spouses during the entire
existence of the mixed fund account and contend that hence the community
expense must have consumed the community contribution. To avoid the
community property presumption and establish the separate character of
the acquired asset, the separate claimant must show the dissipation of all
community funds in the account at the time the asset in question was
acquired, 245 or clearly establish that the separate funds then in the account
242. Cf In re Estate of Dewey, 13 Wn. 2d 220, 124 P.2d 805 (1942). Payment of family operating
expenses by the separately owned corporation (in effect, ignoring the corporate form) does not
necessarily involve submergence of the separate property by commingling. Cf. State ex rel. Van Moss v.
Sailors, 180 Wash. 269, 39 P.2d 397 (1934).
243. Holm v. Holm, 27 Wn. 2d 456, 178 P.2d 725 (1947). The net assets of the business apparently
steadily increased during the marriage.
244. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Garrison, 13 Wn. 2d 170, 124 P.2d 939 (1942). The business at
one time had only community funds acquired through borrowing by the husband, i.e., in the separate
property sense the business could be said to have reached a negative position and nothing restored it to a
positive position.
245. In substance this is the analysis in Pollock v. Pollock, 7 Wn. App. 394,499 P.2d 231(1972), in
which the court rejected the argument that community property income had been consumed in paying
family expenses. The analysis in See v. See, 64 Cal. 2d 778, 51 Cal. Rptr. 888, 415 P.2d 776 (1966), is
particularly helpful.
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were used.246 It should be noted that the allocation to community property
income for the spouse's labor in all of these cases must be reasonable and
ordinarily is measured by the amount which would be paid for comparable
services, 247 although special circumstances may require a greater alloca-
tion.248
H. Fortuitous Acquisition
1. Recovery of Damages for Injury to the Spouse
In In re Marriage of Brown249 the court abandoned a long-standing rule
and held that the recovery for personal injury is the separate property of the
injured spouse.250 The abandoned contrary characterization as community
property had its origin in the 1892 case of Hawkins v. Front Street Cable
Railway251 on the reasoning that the cause of action for the tortious injury
was property which, not having been acquired by gift, bequest, devise or
descent, was necessarily community property under the statutes. That
wastebasket approach was disapproved in Brown, which adopted the
"basic principle that, except for gifts to the community, community prop-
erty consists only of that which is acquired by onerous title, or in exchange
for other community property." 252 At issue was the proper characterization
of the potential recovery on a personal injury claim for purposes of
distribution in the marriage dissolution action. The court of appeals applied
the Hawkins rule that the recovery was community property. The supreme
court reversed, reinstating the trial court judgment, stating:
Under our opinion today, recovery for an injury inflicted upon a married
person by a third party tortfeasor is the separate property of the injured
spouse, except to the extent the recovery compensates the community for lost
wages which would have been community property, or injury-related ex-
penses which the community incurred. 253
246. See In re Marriage of Mix, 14 Cal. 3d 604, 122 Cal. Rptr. 79, 536 P.2d 479 (1975). The facts
were more elaborately stated in the vacated court of appeals opinion, id., 37 Cal App. 3d 801, 112 Cal.
Rptr. 717 (1974).
247. See Friedlander v. Friedlander, 58 Wn. 2d 288, 362 P.2d 352 (1961); In re Estate of Hebert,
169 Wash. 402, 14 P.2d 6 (1932).
248. In re Estate of Buchanan, 89 Wash. 172, 154 P. 129 (1916).
249. lOO Wn. 2d 729, 675 P.2d 1207 (1984), noted in Note, CommunityProperty: TortRecovery, 19
GoNz. L. REv. 577 (1984).
250. Inn reMarriage of Hilt, 41 Wn. App. 434,704 P.2d 672(1985), the court of appeals held that
Brown applied retroactively and in the dissolution action the husband's cause of action for personal
injury was his separate property.
251. 3 Wash. 592, 28 P. 1021 (1892).
252. Brown, 100 Wn. 2d at 737,675 P.2d at 1212 (citing W. DE FuNTAK & M. VAUGHN, supra note
2, § 82, at 201).
253. Id. at 730, 675 P.2d at 1208.
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The Hawkins reasoning that the cause of action is property is not
changed by Brown, but now the character of that asset is mixed rather than
totally community as it was under Hawkins. The separate pain and suffer-
ing element will probably be accompanied by harm to earning capacity
(loss or potential loss of wages), and medical and hospital expenses of a
community character. In Brown there was loss of wages before separation
(community) and loss of wages after separation (separate) and, similarly,
medical expenses before and after separation. In a situation not involving
dissolution of the marriage, normally only the pain and suffering elements
would be separate. In the event of a subsequent separation of the spouses,
any asset then on hand which could be traced to recovery for loss of future
wages ought to go to the spouse unable by reason of the tort to earn the
wages.
In Brown the court expressly disapproved two recent court of appeals
cases in which settlements for personal injury claims arising during the
marriage were divided between the spouses, because of the community
property characterization of the claims.254
A related problem, the proper treatment of disability insurance or
pension payments, should be reconsidered in light of the decision in
Brown. In Chase v. Chase, 255 the settlement for the disability incurred after
the divorce hearing but before the decree was held to be community
property not disposed of and therefore equally owned by the former
spouses. The same reasoning was applied (and Chase followed) in Ross v.
Pearson,256 in which the former wife was successful in her claim for one-
half of both past and future payments resulting from a disability incurred
during the marriage. The payments had started before the divorce but no
mention of them was made in the decree.
Under Brown, to the extent such payments were for pain and suffering
they should be separate property; but to the extent they replaced lost wages
they would normally be community property. Whatever their proper
character normally, by reason of a three-pronged community property
agreement2 57 the disability payments were community property at the time
of the divorce. To the extent the payments were for loss of future earnings,
however, they should be awarded to the disabled spouse under the reason-
ing expressed in Brown and described above. For a spouse retired because
of disability and receiving a pension, there are similar problems-is the
254. Id. at 739, 675 P.2d at 1213 (citing with disapproval In re Marriage of Parsons, 28 Wn. App.
276, 622 P.2d 415, review denied. 95 Wn. 2d 1019 (1981); Perez v. Perez, II Wn. App. 429,523 P.2d
455 (1974)).
255. 74 Wn. 2d 253, 444 P.2d 145 (1968).
256. 31 Wn. App. 609, 643 P.2d 928 (1982), review denied, 97 Wn. 2d 1030 (1983).
257. See infra notes 430-33, 475 and accompanying text.
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pension totally for loss of future earnings or is it in part the "deferred
compensation" of a normal pension? To the extent it is deferred compensa-
tion it should be community or separate property according to the rules
discussed before, 258 but to the extent a "disability" pension reflects loss of
earning power future rights should not have to be shared with a former
spouse. This is the position recommended by the court of appeals in In re
Marriage of Kittleson.259
While the cause of action against a third party tortfeasor was held to be
community property, the court took a different approach for the inter-
spousal tort. In Freehe v. Freehe,260 the court concluded that interspousal
immunity is not the law in Washington, inherently assuming the wife to be
separately liable in an action by the husband for injury suffered from
operation of her separate property farm tractor. The court stated that
damages should be awarded to the husband in three parts: (1) special
damages to reimburse for out-of-pocket community expenses from the
injury; (2) general damages for loss of future earnings, which would have
been community property, in the amount of one-half, as his separate
property; and (3) general damages in full for pain and suffering, emotional
distress, and the like as his separate property. The court reasoned that this
result, that is, classifying the recovery for pain and suffering as separate
property, precluded an indirect benefit to the tortfeasor spouse through
sharing in a community property recovery. Although the court carefully
noted that a third party tortfeasor was not involved, the fact that the wife
was separately liable is not necessary to the conclusion that the pain and
suffering recovery is separate property.
The court in Freehe could have applied the then traditional rule that
recovery for pain and suffering is community property, although such a
recovery perhaps would have benefited the wrongdoer wife.261 Nonethe-
less, basic community property rules dictate that the character of an asset
(here the recovery) depends upon how it is acquired, rather than from
whom it is acquired. This basic principle would indicate that the fortuitous
circumstance of the wife being separately liable in Freehe should not
dictate the character of the recovery.
Prior to the 1972 amendments, the husband as manager of the com-
munity property was held to be the only necessary party plaintiff in a tort
action, and in the case of divorce was owner of an undivided half of the
258. See supra notes 177-84 and accompanying text (Part III.E.4).
259. 21 Wn. App. 344, 585 P.2d 167 (1978), review denied, 92 Wn. 2d 1009 (1979).
260. 81 Wn. 2d 183, 500 P.2d 771 (1972).
261. If one thinks in terms of the estates involved (as is sometimes useful), her separate estate
would have to respond to their community estate-but of course, this speculation may be irrelevant with
the change coming from Brown.
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undisposed community cause of action and therefore a necessary party in
an action for injury to the wife, even after divorce. 262 After the 1972
amendments equalizing the managing power of the spouses, the injured
spouse, whether husband or wife, is the only necessary party plaintiff.
263
Doctrines of contributory negligence and imputation of negligence be-
tween spouses have also confounded the problems of tort actions by the
spouses. 264 Previously the husband's contributory negligence barred an
action for the wife's injury.265 These rules have been changed by section
4.22.020 of the Revised Code of Washington and its 1981 amendment,
which adopt the rule of comparative negligence in Washington and appar-
ently eliminate the imputation of negligence between spouses. 266
2. Recovery of Damages for Injury to Property
While the basic asset in the recovery of damages is the cause of action for
the harm done, whether to the person or property of the spouse, 267 tracing
to the source asset is obviously appropriate in the case of injury to property.
Upon recovery there is, in effect, an involuntary exchange with the cause of
action and the character of the subsequent recovery determined by tracing
to the character of the damaged property; thus, if the damaged property is
separate property, so too is the recovery, 268 and if community property, of
course, the recovery is community.
262. Schneider v. Biberger, 76 Wash. 504, 136 P. 701 (1913).
263. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.08.030 (1983).
264. See, e.g., Chase v. Beard, 55 Wn. 2d 58, 346 P.2d 315 (1959), noted in 35 WASH. L. REV. 249
(1960).
265. Ostheller v. Spokane & Inland Empire R.R., 107 Wash. 678, 182 P. 630 (1919).
266. See McGough, Editor's Notes, 28 WASH. ST. B. NEws, Apr. 1974, at 4; Comment, Com-
parative Negligence, 49 WASH. L. REV. 705 (1974). The amendment by Act of Apr. 17, 1981, ch. 27,
§ 10, 1981 Wash. Laws 112, 118 (tort reform), provides a spouse's contributory fault shall not be
imputed to the other spouse to diminish the recovery for fault resulting in injury to person or property,
whether separate or community. See a provocative discussion in Akers, Blood and Money-Separate or
Community Character of Personal Injury Recovery, 9 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 1 (1977), reprinted in 5
CoMm. PROP. J. 107 (1978), in which the author properly points out that the character of the asset should
be determined independently of the effect of contributory or comparative negligence of the noninjured
spouse, and suggests the Freehe solution offers the most equitable compromise of the competing
considerations. See also Christie v. Maxwell, 40 Wn. App. 40, 696 P.2d 1256 (1985), which reversed
the trial court's determination that wife's recovery for loss of consortium should be reduced by the
62.5% negligence attributable to husband. The court of appeals held the cause of action was separate
and independent, not derivative. Wife had argued that in any event husband's negligence could not be
imputed to her under the statute.
267. Clark v. Beggs, 138 Wash. 62, 244 P. 121 (1926).
268. W. DE FUNIAK & M. VAUGHN, supra note 2, § 86.
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I. Right to Reimbursement: The Equitable Lien
The community or separate property character of an asset becomes fixed
at the time of acquisition, but subsequent to acquisition, assets or labor of a
different character may be used to make payments in connection with the
transaction or to contribute to the quality or enhance the value of the
asset. 269 Such contributions may give rise to an equitable lien in favor of the
contributing fund or estate and thereby provide a protection to the contrib-
utor without ordinarily creating in the contributor a share or fraction of
ownership in the asset. This proposition has become somewhat confused by
the holding in In re Marriage of Elam,2 70 in which the equitable lien was
given for the contribution and for a proportionate part of the inflationary
increase in value. Elam is discussed below.271
Analysis of these problems should focus upon the following questions:
(1) What is the nature of the right protected? (2) Under what circumstances
will it arise? (3) How is it valued? (4) When and by whom may it be
asserted?
1. The Nature of the Right Protected
Although the right is commonly referred to as an "equitable lien," the
author believes that the better analysis postulates that the contributor has a
right to reimbursement 272 protected by an equitable lien. Under the usual
analysis a lien arises to assure performance of an obligation or duty, or
payment of a debt.273 For the right to arise, therefore, the creating transac-
tion must in effect involve a loan.
269. Whether the multiple character of assets devoted to the transaction control the character of the
asset is discussed above, particularly in the mortgage and installment acquisition cases. See supra notes
144-76 and accompanying text.
270. 97 Wn. 2d 811, 650 P.2d 213 (1982). For extensive discussion of problems in the area
including Elam, see Comment, Serving Two Masters: Expenditure of Community Labor andAssets on
Separate Property in Washington, 19 GONZ. L. REv. 519 (1984); Note, supra note 236.
271. See supra notes 235-38 and accompanying text; infra notes 292,299-303 and accompanying
text.
272. This is the basic Spanish law view. See W. DE FuNIAK & M. VAUGHN, supra note 2, § 73.
273. BLACK'S LAW DICrnONARY 832 (5th ed. 1979). Compare the analysis in Bartke, Yours, Mine
and Ours-Separate Title and Community Funds, 44 WASH. L. REv. 379 (1969). See the explanation of
an equitable lien by the court of appeals in Monegan v. Pacific Nat'l Bank, 16 Wn. App. 280, 287,556
P.2d 226, 231 (1976), which was not a community property case.
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2. Circumstances Under Which the Right Will Arise
The right to reimbursement is undoubtedly predicated upon equitable
considerations. Thus, the facts surrounding the contribution must be evalu-
ated to determine where the equities lie and whether the right to reimburse-
ment will arise. In the usual case, money of a character different from the
improved asset has been expended to discharge an obligation 274 or to build
or improve a structure, 275 but the contribution may also take the form of
labor of the spouse 276 which is in effect a community property contribu-
tion. Any one of the funds, separate-wife, separate-husband, or community
property, could be the source of the contribution to enhance the asset held
in any one of the other two categories. 277
The typical factual situation giving rise to a right of reimbursement has
involved the use of community property funds by the husband to improve
his separately owned real estate. Use of community funds by the managing
spouse to improve his or her own separate property presents the clearest
case for recognizing the right. Such use of funds does not change the
ownership of the improved asset, 278 and if no protection were given to the
community property position, the transaction would amount to a fraud on
the community property position and the other spouse.
If the managing spouse uses community property to improve his or her
separate property, there is a probability that reimbursement will be due and
the community right protected through an equitable lien. On the other
hand, if the manager uses his or her separate property to improve com-
munity property or the other's separate property, the likelihood that reim-
bursement will be due is smaller. The determination in both of these cases
depends upon the circumstances, including expectations, at the time of the
contribution; 279 the right to reimbursement is created then, if at all.
When the managing spouse uses community funds to improve the other
spouse's separate property, the possibility of a gift exists so that the right to
274. For example, payment of contract installments, mortgage principal and interest, taxes,
maintenance expenses. See cases cited infra note 288.
275. E.g., lnre Marriage of Elam, 97 Wn. 2d 811, 650 P.2d 213 (1982); Jones v. Davis, 15 Wn. 2d
567, 131 P.2d 433 (1942); Conley v. Moe, 7 Wn. 2d 355, 110 P.2d 172 (1941); In re Estate of Hart, 149
Wash. 600, 271 P. 886 (1928).
276. Legg v. Legg, 34 Wash. 132,75 P. 130(1904); lnre Estate ofTrierweiler, 5 Wn. App. 17,486
P.2d 314 (1971); see also Baker v. Baker, 80 Wn. 2d 736,498 P.2d 315 (1972); ll re Estate of Pugh. 18
Wn. 2d 501, 139 P.2d 698 (1943).
277. The lien was found for the wife's separate contribution to the husband's separate properties in
In re Estate of Trierweiler, 5 Wn. App. 17, 486 P.2d 314 (1971). See generalir W. DE FUNIAK & M.
VAUGHN, supra note 2, § 73.
278. See, e.g., Leroux v. Knoll, 28 Wn. 2d 964, 184 P.2d 564 (1947); Merritt v. Newkirk, 155
Wash. 517, 285 P. 442 (1930); Legg v. Legg, 34 Wash. 132, 75 P. 130 (1904).
279. The reimbursement might later be found to have been made, however. See infra note 294 and
accompanying text.
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reimbursement may never arise.280 The circumstances surrounding such
use of the community property by the manager must be examined to
determine the intention of the contributing spouse. It may be clear that the
husband intended a gift, particularly when a home is built upon the wife's
separate real property, 281 but his expectation that he would inherit the home
can be sufficient to establish the absence of a donative intent. 282 On the
other hand, if the contribution can reasonably be viewed as a business
investment or as supporting the operation of a business, it is unlikely that a
gift of the community property funds will be found.283 The community
property preference and the difficulty of overcoming the basic community
property presumption in cases involving a direct gift of an asset to a
spouse 284 also suggest that a community property "interest" is likely to
remain in such contributions. 285 While the traditional problem has been the
husband's use of community funds to improve the wife's separate property,
the use of community funds by the wife to improve the separate real
property of the husband should pose identical problems under the equal
managing power she now has by reason of the 1972 amendments.
If separate property is contributed to improve either the community
property or the other spouse's separate property, the claim of the contrib-
utor to a right to reimbursement is probably weaker. If the separate
property contribution is to community property, the preference with which
community property is treated militates against any right in the contributor.
Further, in this case as well as where separate property is contributed to the
other spouse's separate property, there is a probability that the contribution
is a gift; the presumption of a gift when one spouse purchases property With
separate funds taking title in the other spouse's name furnishes a close
analogy.286 Although the contribution is not a title-acquiring transaction,
the rule that title to the benefited property is not changed by the contribu-
tion287 in effect shifts the title of the separate property contribution, when it
is used for the improvement or payment of the obligation relating to the
other spouse's separate property, or their community property, to the owner
280. There is some suggestion that a gift is presumed, though probably not from the mere fact of
such use of the funds. See Sackman v. Thomas, 24 Wash. 660, 64 P. 819 (1901).
281. In re Estate of Hart, 149 Wash. 600, 271 P. 886 (1928).
282. In re Estate of Hickman, 41 Wn. 2d 519, 250 P.2d 524 (1952).
283. In re Estate of Carmack, 133 Wash. 374, 233 P. 942 (1925), as explained in In re Estate of
Hart, 149 Wash. 600,271 P. 886 (1928);In re Estate of Trierweiler, 5 Wn. App. 17,486 P.2d 314 (1971)
(community contribution to the husband's separate asset used in business).
284. E.g., In re Estate of Slocum, 83 Wash. 158, 145 P. 204 (1915).
285. The "interest" is not an ownership share, however. See the explanation in W.T. Rawleigh Co.
v. McLeod, 151 Wash. 221, 224-25, 275 P. 700, 702 (1929), of the use of the term in In re Estate of
Carmack, 133 Wash. 374, 233 P. 942 (1925).
286. See cases cited supra note 97.
287. See cases cited supra note 278.
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of the benefited property.288 Rebutting this presumption of gift involves
measuring the facts of the contribution transaction and should be similar to
showing the absence of a donative intent when community property is used
to improve the other spouse's separate property.
Even in situations other than gifts, the right to reimbursement may not
arise because the contributor may have realized some current benefit by
using the asset. In re Marriage of Miracle289 is the clearest expression of
this proposition. 290 During the marriage the wife owned separately two
houses in one of which she and her husband lived. Wage and rental income
was deposited in a single account and payments on the purchase contracts
for both houses were made from that account. The husband appealed the
trial court's determination that the rental value of the house occupied as a
home ($250 to $300 per month) should be offset against the community
payments on the purchase contract for the home ($124 to $151 per month).
The court of appeals remanded on this issue implying that the trial court
had erred in failing to impress the wife's separate property with an equita-
ble lien in favor of the community for the community funds expended on the
family residence. The supreme court reversed, reinstated the judgment of
the trial court, and said, "We believe that the trial court properly refused to
impose an equitable lien in favor of the community in view of the finding
that the community had been adequately compensated for its expenditures
by its beneficial use of the premises." 291 The court concluded, "We cannot
find that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to recognize a right
to reimbursement in this case." 292 In addition, if the improved asset is
income producing, the claim of contribution may fail by reason of the
presumption that the proper fund (the income from the asset) has been used
to make the improvement, 293 and also because of the possibility that the use
288. Payments on a mortgage obligation can give rise to the equitable lien, Merkel v. Merkel, 39
Wn. 2d 102,234 P.2d 857 (1951); so also with payments on a purchase contract, Fritch v. Fritch, 53 Wn.
2d 496, 335 P.2d 43 (1959); Farrow v. Ostrom, 16 Wn. 2d 547, 133 P.2d 974 (1943).
289. 101 Wn. 2d 137, 675 P.2d 1229 (1984).
290. Cf Merkel v. Merkel, 39 Wn. 2d 102, 116,234 P.2d 857, 864 (1951) (treatment of interest, tax
and upkeep payments as being "no more than reasonable rental for the use of the land").
291. 101 Wn. 2d at 139,675 P.2d at 1230.
292. Id. It should be noted that In re Marriage of Elam, 97 Wn. 2d 811, 650 P.2d 213 (1982),
discussed supra notes 235-38, 270 and accompanying text, infra notes 299-303 and accompanying
text, may be inconsistent although it involved rights stemming from improvements made on separate
property and not payments on a purchase contract. In Miracle there was neither improvement nor a labor
contribution, only monetary contributions. Elam is like most other marriage dissolution cases in that
there is no indication that argument was made that reimbursement had already been made, or that the
contribution was a gift, or that reciprocal benefit was provided, or that there was some other basis for
concluding an equitable lien should be denied. It is therefore difficult to determine whether the
possibilities were overlooked or whether in marriage dissolution cases the reimbursement/equitable
lien pattern has attached almost automatically.
293. See, e.g., cases cited supra notes 167, 223.
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of subsequent income from the asset has in substance effected repayment so
that there is no longer an equity existing for the contributor. 294
3. The Value of the Right
When money has been contributed, the amount advanced has been the
measure of the right,295 without particular attention being given to the
possibility that the use of the money may not have increased the value of the
asset by the amount advanced. 296 If the contribution is labor, the value of
the right should be determined by calculating what would be reasonable
wages, but it could be fixed as the resulting increase in value of the thing on
which the labor is bestowed. Choosing between the alternatives may be
facilitated by considering for whom the protection is sought and the
possible results had the contribution been directed to some other purpose.
Thus, if a spouse expends community funds in connection with his or her
separate property, the claim for the community estate should be the full
expenditure, both because the other spouse's interest in those funds would
otherwise be depleted without consent and because the funds could be used
to secure a full return by almost any other use. A comparable argument can
be made if the contribution is labor, that is, the reasonable value of the labor
should be the measure. However, if one spouse works on or expends
community funds on the other spouse's separate property, without intend-
ing a gift, only the increased value should be the measure, because the
contributing spouse hardly needs to be protected against an unintended use
of the community asset, and there would be a danger that a contrary result
could involve giving a power to one spouse to "improve the other out" of
his (or her) separate property.297
294. This probably was the factual situation inln re Estate of Woodbum, 190 Wash. 141,66 P.2d
1138 (1937). Spouses moved onto unimproved, undeveloped land that was separately owned and made it
productive. Income therefrom, which during the marriage exceeded all expenses relating to the land
and with other income was devoted to normal family expenses and investments, was conceded to be
community property. The court held there was no equitable lien for the community improvement.
295. See cases cited supra note 288; Jones v. Davis, 15 Wn. 2d 567, 131 P.2d 433 (1942). However,
in Conley v. Moe, 7 Wn. 2d 355, 110 P.2d 172 (1941), the community contributed $2500 to build a
home, but the lien was fixed by the trial court at $2000. There is nothing in the opinions or the briefs to
explain the difference.
296. If the money is used to pay an obligation, e.g., taxes, mortgage note, or contract installment,
there would be that much increase in the recipient's worth (though probably not in the net equity in the
asset), but if the money is used to make physical improvements or repairs, the market value of the asset
would not necessarily be enhanced equally.
297. An analogy may be drawn to the partition of property that is subject to a co-ownership. In such
a partition proceeding a co-owner may not demand an allocation before a division of sale proceeds of
more than the amount his improvements increased the sale price. In short, the rules of equity control. 2
AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 6.18 n.15 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952); 4A R. POWELL, REAL PROPERTY
604, 614 (1973).
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In addition, it is conceivable that the reimbursement amount should be
augmented by an interest factor, although consideration of all the equities
probably would indicate that the "contributor" has received some benefit
through the use of the improved asset which could offset any argument for
such an addition to the recovery.298
If in addition to the "contribution" there is an inflationary increase in
value, the analysis becomes more complex because of the holding in In re
Marriage of Elam, 299 in which the court held there should be an equitable
lien for the amount of the contribution plus a proportionate part of the
inflationary increase in value. On the basis of the husband's testimony the
supreme court calculated that at the time of the marriage the wife's
separately owned home was worth $15,000, and that during the marriage
$5500 had been contributed as community funds and labor to improve the
home. The trial court had found the contribution was $9000 and awarded
the husband $5000 (protected by a lien) for his share of that contribution;
but the supreme court noted that $3500 of the total contribution was made
before the marriage, hence the $5500 figure.
The trial court set the value of the house at $34,000 at the time of
dissolution. The husband argued that the entire $26,500 increase in value
from the $7500 at marriage to the $34,000 at dissolution should be
community property (of which he should have half) in the absence of proof
by the wife to rebut a presumption of the community character of the
increase. The trial court obviously did not adopt that argument and the
court of appeals certified to the supreme court the question of the extent of
community interest in the inflationary increase in value of separate prop-
erty where community funds and labor were used to improve the property.
The supreme court held that there is a presumption that an increase in
value of separate property is separate, which can be rebutted by direct and
positive evidence that the increase is attributable to community funds or
labor. The court then approved the trial court's determination that $5000
should be awarded to the husband for his share of the community's interest
as being sufficiently supported by the evidence and consistent with the
principles articulated in the case, and because the trial court found without
objection that the distribution was fair and equitable.
298. The late Professor Bartke cautioned that if separate property is improved with community
funds, the increased benefit may be realized as community property if rents, issues, and profits of the
separate property constitute community property or if the improved asset is used for community
purposes. However, where rents, issues, and profits are separate property (as in Washington) or the
improved asset is not used for community purposes, the contrary result is reached. Bartke, supra note
273, at 385-86.
299. 97 Wn. 2d 811, 650 P.2d 213 (1982). Elam also points out that a mere increase in value during
marriage of a separate asset does not create any community interest or right in the asset. See supra notes
235-38, 270, 292 and accompanying text.
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The supreme court's calculation identified $2750 as the husband's share
of the improvements and added $1809 as his share of the inflationary
increase for a total of $4559. The $1809 figure was derived by first
determining that the increase in value by inflation, from the $20,500 value
without inflation (a combination of the $15,000 value at marriage and the
$5500 community improvements) to the $34,000 value at dissolution, was
$13,300 [sic]; second, that thirteen percent was the husband's part of the
"beginning" improved value (the ratio of half of the community contribu-
tion over the improved value of the house, that is, $2750/$20,500 equals
approximately thirteen percent); and finally, that the husband should share
in the inflationary increase in value by that percentage.
The formula the court developed approaches a proposition that a com-
munity improvement creates share of ownership in the improved asset, but
certainly the court's analysis does not reflect a purposeful change from the
long stated position that the ownership of an asset is not modified by
contributions that might lead to an equitable lien and for which there must
be reimbursement. Note that the court separately calculated the contribu-
tion to be protected and the sharing in the inflationary increase, even though
it added the amounts together to fix the total for the equitable lien.
The author believes that Elam introduces an unnecessary and undesira-
ble complexity into the reimbursement/equitable lien area. Furthermore,
Elam may be inconsistent with the later case of In re Marriage of Mira-
cle,300 in which the community benefit from living rent free in the improved
separate property offset the duty to reimburse, unless a distinction is to be
drawn between payments on a purchase (or mortgage) obligation and
physical improvements. There has been no indication that the nature of the
contribution is significant except as it complicates the calculation of the
amount of reimbursement due.
Elam is difficult to apply. If the improvement contribution was made
shortly before the settling of the "accounts" at separation or dissolution or
gradually during the marriage, should there be a sharing of the inflationary
increase from the time of marriage? The author thinks that this should not
occur, but in effect that did occur in Elam unless all the $5500 of improve-
ments were made promptly after marriage, which seems improbable. How
should Elam be applied to the situation of a large tract of land in which only
a small area has been improved? Should the sharing be in the inflationary
increase in value of the "unimproved" portion or should it only apply to the
small area where the improvement is? Reimbursement that merely calls for
return of the same amount that has been contributed, dollar for dollar,
obviously can, by reason of inflation, leave the contributor in a less
300. 101 Wn. 2d 137, 675 P.2d 1229 (1984); see supra note 292.
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advantageous position. This may be what prompted Judge Roe in McCoy v.
Ware30 1 to assert that protection against inflation ought to be provided.
Does the reasoning indicate there should be an adjustment if the value
deflates or otherwise decreases? The lack of clear delineation in the cases of
how the right of reimbursement is to be valued may be the source of the
unfortunate difficulties the author perceives likely to develop. They will be
minimized if Elam is confined to the narrowest application possible, or
preferably abandoned altogether.
The right of reimbursement/equitable lien concept is obviously based on
equitable principles and inherently has capacity to adjust to the particular
circumstances of a situation. It would be possible to fix the amount to be
reimbursed at the increase in value measured at the time reimbursement
was sought and traceable to the contribution made. This would adjust the
amount automatically for inflation or deflation and would approach equita-
ble ownership by the contributor in the improvement. It would put the risk
of loss on the contributor; for example, there would be no reimbursement if
the improvement were destroyed. Perhaps a comparable treatment of mone-
tary contributions through payment of installments on a purchase obliga-
tion or mortgage note would call for reimbursement in the amount of the
increased equity, that is, the amount by which the principal obligation was
reduced, but this would not recognize that the contribution also covered an
interest factor.302
In light of the above considerations, the author believes the following to
be the most workable approach to these problems. First, the size of the
contribution should be established as the amount of money advanced or, if a
labor contribution, as reasonable wages, or both, measured at the time the
contribution is made. Then, that figure should be increased, if need be, by
an addition of interest in the event of inflation or absence of any concurrent
benefit to the contributor, or the figure should be decreased or not adjusted,
if there has been benefit received by the contributor. By this method, one
will arrive at the amount to be reimbursed and to be protected by the
equitable lien against appropriate assets of the recipient of the contribution.
The process would basically involve a loan or advancement analysis, and
the adjustments would depend upon equitable considerations permitting
recognition of which "estate" was the contributor and the circumstances of
the contribution, as suggested above. 303
301. 25 Wn. App. 648, 608 P.2d 1268 (1980). There is merely the statement by Judge Roe to the
effect that inflation was not considered in the evolution of the "equitable lien" rules and it should now be
a factor. In Elam the court adopts Judge Roe's idea without any further analysis.
302. These varying solutions are reached in one or more of the community property states. See W.
MCCLANAHAN, supra note 2, §§ 6:15 to 6:17 (1982 & Supp. 1984).
303. See supra notes 278-88, 295-97 and accompanying text.
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4. When and by Whom the Right May Be Asserted
Obviously, the right to reimbursement is most likely to be asserted when
the asset is liquidated or when there is the general settling of "accounts" of
the respective spouse's estates; but the right of reimbursement should not
be lost merely by dissipation of the asset, or because the contribution was
consumed. 3°4 Between the spouses, the problems have typically arisen
when one dies so that there is a settling or ordering of the accounts of their
respective estates and interests in connection with the estate administra-
tion.305 They also can arise in identifying community and separate property
interests preliminary to a division in divorce. 306
As between themselves, the husband or wife can assert the right or waive
it, assuming no equities between them require a different result, but the
assertion of the right by or against creditors presents a more complicated
problem. In Conley v. Moe307 the Washington Supreme Court, in a five-four
decision, concluded that the trustee in bankruptcy could assert the com-
munity equitable lien against the husband's improved separate realty. The
dissent contended that since the wife was not asserting any need for such
protection of her community position, there was no right that a creditor
could reach. There was nothing in the facts of the case to show persuasively
that the contributions were intended as gifts of community property to the
husband separately, and the argument against finding an equitable lien
essentially goes to the effectiveness of relinquishing the right to reimburse-
ment rather than to its creation. As against the creditor, the nature of the
original (creating) transaction or the later (relinquishing) transaction ought
to be resolved in the creditor's favor unless the opponent(s) can show the
good faith quality of the contrary position. The statute308 supports such a
proposition and would protect against the spouses' taking the position
currently most advantageous, even though that position did not accord with
the facts of the transaction. It is also possible that the transaction (creating
or relinquishing) could amount to a gift in fraud of existing creditors. 309
304. See, e.g., In re Trierweiler, 5 Wn. App. 17, 486 P.2d 314(1971).
305. Most of the cases cited previously involve estate administration. In such cases reimbursement
would normally be made without any necessity of equitable lien analysis.
306. E.g., Miracle, 101 Wn. 2d 137,675 P.2d 1229; Elam, 97 Wn. 2d 811,650 P.2d 213; Merkel v.
Merkel, 39 Wn. 2d 102, 234 P.2d 857 (1951).
307. 7 Wn. 2d 355, 110 P.2d 172(1941).
308. WASH. REv. CODE § 26.16.210 (1983) states:
In every case, where any question arises as to the good faith of any transaction between husband
and wife, whether a transaction between them directly or by intervention of third person or
persons, the burden of proof shall be upon the party asserting the good faith.
309. W. DE FuNiK & M. VAUGHN, supra note 2, § 174.
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In Farrow v. Ostrom,310 reimbursement to the wife for separate funds
applied toward the purchase of community property was granted priority
over the claim of the community creditor, although an earlier case has
apparently reached a contrary result. 311 Three other cases suggest the
possibility that the "equitable lien" could come ahead of creditors, 312
although the secured creditor may be protected by the recording act. 313 The
court concluded in Leroux v. Knol 3 14 that there was no need to protect the
claim against a contract purchaser because the equitable lien could be
satisfied out of the proceeds the seller received.
IV. MANAGEMENT AND VOLUNTARY DISPOSITION
The rules controlling management and voluntary disposition of com-
munity property, largely settled over the years, were changed by the 1972
amendments so that now either spouse is authorized to act alone, 315
whereas previously only the husband could do so. The 1972 amendments
also specified new situations in which the joint action of the spouses is
required 316 and added a puzzling paragraph concerning community busi-
nesses, 317 discussed briefly below. 318 The analysis in pre-1972 cases that
defined the scope of the management and transfer power of the husband
before the statutory equalization of the power between the spouses is now
applicable to the wife's acts as well.
A. Inter Vivos Transfers: Joinder Requirements
The statute 319 has long required joint action of the spouses to sell,
convey, or encumber community real estate. The 1972 amendments added
ajoint action requirement in four new situations: (1) to purchase or contract
to purchase community real property;320 (2) to sell, convey, or encumber
310. 16 Wn. 2d 547, 133 P.2d 974 (1943).
311. Walker v. Fowler, 155 Wash. 631, 285 P. 649 (1930). Despite the urging by the dissent in
Walker, the possibility was not even discussed by the majority.
312. deElche v. Jacobsen, 95 Wn. 2d 237, 622 P.2d 835 (1980); Iredell v. Iredell, 49 Wn. 2d 627,
305 P.2d 805 (1957); W.T. Rawleigh Co. v. McLeod, 151 Wash. 221, 275 P. 700 (1929).
313. Federal Land Bank v. Schidleman, 193 Wash. 435, 75 P.2d 1010 (1938).
314. 28 Wn. 2d 964, 184 P.2d 564 (1947).
315. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.030 (1983).
316. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.030(4), (5) (1983).
317. Id. § 26.16.030(6) (1983).
318. See infra notes 400-02 and accompanying text (Part IV.B.2).
319. Id. § 26.16.030(3) (1983). The prior provision to the same effect was § 26.16.040 (1958)
(amended 1972).
320. Id. § 26.16.030(4); see supra notes 205-10 and accompanying text (Part III.F).
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community household goods, furnishings, or appliances; 321 (3) to acquire,
purchase, sell, convey, or encumber community business assets where both
spouses participate in the management of the business;322 and (4) to give
community property,323 although this requirement had been judicially
established prior to the 1972 amendments. Not surprisingly, most of the
cases in which there is discussion of a joinder requirement involve real
property. Some personal property assets are now included. In both the old
and new situations, the analysis developed to satisfy the statutory joinder
requirement in the real estate context will probably be acceptable.
1. Classification as Real or Personal Property; Household Goods
Whether the community property asset involved in a particular transac-
tion is to be classified as real property so that joint action of the spouses is
required, or as personal property (other than household goods, etc.) so that
action of either alone is sufficient is determined by the rules ordinarily
applied in other legal contexts. Accordingly, it has been held that joint
action is necessary to convey or contract to sell a fee estate in land,324
encumber the estate by mortgage 325 or lease, 326 or create an easement or
profit. 327 A community property leasehold, however, is personal property,
and it has been held that the husband can transfer it without the wife's
participation. 328
The difference between the effectiveness of the transfer and the character
of the asset acquired by the transfer should be noted. The leasing of
community real estate requires joint action because it is either a conveyance
of or creates an encumbrance on real estate, but the leasehold acquired is
personal property. In contrast, although the granting of an easement or
profit similarly encumbers the community real estate, it creates a real
property interest in the transferee. 329
321. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.030(5) (1983). In 1981, the legislature added community mobile
homes to this list. Id.
322. See id. § 26.16.030(6); see infra notes 400-02 and accompanying text (Part IV.B.2).
323. WASH. REv. CODE § 26.16.030(2) (1983).
324. Colpe v. Lindblom, 57 Wash. 106, 106 P. 634 (1910).
325. Campbell v. Sandy, 190 Wash. 528, 69 P.2d 808 (1937).
326. Bowman v. Hardgrove, 200 Wash. 78,93 P.2d 303 (1939); Kaufmanv. Perkins, 114 Wash. 40,
194 P. 802 (1921).
327. Bakke v. Columbia Valley Lumber Co., 49 Wn. 2d 165, 298 P.2d 849 (1956); Northwestern
Lumber Co. v. Bloom, 135 Wash. 195, 237 P. 295 (1925).
328. Gabrielson v. Swinburne, 184 Wash. 242, 51 P.2d 368 (1935); Tibbals v. Iffland, 10 Wash.
451, 39 P. 102 (1895).
329. This interest probably can be transferred only by joint action of the spouses, despite the
difference in the statutory language of the management statute-real property-and the transfer
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The community property interest of the vendor, after creation of a
contract purchaser's interest, has been held to be personal property. 330 The
purchaser's interest should, therefore, be real property, 331 and either an
assignment of that interest to a third person or its release to the vendor
should require joint action by the spouses. A number of cases support these
conclusions. 332 The extent to which the vendors' interest in the real estate
can be modified by one spouse acting alone, however, is unclear. As a
personal property asset, it can be managed by either spouse, and modifica-
tion might be merely management so far as community property princi-
ples 333 are concerned. If so, the effectiveness of the act would depend upon
contract principles beyond the scope of this discussion. 334 Should the court
require some kind of joint action, 335 practical resolution of the problem
could lie in finding a presumption of the other spouse's approval or
concurrence, as has been done in a reformation case. 336
Despite a dissenting opinion that the policy of the statute to protect
certain major assets against unilateral disposition by one spouse should
have given protection, the court held in Cooper's Mobile Homes v. Sim-
mons 337 that a mobile home was neither real property nor household goods
within the meaning of the statute requiring joinder. This probably triggered
the 1981 amendment adding a mobile home to the "joinder" list.
statute-real estate. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.030(3) (1983) reads:
Neither spouse shall sell, convey, or encumber the community real property without the other
spouse joining in the execution of the deed or other instrument by which the real estate is sold,
conveyed, or encumbered, and such deed or other instrument must be acknowledged by both
spouses.
See Ross v. Howard, 31 Wash. 393, 72 P. 74 (1903).
330. Meltzer v. Wendell-West, 7 Wn. App. 90, 497 P.2d 1348 (1972).
331. Cf Eckley v. Bonded Adjustment Co., 30 Wn. 2d 96, 190 P.2d 718 (1948).
332. In re Washburn, 98 Wn. 2d 311, 654 P.2d 700 (1982) (purchaser who had "conveyed" his
interest to the seller in a rescission of the real estate contract had a vendor's lien for the balance of the
down payment not returned, effective against a claim of homestead); Freeborn v. Seattle Trust & Say.
Bank, 94 Wn. 2d 336, 617 P.2d 424 (1980) (assignment of vendor's interest as security for debt must be
filed to be perfected as a security interest under the U.C.C. and if title is conveyed, interest must also be
recorded in the county land records); Cascade Security Bank v. Butler, 88 Wn. 2d 777, 567 P.2d 631
(1977) (purchaser's interest in real estate is subject to judgment lien); Monegan v. Pacific Nat'l Bank, 16
Wn. App. 280, 556 P.2d 226 (1976); see also WASH. REV. CODE § 4.56.190 (1983), providing that the
seller's interest in a real estate contract is not real property subject to the lien of a judgment rendered
after the effective date of the Act (Aug. 23, 1983).
333. It was at least suggested that the husband's act of modifying the contract terms was effective in
In re Horse Heaven Irrigation Dist., 19 Wn. 2d 89, 95, 141 P.2d 400, 403 (1943).
334. For example, could the spouse of the contracting party effectively act?
335. As personal property, its disposition should not require joint action.
336. Keierleber v. Botting, 77 Wn. 2d 711, 466 P.2d 141 (1970).
337. 94 Wn. 2d 321, 617 P.2d 415 (1980), noted in Note, Community Property: Mobile Homes. 16
GONZ. L. REV. 947 (1981).
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There is some indication that the husband (and after the 1972 amend-
ments, the wife) acting alone could put someone in possession of com-
munity real property as a periodic tenant, 338 suggesting that a management
rather than a transfer power had been exercised. Under the 1972 amend-
ments, the tenant could be confronted with a dilemma if the other spouse
disagreed and gave notice of the termination of the periodic tenancy. A
tenant at will could face similar problems.
The substance of a transaction may support the conclusion that it does
not fall within the statutory requirement of joinder. The court has reason-
ably held that the legal title held by a trustee can be transferred without
joinder of the trustee's spouse, the trustee having no beneficial interest in
the subject matter of the transfer.339 This reasoning also might be applied to
a fulfillment deed by a vendor of land, particularly if the vendor's interest
had been previously transferred to another, but it would be safer to insist
that both spouses execute any fulfillment deed of land formerly owned as
community real property. The court also has held that some transactions-
assignment for the benefit of creditors340 and abandonment of oyster
lands341-do not constitute conveyances within the meaning of the statute
and hence do not require joinder. A quitclaim deed from a contract
purchaser to his vendor (technically a conveyance by release) might involve
a comparable situation if it is really the recognition of the loss of a right by
forfeiture. Prior to the extension of management power to the wife, the
husband alone could have forfeited the community property interest in a
forfeitable executory contract of purchase by defaulting on payments
permitting the vendor to declare the forfeiture. 342 Now, however, either
spouse can make the payments in the community interest and avoid accrual
of the right to forfeit.
2. The Joinder Requirement: Community Realty or Household Goods,
etc.
Although the present statute343 requires the real estate transfer instru-
ment to be executed by both spouses, the court has held under the previous
statute344 (when only the husband had managing power) that an instrument
338. Cf. Ryan v. Lambert, 49 Wash. 649, 96 P. 232 (1908).
339. Leslie v. Midgate Center, Inc., 72 Wn. 2d 977, 436 P.2d 201 (1967); see also O'Steen v.
Estate of Wineberg, 30 Wn. App. 923, 640 P.2d 28 (1982).
340. Thygesen v. Neufelder, 9 Wash. 455, 37 P. 672 (1894).
341. Halvorsen v. Pacific County, 22 Wn. 2d 532, 156 P.2d 907 (1945); Annot., 158 A.L.R. 555
(1945).
342. But not if done to defraud the wife. Jarrett v. Arnerich, 44 Wn. 2d 55, 265 P.2d 282 (1954).
343. WASH. REv. CODE § 26.16.030(3) (1983).
344. Id. § 26.16.040 (1958), amended by Act of Feb. 23, 1972, ch. 108, § 4,1972 Wash. Laws 2d
Ex. Sess. 244, 246.
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executed only by the husband was effective to create the intended rights in
the transferee if it could be shown that the wife had authorized the husband
to act, 345 estopped herself to deny the effectiveness of the act, 346 or ratified
the act. 347 The substance of the joint action requirement is that effective-
ness depends upon "participation" by both spouses, and the statutory
requirement of joinder in execution of the instrument is only one means of
participation. Thus, the failure to meet the statutory standard does not
make the husband's (now the spouse's) 348 act void, but merely voidable. In
addition to becoming bound by "participation," the spouse will become
bound on the contract if he or she joins as plaintiff to compel the pur-
chase.349
The court has concluded essentially that the requirement ofjoinder is for
the protection of the wife (now the nonjoining spouse) and cannot be
affirmatively asserted by the transferee. Rather, the transferee must first
request joinder and be refused before he can withdraw from the transac-
tion. 350
As noted above in Part III.F, there is comparable analysis that "par-
ticipation" without formal signing is enough to satisfy the new real prop-
erty acquisition provision. 351 The indications are that the same reasoning is
to be applied for transfer of household goods, furnishings, and ap-
pliances. 352
Under the new provision in 1972 concerning management of a com-
munity business, 353 situations may arise in which the joinder requirement
would be inapplicable. If only one spouse participates in the management
of a community business, that spouse acting alone may transfer the assets
of the business (including real estate) without the consent of the other
spouse. The dimensions of this possibility remain obscure and are dis-
cussed briefly below in Part IV.B.2. 354
345. Whiting v. Johnson, 64 Wn. 2d 135, 390 P.2d 985 (1964); Konnerup v. Frandsen, 8 Wash.
551, 36 P. 493 (1894).
346. E.g., Campbell v. Webber, 29 Wn. 2d 516, 188 P.2d 130 (1947).
347. E.g., In re Horse Heaven Irrigation Dist., 19 Wn. 2d 89, 141 P.2d 400 (1943).
348. The equal management power of each spouse should mean the initial formal act of the wife can
be effective if the husband "participates."
349. Tombari v. Griepp, 55 Wn. 2d 771, 350 P.2d 452 (1960).
350. See, e.g., Stabbert v. Atlas Imperial Diesel Engine Co., 39 Wn. 2d 789,238 P.2d 1212(1951);
Colcord v. Leddy, 4 Wash. 791, 31 P. 320 (1892).
351. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.030(4) (1983). See supra notes 205-10 and accompanying text.
352. See Everest v. Levenson, 15 Wn. App. 645, 551 P.2d 159 (1976). A "community mobile
home" should be added to the list because of its inclusion by the 1981 amendment of WASH. REV. CODE
§ 26.16.030(5).
353. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.030(6) (1983).
354. See infra notes 400-02 and accompanying text.
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As noted above in Part III.A, 355 the location of the paper title between the
spouses does not necessarily establish the location of ownership, nor its
character. Consequently, the appearance of an adequate title in just one
spouse in the land records, when in fact the title is held as community
property, may mislead a prospective purchaser by suggesting that he may
obtain good title by obtaining a conveyance from only that spouse. An 1891
statute356 is designed to protect a bona fide purchaser from such a record
title holder unless the other spouse has recorded a claim of interest in the
real estate. However, the difficulty of establishing the position of bona fide
purchaser against a community property claim is great. 357 Indeed, it is
arguably excessive, and practically speaking, the statute is a dead letter.
Title examiners assume a person who appears to be the sole owner of real
estate is married and that the real estate is community property.
3. Joinder Through Agency
Prior to the 1972 amendments, the court had held that the husband could
make the wife an agent to conduct community affairs or transactions either
directly or indirectly through estoppel or ratification. 358 In ordinary situa-
tions, there now will be no need to find that one spouse has been made an
agent by the other because both spouses have equal management powers.
However, when joint action is required, agency reasoning may be a route to
finding the necessary "participation" by both spouses. An intended agency
can be established by means of a power of attorney granted by one spouse to
the other, as provided by statute.359
4. Emergency Powers-Guardianship
In Marston v. Rue,360 the wife, who at that time possessed no manage-
ment power, was held to have an emergency power to act to protect and
preserve community property and to transfer perishable personal property
to avoid loss while the husband was unavailable. Such acts now would
clearly be within her statutory power as comanager and would not call for
analysis on the basis of emergency. However, where joint action is required
to act, there may still be some occasion to premise the effectiveness of the
355. See supra notes 65-84 and accompanying text.
356. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 26.16.095, .100, .110 (1983).
357. See, e.g., Campbell v. Sandy, 190 Wash. 528, 69 P.2d 808 (1937).
358. Lucci v. Lucci, 2 Wn. 2d 624, 99 P.2d 393 (1940); Wallace v. Thomas, 193 Wash. 582, 76
P.2d 1032 (1938); Short v. Dolling, 178 Wash. 467, 35 P.2d 82 (1934).
359. WASH. REv. CODE § 26.16.090 (1983).
360. 92 Wash. 129, 159 P. 111 (1916).
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"other" spouse's sole act on an emergency power. The serious absence361
or the total incompetence 362 of a spouse could present situations in which
there should be found an emergency power of one to act for the other 363 or
both, although the "perishable" nature of the asset involved, upon which
the emergency power in Marston was premised, probably no longer will be
a factor.
The court has held that the managing power of a spouse is constrained
while acting as guardian of the other spouse and must conform to the more
restrictive fiduciary responsibilities of a guardian. 364 In the case cited, the
court noted that the wife had voluntarily become guardian and inventoried
the land and other assets in the guardianship estate, thereby necessarily
relinquishing some management power. The potential awkwardness in
management is patent. Perhaps the complications could be avoided by
exclusion of some assets from an inventory or, more reasonably, court
authorization in advance for normal managing power as to particular assets
or actions.
B. Inter Vivos Management and Transfer Powers of Spouses Acting
Alone
Each spouse acting alone, in the best interests of the community property
in a business sense, may now manage and transfer community personal
property, with the exception of household goods, furnishings, or ap-
pliances, a community mobile home,365 assets of community busi-
nesses, 366 and gifts. 367 In those situations in which one spouse may effec-
tively act alone, the disagreement of the other as to the wisdom of the
transaction is immaterial. Under the pre-1972 decisions, when the husband
exercised his discretion in the community interest as he saw it, the wife was
without power to frustrate his acts; 368 good faith rather than good judgment
361. Id. at 129, 159 P. at 113.
362. Foster v. Williams, 4 Wn. App. 659, 484 P.2d 438 (1971).
363. The particular example is the new statutory requirement that the injured spouse or the
employed spouse is the necessary party in the actions for personal injury, and for compensation for
services, respectively. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.08.030 (1983).
364. Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Brommers, 89 Wn. 2d 190, 570 P.2d 1035 (1977) (wife was held
liable for treble damages for waste for improperly authorizing logging of all merchantable timber, and
was required to account for unauthorized sales of personal property).
365. WASH. REv. CODE § 26.16.030(5) (1983). Mobile homes were included by Act Relating to
Property, ch. 304, § 1, 1981 Wash. Laws 1396, 1397.
366. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.030(6) (1983).
367. Id. § 26.16.030(2) (1983).
368. See, e.g., Hanley v. Most, 9 Wn. 2d 429, 115 P.2d 933 (1941) (husband put enough corporate
shares in voting trust to give his business associate voting-and managing-control of corporation
which previously was in husband's control; wife's challenge unsuccessful); Bellingham Motors Corp.
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was the rule. Similarly, the wife's acts should now be equally effective
under the 1972 amendments despite the husband's disagreement.
Because in ordinary personal property transactions each spouse may
now act alone, there obviously can be competing transferees, each relying
on the act of a different spouse; these problems do not appear to be any
different than those involved in competing transfers by partners or compet-
ing transfers to more than one transferee in other contexts, and will not be
analyzed in this discussion.
1. Management of Community Personal Property: Requirement of a
Business Purpose
As previously mentioned, the basic rule is that the manager must act in
the best interests of the community property in a business sense. 369 While
this rule has been traditionally applicable to the husband alone as a
community manager, the wife must exercise the equal management powers
conferred upon her by the 1972 amendments in a like manner. Essentially,
this judicial doctrine originated to preclude the unilateral gift of com-
munity property; 370 inter vivos gifts of community property are void ab
initio and in toto without the consent of both spouses. 371 While it has been
argued that a community purpose, or at least a permissible disposition of
v. Lindberg, 126 Wash. 684, 219 P. 19 (1923) (husband contracted to buy a truck despite wife's belief
(known to seller) that the transaction was unwise; she was right but community liability was found
nonetheless). If either spouse could contest the judgment of the other, as a practical matter joint
participation by the spouses would always be necessary before a third party could safely transact
business with the community.
369. Sun Life Assurance Co. ofCanada v. Outler, 172 Wash. 540, 20 P.2d 1110 (1933). The statute,
however, indicates that the managing power over the community property is similar to that over separate
property. WASH. REv. CODE § 26.16.030 (1983). Before the 1972 changes, the husband's power was
similarly stated in WASH. REv. CODE § 26.16.030 (1958) (personalty) (amended 1972), but
§ 26.16.040 (1958) (realty) (amended 1972) stated that he had management power over community
realty but joint action was required for transfers.
370. The proposition is the basis of the holding in Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada v. Outler, 172
Wash. 540,20 P.2d 1110 (1933), which overruled Stevens v. Naches State Bank, 136 Wash. 137,238 P.
918 (1925), wherein the court reasoned that the husband's act of pledging a certificate of deposit as
security for their son's debt would have been approved by the wife in all probability.
371. See Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. Powers, 192 Wash. 475, 74 P.2d 27 (1937); In re Estate of
Yiatchos, 60 Wn. 2d 179,373 P.2d 125 (1962), rev'd on other grounds, Yiatchos v. Yiatchos, 376 U.S.
306 (1964). Since the gift serves no business purpose, it is not within the manager's power and cannot be
fully effective; it cannot be partially effective without causing the impermissible division of community
property. See Stockand v. Bartlett, 4 Wash. 730, 31 P. 24 (1892). Spouses own an undivided one-half
interest in each community item-the so called "item" theory. In re Estate of Patton, 6 Wn. App. 464,
494 P.2d 238 (1972). The Powers case has been overruled because it does not involve an inter vivos gift
but rather a quasi-testamentary gift by beneficiary designation; the result is that the insured spouse's
half interest in the proceeds of community property life insurance may go to the named beneficiary
without consent of the surviving spouse. Francis v. Francis, 89 Wn. 2d 511, 573 P.2d 369 (1978). See
infra notes 374-84 and accompanying text (Part IV.B.I.a).
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community property, should be found when a child or parent is benefited by
the gift, the court has held to the contrary. 372
The 1972 amendments merely codified the judicial rule that both spouses
must consent to gifts of community property. 373 The following paragraphs
describe a major change the Washington court made in 1978 in the analysis
of gift transactions that focuses on the immediate or postponed effect of the
transaction, rather than considering merely the donative character of the act
and whether both spouses participated. The gift reasoning involved may
indicate the result to be reached in some joint bank account situations.
a. Life Insurance and United States Savings Bonds
The major 1978 change mentioned above occurred in Francis v. Fran-
cis3 74 in which the court overruled the long-standing rule of Occidental Life
Insurance Co. v. Powers375 that an insured spouse could not without the
consent of the other spouse designate the beneficiary of a life insurance
policy purchased with community funds (a community asset). The court
said:
Having reexamined the Powers case and its progeny, we have come to the
conclusion that the case was erroneously decided and should be overruled.
The majority opinion proceeded upon the incorrect assumption that a desig-
nation of a life insurance beneficiary operates as an inter vivos gift of
community property, failing to recognize that such a designation is merely a
means of transmitting property at death. The opinion confuses the right of the
wife to void an inter vivos gift of community property in its entirety with her
right to receive the value of one-half of the community property at the
husband's death. The designation of an insurance beneficiary is quasi-testa-
mentary in nature, since the beneficiary has only an inchoate right prior to the
death of the insured, at least where the insured retains the right to change the
beneficiary. And even where he does not retain this right the beneficiary's
interest is contingent upon the maintenance of the policy in good standing up
to the time of the insured's death.
While the designation of a beneficiary is quasi-testamentary in nature, it is
not subject to the requirements of the statute of wills (RCW 11.12), since it is
expressly exempted under RCW 11.02.090.376
372. See Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada v. Outler, 172 Wash. 540, 20 P.2d 1110 (1933); Stevens
v. Naches State Bank, 136 Wash. 137,238 P. 918 (1925); Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. Powers, 192 Wash.
475, 492-500, 74 P.2d 27, 34-38 (1937) (Beals, J., dissenting).
373. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.030(2) (1983).
374. 89 Wn. 2d 511, 573 P.2d 369 (1978), noted in Note, Community Property: Disposition of
Insurance Policy Proceeds, 13 GONZ. L. REV. 1049 (1978).
375. 192 Wash. 475, 74 P.2d 27 (1937); Annot., 114 A.L.R. 531 (1937).
376. 89 Wn. 2d at 514, 573 P.2d at 371.
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The last paragraph above answered the argument in Powers that the
testamentary character of a beneficiary designation triggered the applica-
tion of the statute of wills.
In Francis there were two policies on the husband's life in both of which
he had designated his wife and a son by a previous marriage as benefici-
aries. His wife's claim to all proceeds, successful in the trial court, failed on
the appeal and the court directed that the proceeds should be paid according
to the terms of the policies-that is, half to each named beneficiary.
Francis does not necessarily control the effect of a designation of a son
(or anyone other than the spouse) as the sole beneficiary of the community
property life insurance policy. It is probable that the rule will be that such a
designation will be effective as to the insured's half interest only, as in
California.377
The statement in the quotation above that the wife had a right to receive
the value of one-half of the community property at the husband's death
needs comment. Under the item theory of community property, which the
Washington court applies, the statement is acceptable if it means that the
wife would get half of the proceeds of each policy, but it would change the
existing rule if it means that the wife would get half of the proceeds of all
community property policies. In other words, if there were two community
policies of equal amounts, with the son as beneficiary in one and the wife in
the other, the result should be that the wife could claim three-fourths of the
total proceeds, that is, all from the policy in which she was beneficiary and
half from the policy in which the son was beneficiary. Perhaps some
minimal application of an "election" approach could be applied and the
wife would only be permitted to assert her rights in half of the proceeds in
one policy if she relinquished her claim to frustrate the insured's attempt to
dispose of all of the other policy. With multiple policies and beneficiaries
the problem could become complex. While such an election approach has
an initial appeal, it would amount to partial abandonment of the item theory
and a step toward adoption of an aggregate theory which was purposely
377. Compare WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.030(1) (1983), limiting testamentary power to half, and
the preference for finding no purpose to exceed the limit in the will situations posing election problems,
discussed infra notes 418-25 and accompanying text. In many beneficiary designation situations it
seems probable that the insured's spouse has agreed, or at least would not disagree if the question were
put. A provision in the insurance code creates a presumption of consent when the beneficiary is a child,
parent, brother, or sister of either spouse. WASH. REv. CODE § 48.18.440(2) (1983). The presumption is
rebuttable, National Bank of Commerce v. Lutheran Bhd., 40 Wn. 2d 790, 246 P.2d 843 (1952). It
applies even though the naming preceded marriage. Miller v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 81 Wn. 2d 302,
501 P.2d 1063 (1972). Thus, the abandonment of the Powers reasoning, 192 Wash. 475, does not
necessarily give more than "half effect" to the beneficiary designation with the surviving spouse taking
the other half.
The particular point made in the text is identified in a very useful Comment, Life Insurance Proceeds
as Community Property, 13 WASH. L. REv. 321, 326 (1938).
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rejected in In re Estate of Patton.378 The author believes such a step should
be taken only if careful study persuades that an aggregate theory produces
better results at the death of a spouse.
In In re Estate of Yiatchos,379 a United States savings bonds case, the
Washington court applied the Powers reasoning and held that the husband's
purchase of bonds with community funds, issued in his name and payable
on death to his brother, amounted to an attempt to give and was ineffective
for lack of consent by the wife; therefore the husband's will disposed of his
half interest in the bonds and the wife owned the other half interest. 380 The
United States Supreme Court reversed by invoking federal law, 381 holding
that the brother as beneficiary owned the husband's half interest, and that
he also should get the wife's half unless she could show the absence of her
consent to such use of the funds. The Supreme Court concluded that until
the husband's death there had been no interference with the wife's com-
munity property position-community property funds had merely been
converted into community property bonds-thereby flatly rejecting the
Powers reasoning that the Washington court had applied. As to the hus-
band's half interest, this holding is consistent with the present Washington
rule under Francis regarding the permissibility of the quasi-testamentary
gift. The difference as to the wife's half has been noted above in Part
III.D. 382
The survivorship feature of the "or" bonds prevailed, by reason of
federal supremacy, over Texas community property law in Free v. Bland.383
The Court held the surviving spouse owned the bonds issued to the husband
"or" the wife, against any claim direct or indirect of the decedent spouse's
legatee. Certainly if there is immediate control over the asset by either of
the co-owners, it would be inappropriate to analyze the rights as being
based on a quasi-testamentary disposition, even though the total ownership
would only accrue upon the death of one of the co-owners. If a stranger
rather than the other spouse is named as co-owner, the result should be the
same as in Yiatchos v. Yiatchos, that is, the disposition by survivorship
should operate as to the decedent spouse's half community interest, but not
necessarily as to the surviving spouse's. The effect of attempts to convert a
community property ownership into something else without federal su-
premacy complications is discussed below. 384
378. 6 Wn. App. 464, 494 P.2d 238 (1972), review denied, 80 Wn. 2d 1009 (1972).
379. 60 Wn. 2d 179, 373 P.2d 125 (1962), rev'd, Yiatchos v. Yiatchos, 376 U.S. 306 (1964).
380. See also In re Estate of Allen, 54 Wn. 2d 616, 343 P.2d 867 (1959).
381. Yiatchos v. Yiatchos, 376 U.S. 306 (1964).
382. See supra notes 122-25 and accompanying text.
383. 369 U.S. 663 (1962).
384. See infra notes 385-91, 514-40 and accompanying text.
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b. Common Law Co-Ownership Including Bank Accounts
Two patterns may exist-a co-ownership between one spouse and a
stranger or between the spouses only. In addition, the co-ownership form
could be joint tenancy or tenancy in common. Either is a separate property
rather than a community property holding.
The attempt by one spouse to convert community property into a joint
tenancy with a third person without the consent of the other spouse will fail,
by reason of the statutory requirement that both spouses join in the writing
creating ajoint tenancy with community property 385 unless "participation"
might be sufficient. Similarly, the court has held that it requires a writing
signed by both spouses to create a joint tenancy between them with
community property. 386
A new statute, originally enacted in 1984 as a part of a comprehensive
trust law and reenacted in 1985 separately 387 to avoid possible unconstitu-
tionality by reason of the narrowness of the 1984 bill's title, affects the
husband/wife joint tenancy situation by creating a presumption that their
interests are community property but preserving the survivorship of a joint
tenancy. 388 The language of the law is puzzling: does it mean that interests
held in joint tenancy form are presumed to be community property, or does
the statute operate only after a joint tenancy interest is created through
meeting the requirements mentioned above under the basic joint tenancy
statute? The latter interpretation would trigger a rather pointless circuity-
both spouses would have to join in the writing389 to create a joint tenancy
385. WASH. REv. CODE § 64.28.010(1983); see In re Estate of Patton, 6 Wn. App. 464,494 P.2d
238 (1972).
386. Lambert v. Peoples Nat'l Bank, 89 Wn. 2d 646,574 P.2d 738 (1978) (registration of mutual
fund shares in names of husband and wife as joint tenants was not enough to satisfy the statutory
requirement of a writing by both);In re Estate of Olson, 87 Wn. 2d 855, 557 P.2d 302 (1976) (note and
mortgage to husband and wife as joint tenants for community funds loaned held as community
property); Rogers Walla Walla, Inc. v. Ballard, 16 Wn. App. 81, 553 P.2d 1372 (1976), review denied,
88 Wn. 2d 1004 (1977) (community property stock reissued in joint tenancy form held to be community
property); see also Note, Property-Community Property and Joint Tenancy: Creating Survivorship
Rights in Washington, 53 WASH. L. REv. 557 (1978).
387. Act of April 2, 1985, ch. 10, 1985 Wash. Laws 120 (to be codified at WASH. REV. CODE
§ 64.28.040). The Act provides that the relevant section should be operative as of Jan. 1, 1985.
388. The statute reads:
(1) Joint tenancy interests held in the names of a husband and wife, whether or not in conjunction
with others, are presumed to be their community property, the same as other property held in the
name of both husband and wife. Any such interest passes to the survivor of the husband and wife as
provided for property held in joint tenancy, but in all other respects the interest is treated as
community property.
(2) This section applies as of January 1, 1985, to all existing or subsequently created joint
tenancies.
Id.
389. Or at least "participate."
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interest which would then be presumed to be a community property
holding. If the spouses really want a joint tenancy, apparently their writing
will require the recitation, "as a joint tenancy and not as community
property or a tenancy in common" or some such phraseology. It might have
been better merely to provide for a special community property holding
with a right of survivorship, adequately indicated on the creating instru-
ment. 390
The spouses could change community property into a tenancy in com-
mon, but an attempt by one spouse to convert a community property
holding into a tenancy in common between the two of them should fail
under the reasoning of In re Estate of Allen391 because clearly the attempt
could have only inter vivos and not, in any manner, a quasi-testamentary
effect. Such an effort would fail if joinder of both spouses is required by
statute for any manipulation of the asset, that is, if the subject matter is real
property, a mobile home, or household goods, furnishings, or appliances.
The "bank" account problem has been changed by statute effective July
1, 1982,392 so that the type of account or of the financial institution in which
the account is does not affect the community or separate property rights.
Previously a distinction needed to be drawn between a joint account that
was merely a multiple party account with or without survivorship, and a
joint tenancy account that raised the kinds of questions indicated for-
merly.393 The new statute does not preclude the purposeful creation of a
joint tenancy in an account but it seems probable that this will not be done;
rather there will be joint accounts with a right of survivorship or just joint
accounts, but as to any account authorized by the statute it provides that the
act shall not be deemed to alter the community or separate property nature
of funds held on deposit, and community or separate rights shall not be
affected by the form of the account. 394 Further, subject to community
property rights, joint account funds belong to depositors in proportion to
the net funds owned by each unless the contract provides otherwise, or
there is clear and convincing evidence of a contrary intent at the time the
390. The effect of the new statute will be important because, for instance, the rights of creditors
differ with respect to joint tenancy and community property, the power of a spouse to manipulate a half
interest differs in joint tenancy and community property holdings, and involuntary or voluntary
transactions could occasion the need to sustain or rebut the community presumption, the burden of
which probably should fall on the disputing spouse.
391. 54 Wn. 2d 616, 343 P.2d 867 (1959).
392. WASH. REV. CODE ch. 30.22 (1983) (Financial Institution Individual Account Deposit Act).
Banks, trust companies, mutual savings banks, savings and loan associations, and credit unions are all
included. Id. § 30.22.040(12).
393. Cross (1974), supra note 1, at 793-94.
394. WASH. REV. CODE § 30.22.030 (1983).
Vol. 61:13, 1986
Community Property
account was created. 395 Ownership at death is subject to community
property rights and the provisions of a community property agreement.
396
The effect of the new statutory provisions appears to be as follows. If
community property funds are deposited by one spouse there will be
merely a change of form of the community property asset even though the
account is in the names of the depositor and someone other than the
depositor's spouse. The result will be the same as in Munson v. Haye,
397
although that case held that showing the community character of the funds
deposited rebutted a presumption of a joint tenancy between the spouses in
the account so that one spouse could not by gift create any rights in another
in the funds withdrawn. If the account provides for survivorship in a third
person, the quasi-testamentary quality of the arrangement ought to support
the claim of the third person to the decedent's half interest in the account
under the reasoning of Francis v. Francis.398 If the account is in the name of
both spouses it will normally be community property (not separate prop-
erty in either joint tenancy or tenancy in common), and a provision for
payment to the survivor would make the ownership complete in that person.
The provision in favor of the survivor for an account in the names of a
spouse and a third person should continue to operate for the spouse upon
the death of the third person under the holding of In re Estate of Webb, 399
but conceivably the funds from the third person would be owned by the
spouse as separate property by gift, rather than as community property (as
presumably the funds from the spouse in the account would be).
2. Community Business Assets
Management or transfer of community business property (including real
estate) involves unique problems because of the 1972 addition of section
26.16.030(6) to the Revised Code of Washington. The paragraph provides:
Neither spouse shall acquire, purchase, sell, convey, or encumber the
assets, including real estate, or the good will of a business where both spouses
participate in its management without the consent of the other: Provided, That
where only one spouse participates in such management the participating
spouse may, in the ordinary course of such business, acquire, purchase, sell,
convey or encumber the assets, including real estate, or the good will of the
business without the consent of the nonparticipating spouse. 400
395. Id. § 30.22.090.
396. Id. § 30.22.100.
397. 29 Wn. 2d 733, 189 P.2d 464 (1948).
398. See supra notes 374-84 and accompanying text (Part.IV.B.l.a).
399. 49 Wn. 2d 6, 297 P.2d 948 (1956).
400. WASH. REv. CODE § 26.16.030(6) (1983).
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This provision creates two exceptions to the general rules on managing and
transfer power: (1) when both spouses participate in the business, theirjoint
action is required to transfer community business personalty (as well as
realty); and (2) when only one spouse participates in the business, that
spouse acting alone (and apparently not the other spouse) may transfer
community business personalty and also realty. Three principal questions
arise: (1) Under what circumstances do "both spouses participate in ...
management" of the community business? (2) What suffices as "consent"
of the other spouse? (3) What are the acts within "the ordinary course" of
the business?
It seems probable that an incorporated business will not be within the
new provision. 40 1 The "sole proprietorship" poses the greatest potential
difficulty as to participation by both spouses, because such incidental
support activity as "keeping the books" may be enough to constitute
"participation" and require consent of the "sole proprietor's" spouse. As
suggested elsewhere, 40 2 if such minimal involvement is sufficient to con-
stitute "participation," some sort of implied consent to the acts of the
principal manager of the business will be necessary to avoid serious
practical complications in the conduct of a business. Even if both spouses
actively manage the business, implications of authority of each will be
necessary to consummate most transactions, that is, those not clearly of an
extraordinary character. Although the protection the required consent
provides against total sale of the business may be desirable, and perhaps all
the protection that is necessary, the language of the paragraph is too
detailed to limit its application to total sale, and the scope of interference
with less extensive transactions continues to be uncertain.
3. Litigation
The 1972 amendments have changed the rules involving litigation. 403
Previously the husband as community manager was a necessary party to
any community property litigation. Under the 1972 amendments equaliz-
ing management power, as a general proposition either spouse can sue or be
sued in a community property matter. At least presumptively, proceeds or
401. If all, or almost all, shares of a corporation are owned by the spouses, it would not be
surprising to conclude that the paragraph applied if in the operation of the business the corporate form
was largely ignored. Situations in which such a result might be reached are illustrated by State ex rel.
Van Moss v. Sailors, 180 Wash. 269, 39 P.2d 397 (1934) and In re Estate of Buchanan, 89 Wash. 172.
154 P.129 (1916).
402. Cross, supra note 9, at 537-41. The problems raised in the text are more fully discussed in that
article.
403. See id. at 545-46, where the author has identified the changes somewhat more fully.
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liabilities flowing from such a suit would be community in character. 404
Note, however, that the agency of a spouse ceases at dissolution of the
marriage so that the subsequent judgment by confession by the husband for
himself and the former "community" does not affect the now independent
interest of his former wife not served or joined in the suit. 40 5 If only one
spouse is named as a defendant and a community liability is sought, it is
probable that the equal managing power of each spouse will support
intervention by the other spouse. 406
Several exceptions exist to the general proposition that either spouse may
now sue or be sued in a community property sense. By the 1972 amend-
ments the injured spouse is the necessary party in an action to recover for
personal injuries, 4° 7 and the employed spouse is the necesshry party in an
action to recover compensation for services rendered. 408 In addition, the
court long ago held that both spouses were necessary parties to an action
involving community real estate, on the reasoning that the power to
maintain such an action included the power to compromise and "[t]he
effect of that compromise might be to effectually dispossess the com-
munity of the land, or, at least, to seriously incumber it.'409 This reasoning
should equally apply to controversies involving the transfer or en-
cumbrance of community household goods, furnishings, or appliances, or
a community mobile home, 410 and probably those involving a community
business "where both spouses participate in its management."
'411
404. See Oil Heat Co. v. Sweeney, 26 Wn. App. 351, 613 P.2d 169 (1980) (service on wife was
enough to support community liability on debt incurred by husband who had disappeared); Komm v.
Department of Social and Health Servs., 23 Wn. App. 593,597 P.2d 1372 (1979) (husband unsuccess-
fully sought to prevent garnishment of wages to contribute to cost of foster care for stepchildren based
on community liability established in an administrative proceeding to which only wife was party).
405. Northern Commercial Co. v. E.L Hermann Co., 22 Wn. App. 963, 593 P.2d 1332 (1979); see
also Griggs v. Averbeck Realty, 92 Wn. 2d 576, 599 P.2d 1289 (1979) (default judgment against
husband after dissolution of the marriage, in suit commenced against husband and wife before the
dissolution, was set aside by wife who then prevailed on the merits; attempt to reach former community
property in wife's hands on the default judgment against husband was unsuccessful-husband had no
authority to act for the "community" after the dissolution of the marriage).
406. WASH. REv. CODE § 4.08.040 (1983). Prior to the 1972 amendments the statute applied only
to the wife's intervention to protect her separate property interests which might be prejudiced by the suit
against her husband. With power under the amendments in each spouse to be sued or sue, the present
language of the section should mean that either spouse may intervene and defend in a suit involving
community assets to protect against an adverse community consequence when the other spouse
(defendant in the suit), for whatever reason, chooses not to do so.
407. Id. § 4.08.030(1).
408. Id. § 4.08.030(2).
409. Lownsdale v. Gray's Harbor Boom Co., 21 Wash. 542, 544, 58 P. 663, 664 (1899).
410. By reason of the joinder requirement of WASH. REv. CoDE § 26.16.030(5) (1983).
411. Id. § 26.16.030(6).
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4. Management Power While Living Separate and Apart
If the spouses have permanently separated, under the analysis above in
Part III.C,4 12 so that future acquisitions will be separately owned, there
may nonetheless remain community property to be managed 413-mere
separation does not affect the community character of existing assets. In
addition there may be continuing authority to represent community interest
in litigation.4 14 Prior to the 1972 amendments the court recognized the ne-
cessity of a continuing managing power in the husband, but cautioned that a
third person (e.g., a creditor) may not be able to deal with the husband with
impunity, for there may be situations in which known facts would suggest
that the managing power was being abused. 4 15 With each spouse now
having equal managing power, the potential difficulties are compounded;
the author has discussed some possibilities elsewhere, 4 6 and has suggested
that the power be restricted to the reasonable necessities of the situation. 417
C. Testamentary Powers
1. Intestate Succession and Testamentary Powers in General
Although earlier statutes provided otherwise, since October 1, 1974,
the surviving spouse takes by intestate succession the decedent spouse's
share of community property, 4 18 and continues in ownership of the other
half.4 19
Each spouse has testamentary power over one-half of the community
property,420 but no more.4 21 Indirectly, however, one spouse could dispose
of both halves of the community property in particular assets, 422 or of the
412. See supra notes 98-117 and accompanying text.
413. Cf Cohn v. Cohn, 4 Wn. 2d 322, 103 P.2d 366 (1940).
414. Gleason v. Metropolitan Mortgage Co., 15 Wn. App. 481, 551 P.2d 147 (1976).
415. Dizard & Getty v. Damson, 63 Wn. 2d 526, 387 P.2d 964 (1964).
416. Cross, supra note 9, at 543-44.
417. After dissolution of the marriage neither party has a management power over the other's
interest in former community property. Griggs v. Averbeck Realty, 92 Wn. 2d 576, 599 P.2d 1289
(1979) (default judgment against husband after divorce did not affect wife's interests under the
circumstances since husband had no continuing managing power).
418. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.04.015 (1983).
419. Id. § 11.02.070. Under an earlier statute the decedent's half went by intestate succession to
legitimate issue, then by a change effective July 1, 1967, it went half to the surviving spouse and the
other half to issue or parents of the decedent. If there were no issue or in-laws, the surviving spouse took
the decedent's share, but both statutes left the potential for awkward tenancy in common ownerships
between the surviving spouse and children, stepchildren, or in-laws.
420. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.02.070 (1983).
421. Id. § 26.16.030(1) (1983).
422. The item theory of ownership can come into play here. In re Estate of Patton, 6 Wn. App. 464,
494 P.2d 238 (1972).
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whole estate, by putting the survivor to an election. 423 In effect, by putting
the survivor to an election the decedent proposes to dispose of the sur-
vivor's interest in community property and offers in exchange to the
survivor some interest or asset of the decedent's. 424 The crucial question,
however, is under what circumstances the surviving spouse will be put to an
election. The court of appeals has stated the rule as follows:
To create the necessity for a widow's election upon the husband's death,
there must appear on the face of the husband's will a clear and unmistakable
intention to dispose of property which is not in fact his own and which was not
within his power of disposition. . . . It has been determined that it is
immaterial whether the testator knew the property he purported to dispose of
in his will was not within his power of disposition, or whether he erroneously
believed it to be, because, in either case, if the intention to dispose of it
specifically appears, the necessity for an election exists. 425
What would otherwise be the change of ownership at death may be
frustrated by the beneficiary (i.e., the intended recipient) disclaiming the
interest under the broad powers of the 1973 disclaimer statute,426 which
reaches essentially all methods of disposition. The power is likely to be
used primarily in post-death tax planning.
There is full testamentary power over separate property,427 which may
pose a practical problem of some consequence to a surviving spouse if the
domicile of the spouses had been in a common law state most of the time.
Assets accumulated under those circumstances would not be community
property, and as far as Washington law is concerned could be freely devised
by the owner spouse, resulting in what has been called "disinheritance" of
the surviving spouse. 428 The protection for a surviving spouse afforded by
the common law state would not apply, and the protection under Washing-
ton law would not be available due to the absence of community property.
McClanahan has suggested a possible escape from this result: apply, under
423. See generally Comment, The Widow's Election as an Estate Planning Device in Washington,
43 WASH. L. REv. 455 (1967). For the decedent to succeed, of course, the survivor has to make the
election.
424. Contrast the election problem in common law states where typically the widow could elect to
take a dower interest (or some statutory substitute) in her husband's estate or take part of his estate under
the terms of his will, i.e., a choice between how and on what basis she took some of his estate, not an
exchange of some of her estate for some of his. In re Estate of Cooper, 32 Wn. 2d 444, 202 P.2d 439
(1949), involved facts which could have been, but were not, analyzed on the basis of the common law
election, which probably affected the outcome.
425. In re Estate of Patton, 6 Wn. App. 464,477-78,494 P.2d 238,246 (1972) (citations omitted).
426. WASH. REv. CODE ch. 11.86 (1983).
427. Id. §§ 26.16.010, .020.
428. See Gilchrist, Washington Disinherits the Non-Native Wife, 46 WASH. L. REv. 283 (1971).
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the conflict of laws rules, the death succession scheme of the common law
state of origin or acquisition. 429
2. The Community Property Agreement
Although negatively stated, a statute430 authorizes the husband and wife
to enter into an agreement "concerning the status or disposition of the
whole or any portion of the community property, then owned by them or
afterwards to be acquired, to take effect upon the death of either." The
statute requires the agreement to be executed in deed form, provides that it
may be "altered or amended" in the same manner, and specifies that it shall
not derogate from the rights of creditors. 431
Many community property agreements actually executed, which the
author calls "three-pronged," go beyond the disposition of the deceased
spouse's community property as contemplated by the statute (the third
prong) by including, as two more prongs, provisions to convert existing
separate property into community property (the first prong) and to establish
that future acquisitions by either spouse shall be community property even
though such an acquisition would otherwise be separate property (the
second prong). These first two "prongs" are discussed below in Part
V.A;432 the present discussion refers only to a "statutory community
property agreement" rather than the broader "three-pronged" agreement
and assumes that only community property, however it may come about, is
the subject matter of the agreement.
As a dispositive instrument, the agreement takes effect at death, as
provided by the statute, and normally prevails against the will of the
decedent, 433 but Norris v. Norris434 teaches that if an inconsistent will is
probated and the estate administered, there may be an election to take under
the will and against the community property agreement or a disclaimer of
rights under the agreement. 435 The inter vivos effect of the agreement is
429. W. MCCLANAHAN, supra note 2, § 13:11 (1982 & Supp. 1984). Compare the common law
state equitable interests of a nonowner spouse in a divorce situation in a community property state after
the change of domicile, mentioned sympathetically in In re Marriage of Landry, 103 Wn. 2d 807, 811,
699 P.2d 214, 216 (1985).
430. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.120 (1983). "Nothing contained in any... law of this state, shall
prevent the husband and wife from jointly entering into any agreement [whatsoever]."
431. Valuable discussions are in Brachtenbach, Community Property Agreements-Many Ques-
tions, Few Answers, 37 WASH. L. REV. 469 (1962); Buckley, The Community Property Agreement
Statute, 25 WASH. L. REV. 165 (1950); Nelson, The Community Property Agreement: A Probate Cure
with Side Effects, 18 GONz. L. REV. 121 (1983).
432. See infra notes 470-513 and accompanying text.
433. In re Estate of Brown, 29 Wn. 2d 20, 185 P.2d 125 (1947).
434. 95 Wn. 2d 124, 622 P.2d 816 (1980).
435. In Norris, husband and wife had made reciprocal wills by which the survivor got a life estate
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controlled by normal contract principles, including the possibility that by
reason of mistake or misunderstanding as revealed by all surrounding
circumstances, the community property agreement will be found to have no
operative effect.436 While the agreement deprives the spouse who dies first
(but not the surviving spouse) of the power to make an effective inconsis-
tent will, 437 it does not modify the rules concerning management or transfer
of community property during the lifetime of both spouses. 438 One spouse
acting alone cannot revoke the agreement, 439 and even inconsistent acts by
both will not nullify the agreement unless there can be found a mutuality of
purpose to terminate the agreement. 440
Although a will cannot prevail against the community property agree-
ment disposition, it is not uncommon for spouses, on advice of counsel, to
execute both wills and a community property agreement at the same time,
probably with two purposes in mind: first, to increase the likelihood that a
common plan for ultimate disposition by the survivor will come into
and the remainder went to their son and grandson. Thereafter, without their lawyer's advice they made a
survivorship community property agreement. After wife died, husband was advised of the tax con-
sequences, probated the will and administered the estate through to the decree of distribution, without
revealing to the court the existence of the community property agreement. Husband remarried and
controversy arose between him and his son about rent and other matters concerning the farm. Husband
then brought this quiet title action, asserting he was sole owner by reason of the community property
agreement. The trial court so held. The court of appeals reversed, holding that probating the will was a
disclaimer of rights under the community property agreement. Id., 25 Wn. App. 290, 605 P.2d 1296
(1980). The supreme court affirmed, concluding there had been an election, but did not directly address
the disclaimer analysis.
436. See In re Estates of Wahl, 31 Wn. App. 815, 644 P.2d 1215 (1982), aff'd, 99 Wn. 2d 828,664
P.2d 1250 (1983), in which husband and wife each had a will in favor of the other contingent upon
survival for 90 days, and subsequently executed confirming codicils on the same day that they executed
a survivorship community property agreement (with no provision for the 90-day survival). Husband
survived wife less than 90 days. On appeal from a summary judgment for husband's relative, the court
of appeals reversed and remanded for trial, holding that contract rules of interpretation should be
applied with consideration given to the provisions of the community property agreement, the wills, the
codicils, and the surrounding circumstances to determine the intent of husband and wife. (Roe, A.C.L,
concurred that summary judgment for husband's relative was inappropriate, but would have granted one
for wife's relatives because by a mistake of fact the agreement was not effective.) The supreme court
affirmed that contract construction rules applied and the court must consider and determine the spouses'
intent, when on the same day they had executed codicils and a community property agreement which
were inconsistent.
437. Although what property interest the survivor has in former community property can be
affected by the agreement which, therefore, indirectly may affect the survivor's testamentary power.
438. For example, it does not modify the power to convey to a trustee, Hesseltine v. Frst Methodist
Church, 23 Wn. 2d 315, 161 P.2d 157 (1945).
439. In re Estate of Brown, 29 Wn. 2d 20, 185 P.2d 125 (1947) (surviving husband had become
incompetent; wife's will, apparently designed to accomplish plans the spouses had, held to be
ineffective); In re Estate of Wittman, 58 Wn. 2d 841,365 P.2d 17 (1961); In re Estate of Lyman, 7 Wn.
App. 945,503 P.2d 1127 (1972), aff'd 82 Wn. 2d 693,512 P.2d 1093 (1973) (wife commenced divorce
action, asking court to fix rights in community property; husband then made will inconsistent with
survivorship provision in agreement; wife took as survivor by force of agreement).
440. In re Estate of Wittman, 58 Wn. 2d 841, 845, 365 P.2d 17, 20 (1961).
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operation;441 and second, to avoid the consequence that the community
property agreement could not operate for lack of an identified survivor, 442
in the event of simultaneous death of both. Of course, a more complicated
scheme in the agreement could accomplish both purposes directly.
As a conveyance, the agreement transfers title at the death of one spouse,
and if real property is included in the affected assets, the agreement should
be recorded to establish the necessary link in the record title. Recordation is
not otherwise necessary to the effectiveness of the agreement, although it
may be useful to preserve evidence of the existence of the agreement.
While the statute specifically states that a proper writing is necessary to
alter or amend the agreement, in In re Estate of Ford443 the court held that
the survivorship provision of the agreement did not control against the
wife's will as to land quitclaimed by the husband to the wife after execution
of the agreement, on the basis that the conveyance amounted to a partial
revocation. 444 The result is sound. The complete inter vivos power the
spouses have, despite the existence of the community property agreement,
supports the reasoning that the quitclaim deed made the asset the wife's
separate property, thereby removing it from the scope of the agreementjust
as a conveyance to a stranger would have done. While it appears to the
author to be improbable, it is unclear whether total elimination of the
agreement can be effected only by a writing. The analysis in both the
Wittman and Lyman445 cases indicates that adequate mutuality of purpose
of both spouses may be shown without a writing. However, the concern
expressed by the court in Wittman about the stability of recorded titles44 6
leaves the matter in doubt, at least as regards a possible bona fide purchaser
from the surviving spouse who claims under the agreement.
441. Note why the wife executed a will; it was argued the agreement was rescinded by reason of his
incompetence and her act of making the will, In re Estate of Brown, 29 Wn. 2d 20.27, 185 P.2d 125, 129
(1947). The decedent could not be certain the survivor would not change the will, of course.
442. Cf In re Estates of Clise, 64 Wn. 2d 320, 391 P.2d 547 (1964). Apparently, at times, spouses
execute both wills and a community property agreement with the purpose that the survivor can destroy
the agreement executed by the decedent that is less advantageous. The risk of not succeeding merely by
physically destroying the agreement is patent.
443. 31 Wn. App. 136, 639 P.2d 848 (1982).
444. The dissenting judge contended there had been no mutual rescission and there was no basis for
concluding there was partial revocation.
445. See supra note 439.
446. The court said:
Even if mutual repudiation may, under certain circumstances not here present, constitute a
rescission, we are not prepared to subject the statutory community property agreement, which
serves as a recorded conveyance of property to the surviving spouse, to the cloud of uncertainty
such a rule would cast upon the record and, hence, the title to the property.
Wittman, 58 Wn. 2d at 845, 365 P.2d at 20.
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The usual agreement provides simply that the survivor of the spouses
shall take all community property447 without identifying the property
particularly.448 However, the statutory language is broad enough to permit
agreements affecting only certain assets rather than all, and also to permit
dispositions other than solely to the survivor.449 It is the author's belief that
complete flexibility in dispositive schemes450 is available and that multiple
agreements, each affecting some particular assets but not others, could be
executed. By the latter route, spouses could provide for survivorship, for
example, with respect to particular assets and at the same time clearly
preserve their community property character until one of them died. A
somewhat similar result may be realized under the new statute451 which
provides that joint tenancy interests held in the names of the husband and
wife are presumed to be their community property, and "[a]ny such interest
passes to the survivor of the husband and wife as provided for property held
in joint tenancy, but in all other respects the interest is treated as community
property. "452
In many situations, a survivorship disposition by a community property
agreement is too simple, causing complications which could be avoided by
testamentary dispositions tailored to the particular situation of the spouses.
447. See, e.g., suggested form in WASH. REV,. CODE ANN. § 26.16.120, at 489 (West 1961).
448. See In re Estate ofVerbeek, 2 Wn. App. 144, 158-60, 467 P.2d 178, 187-88 (1970) (certain
property was treated as being community property and, therefore, subject to the agreement, even
though it was not described in any way).
449. WASH. REv. CODE § 26.16.120 (1983). The statute provides that the agreement may affect
"the status or disposition of the whole or any portion of the community property"; this language does
not require disposition to surviving spouse.
450. See In re Estate of Dunn, 31 Wn. 2d 512, 526, 197 P.2d 606, 614 (1948) (life use and
remainders over were set up by an agreement in a form adequate for the statutory community property
agreement and a joint will). Cf. Raab v. Wallerich, 46 Wn. 2d 375, 383, 282 P.2d 271, 275 (1955).
451. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. 64.28.040(1) (West Supp. 1986). See supra text accompanying notes
387-90.
452. Would such a survivorship insulate the asset from the creditors ofthe deceased "joint tenant,"
as in pure joint tenancy, or would the community property rules apply? A more direct way to achieve the
result apparently intended would have been to authorize specifically a form of community property with
survivorship and avoid the complications which can arise in application of a presumption, as well as the
difficulty of determining how the joint tenancy law is now to be applied.
A true joint tenancy might achieve the same result; the author has previously expressed discontent
(which continues) with that sort of approach:
An alternative approach would be conversion from community property to joint tenancy owner-
ship, but the inseverability of community property would be lost in joint tenancy (either voluntary
or involuntary severance of the half of either spouse) and the certainty that the survivor would take
all would also be lost. Such inconsistencies in the incidents of these two types of ownership
indicate the illogic, and undesirability, of "community property in joint tenancy form," a hybrid
out of California largely occasioned by the absence of dispositive power in the divorce court over
separate (i.e., here, joint tenancy) property. See Griffith, Community Property in Joint Tenancy
Form, 14 STAN. L. REv. 87 (1961); Griffith, Joint Tenancy and Community Property, 37 WASH. L.
RaV. 30 (1962).
Cross (1974), supra note 1, at 801 n.355.
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The following factors need to be considered in deciding whether to use the
simple survivorship agreement: availability of the nonclaim, the award-in-
lieu of homestead, and the family allowance statutes of the probate code;
out-of-state acceptability of the device;453 irrevocability of the agreement;
valuation of assets at death for capital gains tax purposes; and value of
determinations inherent in the final decree in probate as to ownership and
character of particular assets. Transfer of corporate shares by means of the
agreement is facilitated by a 1965 statute,454 but no statute of general
coverage exists. Particularly in larger estates, straight survivorship might
be costly in terms of death taxes, but there may be an escape from the worst
of such consequences through the 1973 disclaimer statute,455 the existence
of which might also warrant the execution of a will inconsistent with the
dispositive scheme of the agreement.
3. Simultaneous Death
If the dispositive scheme, however set up, contemplates that a spouse
will survive, the simultaneous death of both obviously will frustrate it.
Washington has enacted the Uniform Simultaneous Death Act 456 which
generally provides that if there is no sufficient evidence that the spouses
have died other than simultaneously, and if the spouses have not provided to
the contrary, each spouse's property shall devolve as if he or she survived
the other.457 The Act also provides that in the event of simultaneous death of
the insured and beneficiary of an insurance policy, the proceeds of the
policy shall be distributed as if the insured survived. 458 The Washington
court's application of this insurance provision warrants comment.
In re Estates of Saunders459 involved the simultaneous death of both
spouses, each of whom had life insurance policies in which the other
453. McClure, Advisability of Community Property Survivorship Pact, XV WASH. ST. B. NEWS,
Sept.-Oct. 1961, at 33.
454. WASH. REV. CODE § 23A.08.325 (1983).
455. Id. ch. 11.86.
456. Id. ch. 11.05.
457. The statute provides:
Where the title to property or the devolution thereof depends upon priority of death and there is no
sufficient evidence that the persons have died otherwise than simultaneously, the property of each
person shall be disposed of as if he had survived, except as provided otherwise in this chapter.
Id. § 11.05.010.
458. The statute provides:
Where the insured and the beneficiary in a policy of life or accident insurance have died and there is
no sufficient evidence that they have died otherwise than simultaneously the proceeds of the policy
shall be distributed as if the insured had survived the beneficiary.
Id. § 11.05.040.
459. 51 Wn. 2d 274, 317 P.2d 528 (1957).
Vol. 61:13, 1986
Community Property
spouse was the only beneficiary.460 The court held that the insurance
provisions of the Uniform Simultaneous Death Act controlled, so that the
asset to be distributed continued to be proceeds of the respective policies
falling within the particular section of that Act by which the insured is
determined to be the survivor,461 rather than the section which controlled
with respect to assets generally, in which the owner of the asset is deter-
mined to be the survivor.462 The court reasoned that the wife had a vested
interest in half of the proceeds of the policy on the husband's life which
went to her personal representatives, and then to the husband as her heir
under the general inheritance statute463 rather than to her collateral heirs.
The result, after applying the same reasoning to the policies on the wife's
life, was that all proceeds of policies on the husband's life went to his
collateral heirs and all on her life to her collateral heirs. Unfortunate-
ly, there was more insurance on his life than on hers. This authority
was followed and the same result was reached in In re Estates of Clise.464
The result seems to the author to be unsatisfactory, involving an unfortu-
nate concentration on the word "proceeds" in the statute, and in the latter
case overlooking the reasoning of an intervening case, In re Estate of
Leuthold.465
It seems unlikely that either spouse would wish the collateral heirs of the
other to have a larger share of the property of both spouses, if it is to go at
once to collateral heirs, that is, if the other spouse is not at least initially to
own the whole in a meaningful, substantial sense. In addition, the frame-
work of the Uniform Simultaneous Death Act is designed primarily for
situations in which an individual owner dies simultaneously with a poten-
tial successor in ownership, 466 and in the only section which clearly
involves deaths of two co-owners, 467 each is deemed to be the survivor as to
a half interest. This reasoning militates against the results reached in
Saunders and Clise.
460. Some policies provided that the proceeds should go to the executor, etc. of the insured, if the
beneficiary was not living at the insured's death. This should not affect the ultimate result.
461. See supra note 458.
462. See supra note 457.
463. WASH. REv. CODE § 11.04.015 (1983).
464. 64 Wn. 2d 320, 391 P.2d 547 (1964).
465. 52 Wn. 2d 299, 324 P.2d 1103 (1958).
466. Note the reference in Saunders to UNIFORM SIMULTANEOUS DEATH Acr § 5, 9C U.L.A. 167,
reprinted in 8A U.L.A. 557,581 (1983 & West Supp. 1985), recommending amendment in community
property states.
467. WASH. REv. CODE § 11.05.030 (1983) (simultaneous deaths of joint tenants).
Washington Law Review
The court in Saunders reasoned that half of the proceeds of the policy in
which the husband was the insured went to the wife's personal representa-
tives, but this can be so only if the wife, before her death, had the right to
the proceeds, and the payment in fulfillment of the duty to deliver proceeds
to the owner of them was merely made after her death. However, if the
beneficiary wife predeceased the insured husband, there were then no
proceeds which she could own, because proceeds do not exist until the
insured dies. While it has been convenient to refer to the beneficiary
spouse's community interest in a life insurance relationship as existing in
the proceeds, 468 in fact the community property interest is in the policy, not
the proceeds. 469 Successors of the beneficiary spouse's estate eventually get
part of the proceeds upon death of the insured because of their ownership of
the source asset, that is, the policy.
Under this analysis, and that in Leuthold, if the beneficiary spouse is
deemed to have died first (as the Act stipulates if in fact both the insured and
beneficiary die simultaneously) there necessarily is included in the bene-
ficiary's estate a half ownership in the policy. Thus, his or her successors as
half-owners of the policy should own half of the proceeds by reason of
ownership of the source asset, that is, the policy. Ownership in this source
asset should pass under the provisions of the Act governing the disposition
of assets generally, under which neither spouse is deemed the intestate
successor of the other, rather than by focusing upon proceeds. This analysis
would place half of the proceeds of all community property life insurance
policies in the successors of each spouse, and accord with what the author
thinks would be the probable wish of each spouse.
V. TRANSACTIONS AND AGREEMENTS BETWEEN SPOUSES
The statutes bestow full power on either spouse to deal with the other
concerning separate property470 or community property interests, 471 and to
give power of attorney to the other or to a third person to deal with separate
or community property interests. 472 Civil disabilities unique to the wife
468. See cases discussed supra notes 155-64 and accompanying text (Part III.E.2), concerning life
insurance policy ownership questions.
469. This was recognized in Francis v. Francis, 89 Wn. 2d 511, 573 P.2d 369 (1978).
470. Either may act alone with respect to his or her separate property as fully and to the same extent
as if unmarried. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.010 (1983) (husband); id. § 26.16.020 (wife).
471. Id. § 26.10.050 (either may convey the community interest in real property to the other,
thereby making it the grantee's separate property); id. § 26.16.150 (every married person has "right
and liberty to acquire, hold, enjoy and dispose of every species of property, and to sue and be sued, as if
he or she were unmarried").
472. Id. 88 26.16.060-.090. Both also can give power of attorney to a third person concerning
community property.
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have been abolished, 473 and she may contract and incur liabilities to the
same extent as if she were unmarried. 474
A. Agreements Between the Spouses
Transactions between the spouses affecting their property may assume
the form the author calls "three-pronged" community property agree-
ments-the first "prong" of such agreements converts each spouse's
existing separate property into community property; the second "prong"
provides that each spouse's future acquisitions which otherwise may be
separate property shall be community property; and the third "prong"
disposes of their community property upon the death of one of the
spouses. 475 Of course, the spouses may effect the reverse of the first two
"prongs" and provide by "separate property agreement" that their existing
property and the future acquisitions of each which otherwise would be
community property shall be the separate property of the acquiring spouse.
The favor with which community property is viewed, however, imposes a
higher standard of proof to establish the existence of separate property
agreements than community property agreements.
A question of good faith may arise in a transaction between spouses.476
When good faith is challenged, the burden of proof is on the party asserting
the good faith. 477 The question, however, cannot be raised by subsequent
creditors, that is, those whose interests do not exist at the time of the
transaction between the spouses, particularly in light of the statute autho-
rizing direct conveyances between the spouses which protects only "exist-
ing equity in favor of creditors of the grantor." 478
1. Transfers of Presently Owned Property
As provided by statute, 479 a deed of the community interest in real
property from one spouse to the other will make that property separately
473. Id. § 26.16.160.
474. See id. § 26.16.170 (1958), repealed by An Act Relating to Equal Rights, ch. 154, § 121(3),
1973 Wash. Laws 1st Ex. Sess. 1118, 1198 (apparently, legislature felt § 26.16.170 was no longer
necessary).
475. This third "prong" is the statutory community property agreement, discussed supra notes
430-55 and accompanying text (Part V.C.2).
476. See, e.g., Benham v. Hawkins, 82 Wash. 390, 391-92, 144 P. 532, 533 (1914) (as to
community property); Davison v. Hewitt, 6 Wn. 2d 131, 135, 106 P.2d 733, 735 (1940) (as to separate
property). Burden of proof falls on the grantee spouse as against the grantor's creditor under WASH.
Rsv. CODE § 26.16.210 (1983).
477. WASH. REv. CODE § 26.16.210 (1983).
478. Id. § 26.16.050. See also Smith v. Weed, 75 Wash. 452, 463, 134 P. 1070, 1075 (1913).
479. WASH. REv. CODE § 26.10.050 (1983).
Washington Law Review
owned by the grantee spouse "unless there is clear and convincing evidence
that such was not the intention of the parties." 480 Although there is no
statute specifically authorizing the reverse transaction, the court in Volz v.
Zang481 established that the spouse(s) may change separate property into
community property if the transaction is in proper form and the spouses so
intend. 482 In Volz both spouses executed an instrument, in accordance with
deed requirements, which clearly expressed the intent and purpose that
their separate property become community property. After the wife's
death, her mother claimed that certain real estate was separate property; the
husband contended that it had been changed into community property by
the agreement. In holding for the husband, the court noted the policy of the
law in favor of community property, that separate property could be
changed into community property by commingling or estoppel, and con-
cluded if that be so, then "[separate property] should be allowed to change
[into community property] when the parties intend such a change to take
place and evidence this intention by a conveyance, conforming in all
essentials to the requirements of the law affecting the transfer of real
property. " 483
Changing the character of property from community to separate or vice
versa is essentially a transfer or conveyance, and the proper form of the
transaction depends upon the applicability of the statute of frauds. If a
chattel is involved, ordinarily an oral transfer is enough-the cases dealing
with gifts of chattels are illustrative, 484 and no question is presented there of
the necessity of a writing. Obviously, if real property is the subject of the
transfer, an acknowledged writing is required by the deed statute.485
Unfortunately, the matter is somewhat confused by the assertion in Rogers
v. Joughin,486 unsupported by citation of any authority, that "the character
of property cannot be changed from that of separate property to community
480. In re Estate of Monighan, 198 Wash. 253, 255, 88 P.2d 403, 404 (1939).
481. 113 Wash. 378, 194 P. 409 (1920).
482. A wife's conveyance to her husband of an undivided half interest in her separate property does
not create a community property holding but rather a tenancy in common between them. Powers v.
Munson, 74 Wash. 234, 236-37, 133 P. 453, 454 (1913).
483. 113 Wash. at 384, 194 P. at 411.
484. See infra notes 514-24 and accompanying text (Part V.B).
485. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 64.04.010, .020 (1983). The statutory community property agreement
of § 26.16.120 must be executed as deeds are. In re Estate of Verbeek, 2 Wn. App. 144, 467 P.2d 178
(1970), involved the question of the effect of such an agreement to cover separate property not described
but, as the court concluded, intended by the spouses to be the subject matter of the agreement. The lack
of description was immaterial on the statute of frauds question for the agreement, just as it was,
arguably, in Volz v. Zang, 113 Wash. 378, 194 P. 409 (1920). The assertion by the spouses in the
agreement that there was community property, which could have referred only to land that was in fact
separate property, was held to show an intention that it be disposed of as (in effect be converted to)
community property.
486. 152 Wash. 448, 277 P. 988 (1929).
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property, or community to separate by the oral agreement of the spouses
alone."' 487 The court in Leroux v. Knoll mentioned the same general
proposition, 488 citing Rogers v. Joughin, and properly concluded that the
wife's separate real property had not been converted into community
property in that case. However, the sounder statement, recognizing that
oral agreements may be sufficient in particular circumstances, was made
by the court in State ex rel. Van Moss v. Sailors: "It is undoubtedly true that
husband and wife may, by proper agreement or conveyance, change their
separate property into community property and their community property
into separate property." 48 9
2. Agreements Affecting Future Acquisitions
The agreement between the spouses may provide that in addition to
existing property, all future acquisitions by either spouse (which would
otherwise be separate property) shall be their community property; the
result of such an agreement is that unless the agreement is somehow
eliminated, neither spouse will have any separate property while both live.
Two cases forcefully illustrate this proposition and reflect the favor with
which community property is viewed. They are Neeley v. Lockton490 and
Lyon v. Lyon. 491
The court inNeeley concluded that the conversion of separate property to
community property by execution of a "three-pronged" community prop-
erty survivorship agreement prevailed over an inconsistent designation of
beneficiary pursuant to the provisions of a pension trust. The majority in
Neeley held that the expectation of the spouses that the agreement fixed the
rights of both of them in all property, free of any overlooked contrary
schemes, should be protected in promotion of the policy of community
property law. In Lyon the court held that a three-pronged community
property agreement controlled the character of the husband's ownership
acquired by a gift to him and his brother as joint tenants. As a result, the
community property interest the husband acquired through the gift was
totally owned after his death by his wife (as tenant in common with the
, 487. Id. at 456, 277 P. at 991. The court in Rogers found the agreement to be ineffective by reason
of the statute of frauds relating to contracts in contemplation or consideration of marriage, WASH. REv.
CODE § 19.36.010(3) (1983), and no agreement to change separate property to community property
was considered by the court.
488. 28 Wn. 2d 964, 968, 184 P.2d 564, 566 (1947).
489. 180 Wash. 269, 274, 39 P.2d 397, 399 (1934) (emphasis added).
490. 63 Wn. 2d 929, 389 P.2d 909 (1964).
491. lOO Wn. 2d 409, 670 P.2d 272 (1983), noted in Note, Community Property: Joint Tenancy, 19
GONZ. L. REv. 585 (1984).
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brother), rather than going entirely to the brother by survivorship under the
joint tenancy.
It should be noted, however, that agreements making all future acquisi-
tions community property could be phrased to operate only at the time of
death so that all assets would then be transferred as "community property,"
whether or not otherwise separate property, but the inter vivos character of
the assets would remain unaffected. Volz v. Zang and Neeley v. Lockton
reveal the court's desire to give effect to the intention of the spouses, and,
therefore, the particular language of the agreement will be important. As to
future acquisitions, the following differences in phraseology should result
in different conclusions about the inter vivos effect of the agreement:
"It Is Agreed, that upon the death of either of them such property as they
now own or may hereafter acquire from any source whatsoever, shall be
considered as community property and shall, upon such death immediately
become the sole property of the survivor of them." 492
This language should not affect the inter vivos character of a subsequent
acquisition of separate property, permitting such acquisitions to be man-
aged and transferred as separate property until death. With this language
compare the following:
"All property, whether real or personal, now or hereafter standing in the
name of either party hereto, or in the names of both, or in which either or both
of us now or hereafter shall have any interest, is hereby constituted and shall
be treated for all purposes as the community property of both of us, and upon
the death of either one of us the title thereto shall vest in the survivor to the
exclusion of everyone else." 493
This language should preclude classification of any subsequent acquisition
as separate property.
If after the execution of an agreement providing that their future acquisi-
tions shall be community property, the spouses live separate and apart so
that their respective subsequent acquisitions in the absence of the agree-
ment would normally be separate property,494 it is unclear whether the
agreement remains effective. The author believes, however, that the agree-
ment should be held mutually abandoned and ineffective so that their
subsequent acquisitions are separate property. In re Estate of Lyman495
perhaps tends in the opposite direction.
Spouses may agree, as indicated by the above discussion, that their
future acquisitions shall be community property; conversely, spouses may
492. In re Estate of Brown, 29 Wn. 2d 20, 24, 185 P.2d 125, 128 (1947) (emphasis added).
493. In re Estate of Wittman, 58 Wn. 2d 841, 842, 365 P.2d 17, 18 (1961).
494. See discussion supra notes 98-117 and accompanying text (Part IlI.C).
495. 7 Wn. App. 945, 503 P.2d 1127 (1972).
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agree that subsequent acquisitions by either, which ordinarily would be
community property, shall be the separate property of the acquirer.
496
Although in Yake v. Pugh497 the court reasoned that the separate character
of the wife's earnings pursuant to a separate property agreement resulted
from consummation of the husband's continuing intention to make a gift to
her, later cases indicate the separate character exists immediately and
directly upon acquisition of the asset by force of the agreement. Both the.
confidential relationship between spouses and the statutory requirement of
proof of good faith in transactions between them require that separate
property agreements be fair and just. 498
Characterization of an asset acquired by the efforts of either spouse as
eparate property runs counter to fundamental principles and presumptions
of community property law, and the rule is well fixed that clear and
convincing evidence is necessary to sustain the contention that a separate
property agreement exists. 499 In two cases, Kolmorgan v. Schaller5°° and
Mumm v. Mumm, 50 1 the court has indicated that in addition to showing the
existence of the agreement, there must also be a clear showing that the
agreement has been mutually observed.
In Kolmorgan there was a written agreement 502 under which the wife
argued that her subsequent earnings were her separate property and *thus
not reachable by a community creditor. However, the wife had used her
earnings to pay ordinary family expenses. The court thus concluded that the
agreement had not been observed and, therefore, did not control to prevent
the application of the ordinary community property rules under which her
earnings would be community property. While in earlier cases the court
had commented on the spouses' observance of their agreement, no par-
ticular point was made that it was an independent element to establish the
effectiveness of the agreement. Since particular expenditures in
Kolmorgan were made to cover family expenses, which by statute503 would
be her separate liability in any case, the author is not persuaded that such
potentially involuntary payments should indicate a lack of observance of
496. See, e.g., Union Securities Co. v. Smith, 93 Wash. 115, 160 P. 304 (1916); Gage v. Gage, 78
Wash. 262, 138 P. 886 (1914); Dobbins v. Dexter Horton & Co., 62 Wash. 423, 113 P. 1088 (1911).
497. 13 Wash. 78, 42 P. 528 (1895).
498. See, e.g., Hamlin v. Merlino, 44 Wn. 2d 851, 865, 272 P.2d 125, 132 (1954) (antenuptial
agreement); In re Estate of Madden, 176 Wash. 51, 55, 28 P.2d 280, 282 (1934).
499. State v. Miller, 32 Wn. 2d 149, 158, 201 P.2d 136, 141 (1948).
500. 51 Wn. 2d 94, 316 P.2d 111 (1957), notedin Note, Community Property-Mutual Observance
by Spouses of Separate Property Agreements, 33 WASH. L. REv. 112 (1958); Annot., 67 A.L.R.2d 704
(1959).
501. 63 Wn. 2d 349, 387 P.2d 547 (1963).
502. The briefs reflect that the agreement may not have done more than divide existing assets. No
point is made of this in the opinion.
503. WASH. REv. CODE § 26.16.205 (1983) (family expense statute).
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the separate property agreement, 504 even if continued observance is neces-
sary for its vitality.
In Mumm the court concluded that the continued commingling of funds
by the spouses after executing a written separate property agreement
prevented adequate tracing to individual earnings or separate property of
either party; hence, the disputed assets were found to be community
property. The result in Mumn, however, does not seem supportable on this
reasoning. If the agreement originally took effect, there would have been
only separate property, and the confusion of the separate property of two
persons cannot create community property; while the respective separate
property shares of the spouses might be difficult to establish, certainly
there could have been no difficulty in initially identifying earnings of each.
In addition to the commingling rationale, the court in Mumm also relied
on the fact that "the evidence established that the separate property agree-
ment was not mutually observed by the parties; hence, it did not change the
status of the community property.°50 5 However, the result in Mumm is
sound on either one of two bases without relying on mutual observance as
an element to establish the effectiveness of the agreement: (1) the written
agreement was never implemented so that there was no way to identify
which then-existing assets were traceable to community earnings or to
separate property of either, and consequently the community property
status from the preexisting commingling just continued; or (2) their subse-
quent disregard of the agreement amounted to an abandonment of it, so that
the separateness of property created by the agreement was subsequently
lost by commingling with community property acquired after the abandon-
ment of the agreement. The latter explanation seems factually improbable
because the agreement was made on August 25, 1958, and the action for
divorce was started on June 28, 1960. As a result, the time between
execution of the agreement and commencement of the divorce was so short
that it would be hard to show that the agreement had been effective initially,
but by subsequent conduct the spouses had abandoned it. The author
believes, therefore, that the correct explanation of the Mumm case is the
former explanation: that despite execution of the formal agreement, the
parties failed to implement it. Thus the question of the significance of lack
of mutual observance after initial implementation of the agreement still
remains, this point not being necessary to, and therefore left unresolved by,
the decision in either Kolmorgan or Mumm.
In most cases, the separate property agreement has not been put in
writing, and adequate proof of the agreement will be found only if there is
504. See Parsons v. Tracy, 127 Wash. 218, 220 P. 813 (1923) (rejecting argument that separate
property agreement made voluntary the payment of expenses of last illness); Note, supra note 500.
505. 63 Wn. 2d at 352, 387 P.2d at 549 (citing Kolmorgan).
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conduct of the spouses from which there can be a strong inference support-
ing their assertion that they had made such an agreement. In this sense,
therefore, mutual observance probably will be essential to establish the
existence of the asserted oral agreement. If the agreement's existence is
beyond dispute, however, for example, because it is in writing, mutual
observance should be significant only as to such questions as abandonment
of the agreement or the agreement's operative effect in particular factual
situations, but not as an independent element to establish the effectiveness
of the agreement.
Do separate property agreements have a different operative effect de-
pending upon whether the subsequent acquisition is real or personal prop-
erty? In Graves v. Graves,5 6 the court stated that an oral separate property
agreement affecting real property would be void as contrary to the basic
community property statute and contrary to the requirement that con-
veyances of real estate be by deed. An oral agreement, however, should
control the character of acquired property whether that property is real or
personal. As previously indicated, if the real property asset is community
property, the statute of frauds prevents an oral change in its character, but
that analysis is irrelevant to the question of the character of the asset upon
acquisition. 507
For instance, when the spouses effectively change all assets into separate
property of one or the other, all income from such assets will be separate
property under the statutes, 50 8 and if the spouses have agreed that subse-
quent earnings shall be the separate property of the acquirer,50 9 there will
be no assets of a community character which can be the source of a
community property acquisition. 510 Hence, a comprehensive separate
property agreement may dissolve the community property position.
The separate property agreement will not be given effect to insulate what
otherwise would be community property from the community creditor
whose basic claim existed at the time of the agreement. 511 It will be
effective against the subsequent creditor whether he knew of the agree-
ment512 or not.513
506. 48 Wash. 664, 94 P. 481 (1908). In addition to the statement referred to in the text, the court
concluded the facts indicated there was no agreement.
507. See G. McKAY, supra note 111, § 968.
508. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 26.16.010, .020 (1983).
509. This can be done. See, e.g., Gage v. Gage, 78 Wash. 262, 138 P. 886 (1914).
510. It might be argued that a credit acquisition would be community property because the
obligation would presumptively be a community debt, but the absence of existing community property
to establish credit in substance should mean the credit, too, is separate.
511. Marsh v. Fisher, 69 Wash. 570, 125 P. 951 (1912).
512. Union Securities Co. v. Smith, 93 Wash. 115, 160 P. 304 (1916).
513. Piles v. Bovee, 168 Wash. 538, 12 P.2d 914 (1932). The suggestion in G. McKAY, supra note
111, § 902, that the agreement would not be effective against the subsequent creditor if the spouses
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B. "Donative" Acquisitions and Gifts
Prior to the 1972 amendments, if community funds were used by the
husband to acquire an asset, title to which was put in the wife's name, there
was inherently some indication that the husband, as manager, intended by
placing title in his wife's name to consummate a gift (either of the funds or
the asset) which she would then own as her separate property. However, the
basic community property presumption and the requirement that there be
clear proof of a gift impeded the establishment of a title-changing transac-
tion. 5 14 Where the wife, who at that time possessed no managing power,
acquired an asset with title placed in her name, she was likely to be treated
as a substitute manager in a community property acquisition rather than as
a donee. 515 After the 1972 amendments equalizing management power
between the spouses, the acquisition of an asset with community funds by
either spouse and placement of title in either the acting spouse's or the
nonacting spouse's name clearly should rest within the basic community
property presumption. 516
Ownership of an insurance policy on the life of a spouse may involve
similar questions. In Kern v. United States, 517 the beneficiary wife asserted
that the proceeds of the policies on her husband's life should not have been
included in his estate for tax purposes because the two policies had been
given to her. She signed a standard form of application as applicant for both
policies and in one there was a typed endorsement elaborating on her
ownership and control of the policy. Half of the proceeds of the policies was
included in the gross estate, presumably on the grounds that the policies
were community property, and after a claim for refund was disallowed, this
action for refund was initiated. The trial court dismissed the action on the
continued to live together, obviously was not applied; it appears possible, however, that the nonacting
spouse claiming insulation by reason of the agreement might have misled the creditor and thereby be
unable to get the protection claimed.
A provision in the marriage dissolution statute, WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.070(2) (1983), may
support an argument that recording a separate property agreement is required. The section does not
necessitate such a result. Rather, it authorizes recording a separation contract, which with published
notice "shall constitute notice to all persons ... of the facts contained in the recorded document.'"
514. The basic analysis, involving three different factual patterns, appears in In re Estate of
Slocum, 83 Wash. 158, 145 P. 204 (1915). If the spouses, for instance, desire a life insurance policy to be
the separate property of the noninsured spouse (to keep the proceeds out of the estate of the insured
spouse) the gift problem is likely to be involved. See, e.g., Kern v. United States, 491 F.2d 436 (9th Cir.
1974), in which the court concluded there was adequate proof to make one policy the separate property
of the surviving, noninsured spouse but not another policy.
515. Cf Jones v. Duke, 151 Wash. 108, 275 P. 72 (1929) (car acquired with community funds in
wife's bank account; wife stated in license application to be owner; county assessed car as owned by
wife; held, community property).
516. See supra note 514.
517. 491 F.2d 436 (9th Cir. 1974).
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grounds that the policies were community property, reasoning that the
community property presumption could be overcome only by a separate
instrument with the recitation that the property was separate property and
not community property. The court of appeals noted that Washington law
required clear, definite, and convincing proof of the gift to overcome the
strong community property presumption, and concluded that the standard
form statement of control by the applicant in the applications did not
provide the necessary proof, but the special endorsement (and other testi-
mony) as to one policy did. Accordingly, the trial court was affirmed as to
one policy but as to the latter it was reversed, and the case was remanded to
determine the effect of section 48.18.440 of the Revised Code of Washing-
ton that a policy made payable to the spouse of the insured "shall, unless
contrary to the terms of the policy, inure to the separate use and benefit of
such spouse. 518 In Estate of Madsen v. Commissioner,519 the court deter-
mined in answering a question certified by the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit 520 that the same section applied only to proceeds of life
insurance and did not affect the ownership of the policy inter vivos. There is
at least a hint in the opinion that the court might have found that a gift of the
policy had been made to the wife (who was beneficiary) but as the
Washington Supreme Court observed, the contrary determination by the
Tax Court was not reviewable.
Somewhat similarly an argument that, in effect, there had been cross
gifts by the spouses creating two separate property Totten trust bank
accounts failed in In re Estate of Bonness.521 Community funds had been
deposited in a bank account in the name of the wife in trust for the husband,
and an equal amount in the name of the husband in trust for the wife, who
survived. The court held that the account in the wife's name was com-
munity property and that the husband's rights as beneficiary lapsed upon
his prior death (with the wife's rights to the husband's half controlled by
518. WASH. REv. CODE § 48.18.440(1) (1983) provides:
Every life insurance policy heretofore or hereafter made payable to or for the benefit of the
spouse of the insured, and every life insurance policy heretofore or hereafter assigned, transferred,
or in any way made payable to a spouse or to a trustee for the benefit of a spouse, regardless of how
such assignment or transfer is procured, shall, unless contrary to the terms of the policy, inure to
the separate use and benefit of such spouse: Provided, That the beneficial interest of a spouse in a
policy upon the life of a child of the spouses, however such interest is created, shall be deemed to
be a community interest and not a separate interest, unless expressly otherwise provided by the
policy.
519. 97 Wn. 2d 792, 650 P.2d 196 (1982).
520. The Washington court stated that the certified question presented the problem of statutory
interpretation: "Does RCW 48.18.440(1) convert community property life insurance policies into the
sole and separate property of the beneficiary spouse?" Id. at 798, 650 P.2d at 200.
521. 13 Wn. App. 299, 535 P.2d 823 (1975).
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community property succession rules), and the wife owned the account in
the husband's name as her separate property under the beneficiary designa-
tion.
Despite the basic community property presumption and the resulting
practical difficulty in establishing a gift from one spouse to the other, either
subsequent to the acquisition transaction or as the inherent character of that
transaction, there is one factual pattern in which comparatively slight
evidence may be sufficient to establish separate ownership in one spouse by
gift. In Johnson v. Dar Denne522 the question arose whether rings pur-
chased with community funds were the separate property of the wife or
subject to replevin by the surviving husband against the wife's donee. In
affirming the trial court's determination that one ring was the separate
property of the wife, the court said:
In an action such as this, when the rights of creditors are not involved, and
as between the husband and wife only, jewelry or articles of personal
adornment, acquired after marriage with community funds, but worn and
used solely by the wife, will be held to be the separate property of the wife by
gift from the husband upon comparatively slight evidence.523
Thus, two elements appear to be required to establish a gift on this theory:
(1) that the acting spouse has acquired an article peculiarly appropriate for
the use and enjoyment of the other spouse; and (2) that the other spouse has
in fact so used it. The gift character of the total transaction will still be the
ultimate question, 524 although after the 1972 amendments it should be
proper to substitute "spouse to spouse" for the "husband to wife" reason-
ing of the court in Johnson.
C. Joint Tenancies and Tenancies in Common
In addition to changing community property into the separate property
of one spouse, the spouses can convert their community property owner-
ship into a common law form of co-ownership, either a joint tenancy or a
tenancy in common. Survivorship and other incidents of the joint tenancy
are sufficiently different from community property incidents to indicate
that the respective interests of spouses as joint tenants are separate prop-
erty, 525 although a recent statute526 has confused the matter by establishing
522. 161 Wash. 496, 296 P. 1105 (1931).
523. Id. at 497, 296 P. at 1106.
524. Note the conclusion as to jewelry of the husband in In re Estate of Dougherty, 27 Wn. 2d II,
176 P.2d 335 (1947) (diamond-studded wrist watch given, but not a ruby tie clasp or a diamond ring).
525. Cf W. DE FUNIAK & M. VAUGHN, supra note 2, § 134.
526. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 64.28.040(l) (West Supp. 1986) provides:
Joint tenancy interests held in the names of a husband and wife, whether or not in conjunction
with others, are presumed to be their community property, the same as other property held in the
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that joint tenancy interests held in the names of a husband and wife are
presumed to be their community property. The automatic survivorship of a
joint tenancy may have enough of an appeal to persuade spouses to abandon
community property protections by converting to a joint tenancy holding,
but of course survivorship may not operate because of a severance of the
joint tenancy before the death of one of the joint tenants. However, unless
the new statutory presumption is rebutted, unilateral severance would not
be allowed, so it appears there would be a survivorship indestructible by
any voluntary act of one of the spouses. 527 Normally if the spouses agree
not to have community property, an acquisition to which both contributed
would apparently be a tenancy in common. 528 The author does not perceive
any particular reason why the spouses would change community property
into a separate property tenancy in common.
By Washington law, a joint tenancy may be created in real or personal
property, but only by a written instrument, which may be "from husband
and wife, when holding title as community property, or-otherwise, to
themselves or to themselves and others, or to one of them and to another or
others." '529 The new statute mentioned in the preceding paragraph will
apparently require an express recitation in the creating instrument that
community property holding is not intended, if the spouses desire to create
a joint tenancy between a husband and wife. Perhaps some such language
as "to hold in joint tenancy with right of survivorship and not as community
property" will be needed.
In addition to these joint tenancy statutes there have been "bank"
account statutes530 in which co-ownership, including joint tenancy, prob-
lems could arise, but these probably no longer have any uniqueness by
reason of the provisions in the 1982 statute531 that the form of the account
shall not affect community or separate property rights, funds deposited
belong to the depositors as before the deposit, and ownership at death is
subject to community property rights and provisions of a community
property agreement. While the 1982 statute does not preclude creation of a
name of both husband and wife. Any such interest passes to the survivor of the husband and wife as
provided for property held in joint tenancy, but in all other respects the interest is treated as
community property.
527. Although not by involuntary severance by a tort creditor of one of the spouses, under deElche
v. Jacobsen, 95 Wn. 2d 237, 622 P.2d 835 (1980). The case is discussed infra notes 560-67, 655-56,
665, 673-708 and accompanying text (Part VI).
528. WASH. REv. CODE § 64.28.020 (1983).
529. Id. § 64.28.010. The attempt to create ajoint tenancy between the husband and a child from
community property was frustrated by lack of the necessary writing in In re Estate of Patton, 6 Wn.
App. 464, 494 P.2d 238 (1972).
530. Separate statutes existed for commercial banks, mutual savings banks, savings and loan
associations, and credit unions.
531. WASH. REv. CODE ch. 30.22 (1983). It applies to all four types of financial institutions.
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joint tenancy account it seems probable that such an account will be
unusual, and the account created by either one or both of the spouses with
community funds will be a community property asset-the transaction
amounting merely to a change in form but not a change in character of the
property. The result will accord with the holding in Munson v. Haye532 that
a presumption of the joint tenancy character of the account "ceased to
exist" when it was shown that the funds deposited were community
property. The court added that it would take evidence that was clear,
certain, and convincing "to establish that [the spouses] intended to change
the status of community property by giving to either the right to appropriate
all or any part of the account to his or her own use." 533
The statutory requirement of a writing to change community property
into joint tenancy,5 34 the new statute creating a presumption of a com-
munity property holding, and the reasoning in Munson v. Haye indicate
that if real property acquired by the spouses is intended to be held in joint
tenancy, the transaction ought to be accompanied by their signatures
accepting the joint tenancy form on the deed or in a separate writing clearly
stating their intention.
A similar problem exists with respect to bonds, corporate shares, and
similar assets. The court has held that registration of mutual fund shares in
the names of both spouses as joint tenants did not satisfy the statutory
requirement of a writing by both, 535 that a note and mortgage to the spouses
as joint tenants, for community funds loaned, were community property,536
and that community property shares of stock reissued in joint tenancy form
were still community property.537 In an Idaho case involving a "joint
tenancy" account with a stockbroker and on reasoning likely to be applied
in Washington, the court held there was no adequate showing of clear intent
to change an asset from community property status; therefore, a half
interest was necessarily in the wife's estate because of its community
property character. 538 It is thus not clear that a standing order to a stock-
broker to acquire in the name of the customers as joint tenants should by
itself be adequate to convert an otherwise community acquisition into a
joint tenancy acquisition. The power of the spouses to agree that future
acquisitions by either be the separate property of the acquirer 539 is not
532. 29 Wn. 2d 733, 189 P.2d 464 (1948).
533. 29 Wn. 2d at 743, 189 P.2d at 470.
534. WASH. REV. CODE § 64.28.010 (1983).
535. Lambert v. Peoples Nat'l Bank, 89 Wn. 2d 646, 574 P.2d 738 (1978).
536. In re Estate of Olson, 87 Wn. 2d 855, 557 P.2d 302 (1976).
537. Rogers Walla Walla, Inc. v. Ballard, 16 Wn. App. 81,553 P.2d 1372 (1976), review denied, 88
Wn. 2d 1004 (1977).
538. In re Estate of Bogert, 96 Idaho 522, 531 P.2d 1167 (1975).
539. See the discussion supra text accompanying notes 496-98.
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entirely analogous to a continuing agreement that future acquisitions by
both be other than the preferred community property ownership. On the
other hand, the signature card signed by both spouses creating a joint
tenancy bank account arguably 4° would be enough to preclude a con-
clusion of its community property character, and the difference between
the two situations would be only in the relatively narrower scope of the bank
account asset.
D. Divorce (Dissolution)
While transactions which convert all community property to the separate
property of one or the other spouse are possible, such total conversion is not
likely unless the spouses plan dissolution of either the community rela-
tionship541 or the marital relationship. Such a conversion changes titles
immediately,542 but remains subject to the power of the court to make a
different allocation in the dissolution action. Under the current dissolution
of marriage statute, the power of the court to change the disposition made
by the spouses has been restricted to situations in which the court finds that
"the separation contract was unfair at the time of its execution. ,543
All property of the spouses, both separate and community, is before the
court for allocation. The separate or community character of the assets is an
important element to be considered by the court in arriving at a just and
equitable disposition of the assets as mandated by the statute,544 but it is not
required that the trial court's finding be specific if the record reflects that the
540. See Cross (1974), supra note 1, at 817.
541. Both a marital and a family relationship can exist without community of property, e.g., when
there is present conversion to separate property and an agreement that future acquisitions be separate
property. See also Parsons v. Tracy, 127 Wash. 218, 220 P. 813 (1923); G. McKAY, supra note 111,
§ 897; cf. W. DE FuNiAK & M. VAUGHN, supra note 2, §§ 134-36.
542. In re Estate of Garrity, 22 Wn. 2d 391, 156 P.2d 217 (1945).
543. WASH. REv. CODE § 26.09.070(3) (1983). See Rieke, The Dissolution Act of 1973: From
Status to Contract?, 49 WASH. L. REv. 375 (1974).
544. WASH. REv. CODE § 26.09.080 (1983) provides:
In a proceeding for dissolution of the marriage, legal separation, declaration of invalidity, or in a
proceeding for disposition of property following dissolution of the marriage by a court which
lacked personal jurisdiction over the absent spouse or lacked jurisdiction to dispose of the
property, the court shall, without regard to marital misconduct, make such disposition of the
property and the liabilities of the parties, either community or separate, as shall appear just and
equitable after considering all relevant factors including, but not limited to:
(1) The nature and extent of the community property;
(2) The nature and extent of the separate property;
(3) The duration of the marriage; and
(4) The economic circumstances of each spouse at the time the division of property is to become
effective, including the desirability of awarding the family home or the right to live therein for
reasonable periods to a spouse having custody of any children.
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court had the character of the property in mind in making an award proper
under all the circumstances. 545
If the marital relationship between the parties is dissolved the prerequi-
site to community property is gone. Therefore, the former community
property, if not changed from its community status by a transfer while the
two were married and if not allocated by the court in the dissolution
action, 546 will be held by the former spouses as equal tenants in com-
mon. 547 It is possible that the tenancy-in-common claim of the former
spouse may be barred by collateral estoppel, 548 but if the ownership is not in
some way barred, it can be asserted after the title-holding former spouse
dies. Moreover, the ownership asserted by the surviving former spouse is
unaffected by any probate nonclaim-statute reasoning because the asser-
tion is not a claim against the decedent's estate but rather exercise of an
ownership right. 549
VI. INVOLUNTARY DISPOSITION
The statute has long provided that "[c]ommunity real estate shall be
subject. . . to liens of judgments recovered for community debts, and to
sale on execution issued thereon. ,,550 This statutory provision necessitated
classifying debts as community, enforceable against community real prop-
erty, or as separate, and therefore enforceable only against the separate
property of the obligor. Each spouse has power to incur separate obliga-
tions,551 but in general neither spouse has power to impose separate
liability on the other.552 The important question usually is whether the act
of a spouse creates community liability in addition to separate liability,
since as a practical matter it is likely that the acting spouse has no separate
property out of which a judgment may be satisfied but only community
property interests held with the nonacting spouse.
The early cases distinguished between enforcement of the husband's
separate debts against community personal property (over which he then
545. In re Marriage of Dalthorp, 23 Wn. App. 904, 598 P.2d 788 (1979).
546. It is the duty of the court to allocate property brought before it. Bernier v. Bernier, 44 Wn. 2d
447, 267 P.2d 1066 (1954).
547. Ambrose v. Moore, 46 Wash. 463, 90 P. 588 (1907).
548. Cf Witzel v. Tena, 48 Wn. 2d 628, 295 P.2d 1115 (1956); Dean v. National Bank, 57 Wn. 2d
822. 360 P.2d 150 (1961).
549. Smith v. McLaren, 58 Wn. 2d 907, 365 P.2d 331 (1961); Olsen v. Roberts, 42 Wn. 2d 862,
259 P.2d 418 (1953).
550. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.040 (1983).
551. Id. § 26.16.150.
552. Id. §§ 26.16.010, .020, .190, .200. The family expense statute provides the exception. Id.
§ 26.16.205.
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was held to possess greater management power because of the statutory
provision that he had "a like power of disposition as he has of his separate
personal property") 553 and enforcement of his separate debts against com-
munity real property554 (over which the dispositive power was joint).555 In
addition, there was the possibility that debts referred only to voluntary
obligations and that a different rule controlled enforcement of involuntary
obligations, such as those imposed by statute or resulting from tort lia-
bility.556 Both of these distinctions were eliminated in Schramm v.
Steele, 557 in which the court concluded that the husband's broader manage-
ment power over personal property was not based on greater proprietary
rights, but rather on a management agency which could not support
enforcement of his separate obligation, whether voluntary or involuntary,
against either community real or personal property. Further, the court had
already concluded that a separate creditor could not reach his debtor's
undivided half interest in community property,558 because the resulting
ownership of the nondebtor spouse would fit neither the separate nor the
community property definitions. 559 Thus, basically the entire community
property interest was protected from separate obligations. This orderly
scheme was disrupted in 1980 when Schramm was overruled by deElche v.
Jacobsen,560 in which a separate tort creditor was permitted to reach the
tortfeasor spouse's half interest in community personal property. The ram-
ifications of this change will be discussed in the appropriate places be-
low.5 61
In Nichols Hills Bank v. McCool,562 the court refused to extend deElche
to the husband's separate contract obligation, thereby preserving that much
of the indivisibility of community property first confirmed in Stockand v.
Bartlett.563 In Nichols the husband signed a guaranty agreement in support
553. See Act of Feb. 23, 1972, ch. 108, § 3, 1972 Wash. Laws 2d Ex. Sess. 244, 245 (amending
WASH. REv. CODE § 26.16.030 (1958)).
554. Powell v. Pugh, 13 Wash. 577, 43 P.879 (1896).
555. See Act of Feb. 23, 1972, ch. 108, § 4, 1972 Wash. Laws 2d Ex. Sess. 244, 246 (amending
WASH. REv. CODE § 26.16.040 (1958)). The joint power statement is now in § 26.16.030 (1983).
556. See Brotton v. Langert, 1 Wash. 73, 23 P. 688 (1890), particularly the dissent.
557. 97 Wash. 309, 166 P. 634 (1917).
558. Stockand v. Bartlett, 4 Wash. 730, 31 P. 24 (1892). The request to permit enforcement of a
separate obligation against the husband's half interest in community property was denied in Aichlmayr
v. Lynch, 6 Wn. App. 434,493 P.2d 1026 (1972). See also Nichols Hills Bank v. McCool, 104 Wn. 2d
78, 701 P.2d 1114 (1985).
559. The awkwardness can arise through enforcement of federal liens, discussed infra in text
accompanying notes 647-56 (Part VI.A.2.b).
560. 95 Wn. 2d 237, 622 P.2d 835 (1980).
561. See infra notes 562-67, 655-56, 665, 673-708 and accompanying text.
562. 104 Wn. 2d 78,701 P.2d 1114 (1985).
563. 4 Wash. 730, 31 P. 24 (1892).
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of their son's obligation without the consent of the wife. The transaction
was found to be a gift of community credit proscribed by the statute,564
which requires the consent of both spouses; the wife's knowledge alone was
not enough to support the plaintiff's arguments that she had "participated"
in the transaction. The court distinguished deElche by pointing out that
there was no statutory barrier to enforcement of the separate tort judgment
against the tortfeasor's half interest in community personal property and
considerations of equity favored that result. In Nichols, there was the
statute, the policy of protecting the innocent spouse and the integrity of
community property, 565 and the control the parties had of the situation in
creating the obligation. "Thus," said the court, "because of the minimal
countervailing policy considerations and the specific statutory mandate, we
decline to extend the holding of deElche to a transaction involving a
contractual gift of community property. ' 566 A separate obligation not
involving a gift567 is not directly covered by Nichols, but all of the elements
except the prohibitory statute do exist, which strongly suggests the desir-
able result that community property indivisibility should remain secure
against separate contract obligations.
A. Contractual and Other Non-Tort Obligations
1. Postnuptial Obligations
The contracting spouse of course incurs separate liability 568 by making
the contract, and the important question usually is whether a community
liability also was incurred. The basic presumption that a debt incurred by
either spouse is a community debt, and thus enforceable against the
community property, is not easily rebutted.
a. The Basic Presumption of a Community Obligation
The ordinary debt transaction of the manager will involve the acquisition
of an asset, which by the rules previously discussed will be presumptively
community property; correlatively, the debt incurred by the contracting
spouse is presumptively community in character. 569 Debts incurred in
564. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.030(2) (1983).
565. I.e., avoiding in effect the substitution of a common law cotenancy for the community
property concept.
566. 104 Wn. 2d at 88, 701 P.2d at 1119.
567. E.g., one in connection with management or transfer of separate property.
568. The wife was separately liable as party to the contract, individually, in Short v. Dolling, 178
Wash. 467, 35 P.2d 82 (1934). See also George C. Lemcke Co. v. Nordby, 117 Wash. 221, 200 P. 1103
(1921); Conrad v. Mertz, 45 Wash. 119, 87 P. 1118 (1906). Consider also WASH. REV. CODE
§§ 26.16.150, .170, .190, .200 (1983).
569. Oregon Improvement Co. v. Sagmeister, 4 Wash. 710, 30 P. 1058 (1892).
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direct management of community property similarly are presumptively
community debts, and if there is an intent to benefit the community
property position by incurring the debt, it will be enforceable against
community property.570
Prior to the 1972 amendments, all debts of the husband were presumed to
be community debts, 571 since he was the manager of the community
property and presumably was acting for the community.572 The wife,
lacking management power at that time, did not create community liability
by her ordinary obligatory acts. 573 The husband could make the wife the
agent to conduct community affairs, 574 however, so that community lia-
bility would follow, or, by his ratification or through estoppel, he could be
precluded from denying that she created a community obligation.575 Such
reasoning is, of course, no longer necessary after the 1972 amendments
establishing the wife's equal management authority; rather, a debt incurred
by either spouse now will be presumptively a community debt.
If both spouses join in the contract, both will be separately liable and
usually there will be community liability.576 The signature of the other
spouse, however, adds nothing to the character of the liabilities, the only
significance of that joinder being to create the second separate liability.
This was the explanation by the court in Northern Bank & Trust Co. v.
Graves,577 where the wife was found separately liable when she signed
notes executed by her husband.
570. Beyers v. Moore, 45 Wn. 2d 68, 272 P.2d 626 (1954).
571. See, e.g., Malotte v. Gorton, 75 Wn. 2d 306, 450 P.2d 820(1969); Fies v. Storey, 37 Wn. 2d
105, 221 P.2d 1031 (1950); Bryant v. Stetson & Post Mill Co., 13 Wash. 692, 43 P. 931 (1896).
572. See, e.g., ies v. Storey, 37 Wn. 2d 105,221 P.2d 1031 (1950); Capital Nat'l Bank v. Johns,
170 Wash. 250, 16 P.2d 452 (1932); Bierer v. Blurock, 9 Wash. 63, 36 P. 975 (1894); Oregon
Improvement Co. v. Sagmeister, 4 Wash. 710, 30 P. 1058 (1892).
573. Streck v. Taylor, 173 Wash. 367, 23 P.2d 415 (1933).
574. Lucci v. Lucci, 2 Wn. 2d 624, 99 P.2d 393 (1940); Wallace v. Thomas, 193 Wash. 582, 76
P.2d 1032 (1938); WASH. REv. CODE §§ 26.16.060-.090 (983).
575. Colagrossi v. Hendrickson, 50 Wn. 2d 266,310 P.2d 1072 (1957); Hartman v. Anderson, 49
Wn. 2d 154,298 P.2d 1103 (1956); Short v. Dolling, 178 Wash. 467,35 P.2d 82 (1934); Bowers v. Good,
52 Wash. 384, 100 P. 848 (1909).
The harshness of the odd conclusion that no community liability attached to the husband's employ-
ment of a broker to find a buyer of community real estate, see Geoghegan v. Dever, 30 Wn. 2d 877, 194
P.2d 397 (1948), because it would in effect encumber the real estate without the necessary participation
by the wife, was ameliorated in Whiting v. Johnson, 64 Wn. 2d 135,390 P.2d 985 (1964), where she was
held to have authorized his act. The Geoghegan case analysis is, in the author's opinion, unsound
inasmuch as the obligation to pay for the personal service would encumber real estate only if it were
reduced to judgment, in the same way as for any contract debt.
Consider whether Goeghegan should survive in light of House v. Erwin, 83 Wn. 2d 898, 524 P.2d
911 (1974) (quoting with approval Central Idaho Agency v. Turner, 92 Idaho 306, 442 P.2d 442 (1968),
in which the quality of the broker's contract for services was emphasized).
576. See, e.g., Conrad v. Mertz, 45 Wash. 119, 87 P. 1118 (1906).
577. 79 Wash. 411, 140 P. 328 (1914). Note that this point was also made by Judge Stiles, quoted
infra note 588.
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While most of the problems discussed in this part of the article do not
arise until enforcement of the obligation is sought, and hence are appropri-
ately discussed as involuntary dispositions, several aspects of contractual
obligations are more appropriately discussed in a management context.
Thus, as discussed above in Part IV, neither the disagreement of the
nonacting spouse over the wisdom of the obligation, 578 nor the acting
spouse's lack of good judgment 579 in undertaking the obligation, nor the
nonacting spouse's lack of knowledge of the obligation 580 affects its com-
munity character. It is necessary, however, that the obligation not amount
to a gift, that is, that it be incurred for a community "business" purpose,58'
although the community benefit need not be actually realized. 582
b. Rebutting the Basic Presumption
The basic presumption of community liability can be rebutted only by
clear and convincing evidence, 583 and the burden of proving that only
separate liability was incurred by the acting spouse rests on the proponent
of the limited liability. 584 Except in situations of a gift of community
credit,585 transactions clearly related to separate property,586 or an effective
separate property agreement between the spouses, it may be impossible to
establish the separate character of the debt of either spouse without a clear
understanding with the creditor that there was to be no community lia-
bility. 587 As the following discussion indicates, there has been almost a
578. See, e.g., Byrne v. Sanders, 17 Wn. 2d 56, 134 P.2d 941 (1943); Bellingham Motors Corp. v.
Lindberg, 126 Wash. 684, 219 P. 19 (1923); Baker v. Murrey, 78 Wash. 241, 138 P. 890 (1914).
579. See cases cited supra note 578.
580. Capital Nat'l Bank v. Johns, 170 Wash. 250, 16 P.2d 452 (1932).
581. Nichols Hills Bank v. McCool, 104 Wn. 2d 78,701 P.2d 1114 (1985); Sun Life Assurance Co.
of Canada v. Outler, 172 Wash. 540, 20 P.2d 1110 (1933). But see infra note 604 and accompanying text.
582. Beyers v. Moore, 45 Wn. 2d 68, 272 P.2d 626 (1954); Way v. Lyric Theater Co., 79 Wash.
275, 140 P. 320 (1914). It is sufficient if there is some benefit received even though it is not initially equal
to the obligation incurred. Lincoln Trust Co. v. Spangler, 121 Wash. 267, 209 P. 521 (1922).
583. Beyers v. Moore, 45 Wn. 2d 68, 272 P.2d 626 (1954). In Zarbell v. Mantas, 32 Wn. 2d 920.
204 P.2d 203 (1949), absence of even indirect community benefit was shown.
584. Beyers v. Moore, 45 Wn. 2d 68, 272 P.2d 626 (1954).
585. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada v. Outler, 172 Wash. 540, 20 P.2d 1110 (1933). In effect
community credit is treated like any other asset which cannot be given unless both spouses concur.
Nichols Hills Bank v. McCool, 104 Wn. 2d 78, 701 P.2d 1114 (1985). See WASH. REv. CODE
§ 26.16.030(2) (1983); supra notes 323, 373-99, 564 and accompanying text; infra notes 605-12 and
accompanying text.
586. Piles v. Bovee, 168 Wash. 538, 12 P.2d 914 (1932); Steward v. Bounds, 167 Wash. 554.9 P.2d
1112 (1932); Union Securities Co. v. Smith, 93 Wash. 115, 160 P. 304 (1916).
587. A community obligation may arise in favor of an intended transferee (essentially quantum
meruit) who has partly performed in a transaction not specifically enforceable because both spouses had
not participated. In Graves v. Smith, 7 Wash. 14, 34 P. 213 (1893), plaintiff recovered the value of
surveying services even though they were intended as part payment for an unenforceable contract to
convey community real property. The requirement of joinder in transactions involving community
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total erosion of the holding (and the apprehensions it raised)588 that a
community liability could not be found in transactions principally of
benefit to third persons, such as obligations arising through accommoda-
tion endorsement, guaranty, or suretyship; the dimensions of "community
debt" have become, in effect, extremely broad.
The presumption of the community character of the debt created when
funds are borrowed is supported when they are used for community
purposes, 589 but their use for separate purposes, whether or not previously
contemplated by both spouses, 590 does not overcome the community pre-
sumption. As between the spouses, if the security given the lender is
separate property, the funds acquired may reasonably be considered to be
separate property, 591 but this has no bearing on the character of the
obligation. 592 The ownership character of funds borrowed as between
husband and wife does not control the character of the debt.593 In both In re
household goods, etc., may also present this problem. See WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.030(5) (1983).
588. Brotton v. Langert, I Wash. 73, 86, 23 P. 688, 690-91 (1890) (Stiles, J., dissenting):
A community debt, within the meaning of the act of 1881, ought to be any liability incurred by
either husband or wife during their marriage, and which is not a separate debt by its express terms,
or by reason of its being patently for the exclusive benefit of the separate property of the party
contracting it ...
I cannot believe that it was the intention of the legislature of 1881 to withdraw all this community
real estate from liability for accommodation indorsements, guaranties, and especially official
bonds, as well as the hundred engagements that married men enter into every day, but which have
no relevancy to their community interests, and cannot be said to benefit them. It is said that these
obligations can be made good by securing the signature of the wife, but I deny it. If the signature of
a husband to the bond of a county treasurer does not make the obligation collectible out of his
community real property, because the debt is not one for the benefit of the community, it is idle to
say that adding the signature of the wife will change the character of the debt, and make it so
collectible; and so on. The combinations and confusions are endless, if this doctrine is once
announced.
The negative inferences from the quoted language of Judge Stiles' dissent identify well the dimensions
of the community debt concept.
589. See, e.g., Fies v. Storey, 37 Wn. 2d 105, 221 P.2d 1031 (1950).
590. See, e.g., Auernheimer v. Gardner, 177 Wash. 158, 31 P.2d 515 (1934); In re Estate of Finn,
106 Wash. 137, 179 P. 103 (1919);seealsoGouldv. Culver, 148 Wash. 689,270 P. 93 (1928). In Gould,
the wife did not know of the transaction; the court concluded that the transfer of the funds to the
husband's brother was not shown to be a gift, but rather there was some indication of conveyance of land
by the brother to the husband, which supported the presumption of the community character of the
transaction. The court also noted that the funds borrowed were presumptively community.
591. In re Estate of Bubb, 53 Wn. 2d 131,331 P.2d 859 (1958), discussed in 34 WASH. L. REv. 147
(1959); In re Estate of Finn, 106 Wash. 137, 179 P. 103 (1919); see also Graves v. Columbia
Underwriters, 93 Wash. 196, 160 P. 436 (1916).
592. In re Estate of Finn, 106 Wash. 137, 179 P. 103 (1919). The court in Auernheimerv. Gardner,
177 Wash. 158, 31 P.2d 515 (1934), asserted the borrowed funds were community property available for
any community use. This conclusion is contrary to the intention of the spouses as reflected by the uses
made of the funds. Cf. National Bank of Commerce v. Green, 1 Wn. App. 713, 463 P.2d 187 (1969),
where the distinction between the character of the obligation and the character of funds borrowed also is
unfortunately blurred.
593. Consider also Riverside Finance Co. v. Griffith, 140 Wash. 322, 248 P. 786 (1926); the court
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Estate of Finn594 and Auernheimer v. Gardner,595 the funds acquired were
separate, but the lender insisted upon the husband's joinder in the notes; the
only reasonable inference is that the creditor intended to acquire a com-
munity obligation, which makes it extremely difficult to overcome the
presumption of a community obligation.
If some community property benefit, direct or indirect, can be found, the
presumption of community liability will not be overcome. For example, a
purpose to benefit the corporation which employs the husband or of which he
is an officer or director will supply sufficient indirect benefit, 596 even though
the corporation is insolvent.597 The position of the surety spouse as share-
holder also evidences sufficient community property benefit, although if the
shares are separate property the indirect benefit and the attendant obligation
will be separate. 598 Expectation of employment likewise will suffice as a
community benefit, 599 as will promotion of sale of a community property
asset. 600 The obligation by which funds are acquired will create community
liability even though there is an accompanying lending transaction of the
borrowed funds to a third person which cannot do more than balance the
borrowing; 6° 1 the same result follows even though the composite result
promotes only recreational opportunities for the spouse.6°2 The latter
possibility, and the reasoning in tort cases that recreational activity is
beneficial to the community, 60 3 suggest that a community "business"
purpose test may be met by any activity except one clearly related to separate
property or clearly donative. 604
concluded that the husband's testimony that he considered his business acquisitions to be separate
property controlled even though a purchase money mortgage signed by both spouses was given for part
of the purchase price; as to the part represented by the purchase money mortgage, this case was
overruled by Walker v. Fowler, 155 Wash. 631, 637, 285 P. 649, 651 (1930), which indicates the
presumption of community debt acquisition was not overcome.
594. 106 Wash. 137, 179 P. 103 (1919).
595. 177 Wash. 158, 31 P.2d 515 (1934). In Finn, the acquisition was held to be the wife's separate
property. Graves v. Columbia Underwriters, 93 Wash. 196, 160 P. 436 (1916), has the same result. As to
Auernheimer, see supra note 592.
596. Horton v. Donohoe Kelly Banking Co., 15 Wash. 399, 46 P. 409 (1896).
597. Proff v. Maley, 14 Wn. 2d 287, 128 P.2d 330 (1942).
598. Union Securities Co. v. Smith, 93 Wash. 115, 160 P. 304(1916); lnre Marriage of Bepple, 37
Wn. App. 881, 683 P.2d 1131 (1984).
599. Beyers v. Moore, 45 Wn. 2d 68, 272 P.2d 626 (1954).
600. Armour &Co. v. Becker, 167 Wash. 245,9 P.2d 63(1932); see also Kuhn v. Groll, 118 Wash.
285, 203 P. 44 (1922).
601. Malotte v. Gorton, 75 Wn. 2d 306, 450 P.2d 820 (1969); Northern Bank & Trust Co. v.
Coffin, 113 Wash. 326, 194 P. 404 (1920); see also Acme Finance Co. v. Zapffe, 161 Wash. 312,296 P.
1050 (1931).
602. Olympia Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. McCroskey, 172 Wash. 148, 19 P.2d 671 (1933).
603. See infra note 700 and accompanying text.
604. See, e.g., Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada v. Outler, 172 Wash. 540, 20 P.2d 1110 (1933);
Peterson v. Zimmerman, 142 Wash. 385, 253 P. 642 (1927); Union Securities Co. v. Smith, 93 Wash.
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While the husband alone cannot give community credit, which is treated
the same as any community asset, an obligation which has no correlative
benefit in a community property sense may be incurred in return for a
previous community benefit. This was the situation, for example, when the
husband joined his son on a note for the price of land the son purchased, the
son previously having worked on the family farm without compensation. 605
Unless the wife objects, the husband can give community credit to her just
as he can give her his interest in any community property. Such a gift of
credit was involved when borrowed money was used to acquire property
subsequently held to be the wife's separate property in one case,6°6 and was
used for the wife's separate purposes in another. 607
A renewal obligation normally will have the same character as the
original obligation, so that a separate obligation will not bind the com-
munity property merely by renewal. 608 However, a subsequent community
obligation may result from an intent to give community credit in support of
the separate obligation of a spouse, even though no benefit can be found to
the community property position. 609 A similar problem exists in a transac-
tion reviving an obligation the enforcement of which has been barred by the
statute of limitations. If the original obligation was community in character
and the managing spouse has made a payment after enforcement was
barred, presumptively a community purpose was served by the revival of
the obligation, 610 and in the absence of proof to the contrary, community
liability will continue. In Gannon v. Robinson,611 the court held that the
presumption of community liability by the husband's revival, without the
wife's knowledge or consent, of an obligation discharged in bankruptcy
had been clearly overcome by proof that the act was not for the benefit of the
community. Although the revival would not fall into the category of a gift of
community credit in support of a separate obligation, it is possible that a
115, 160 P. 304 (1916). On this reasoning community liability could be found if a spouse joined in the
obligation of a nonprofit corporation in whose activity the spouse participated, e.g., a charitable or
recreational organization.
605. Reed v. Loney, 22 Wash. 433, 61 P. 41 (1900).
606. In re Estate of Finn, 106 Wash. 137, 179 P. 103 (1919).
607. Auernheimer v. Gardner, 177 Wash. 158, 31 P.2d 515 (1934). In both this case and Finn the
wife's separate real estate was mortgaged to secure payment of the notes both spouses had signed.
608. Meng v. Security State Bank, 16 Wn. 2d 215, 133 P.2d 293 (1943); First Nat'l Bank v. Estus,
185 Wash. 174,52 P.2d 1243 (1936); National Bank of Commerce v. Green, I Wn. App. 713,463 P.2d
187 (1969).
609. This argument was presented in Meng v. Security State Bank, 16 Wn. 2d 215, 133 P.2d 293
(1943), but the payee was unable to establish that the wife had agreed to give community credit.
610. Catlinv. Mills, 140 Wash. 1,247 P. 1013 (1926), explained in Gannonv. Robinson, 59Wn. 2d
906, 371 P.2d 274 (1962); Annot., 47 A.L.R. 545 (1927). Mapes v. Mapes, 24 Wn. 2d 743, 167 P.2d
405 (1946), followed Catlin, concluding that the husband's note for previous loans, which were barred
by the statute of limitations, was executed within his managing power.
611. 59 Wn. 2d 906, 371 P.2d 274 (1962).
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community purpose was served which ought to recreate the community
obligation. The court in Gannon recognized this possibility: "We leave
open the question as to the liability of the community if the husband, in
order to establish a necessary credit standing or to otherwise benefit the
community, revives a discharged community obligation." 612
c. Separate Liability of the Nonacting Spouse and the Family Expense
Statute: Three-Way Liability
A spouse's act creating both community liability and separate liability in
the acting spouse ordinarily does not create separate liability in the nonact-
ing spouse who has not participated in the transaction, that is, it ordinarily
does not create three-way liability. 6 3 For example, the listing of the
nonacting spouse's separate assets in a financial statement does not estab-
lish the necessary promise to pay,6 14 nor is separate liability established by
the nonacting spouse's mere signing of a financial statement. 6 5 Finding the
husband as manager separately liable for the wife's contracts which create a
community liability is still possible on the basis of Lucci v. Lucci,6 16 but the
author believes such a result is no longer sound after the 1972 amend-
ments.6
17
An exception to the general rule that the acting spouse binds only himself
or herself separately, and presumptively the community property, but not
the nonacting spouse separately, is the family expense statute. 6 8 That
statute provides that "expenses of the family and the education of the
children, including stepchildren, are chargeable" upon the community
property of both and the separate property of either, for which they may be
sued jointly or separately. A family may be without children or dependents
and consist simply of husband and wife. 619
In Yates v. Dohring,620 the court held that the existence of a family
relationship was a prerequisite to extending liability separately 62 1 to the
612. Id. at 907, 371 P.2d at 275.
613. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 26.16.010-.030 (1983).
614. Glaze v. Pullman State Bank, 91 Wash. 187, 157 P. 488 (1916).
615. Yakima Plumbing Supply Co. v. Johnson, 149 Wash. 257, 270 P. 829 (1928). She may be a
party to the contract, however; see cases cited supra note 568.
616. 2 Wn. 2d 624, 99 P.2d 393 (1940).
617. Cross, supra note 9, at 548-50.
618. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.205 (1983).
619. In re Guardianship of DeNisson, 197 Wash. 265, 84 P.2d 1024 (1938).
620. 24 Wn. 2d. 877, 168 P.2d 404 (1946).
621. Id.; see also Van Dyke v. Thompson, 95 Wn. 2d 726, 630 P.2d 420 (1981) (stepchild not part
of family of noncustodial stepparent, whose earnings may not be reached to satisfy obligations of
spouse to support child of prior marriage). Mere separation does not end family relationships, Russell
v. Graumann, 40 Wash. 667, 82 P. 998 (1905); nor does confinement for incompetence, In re
Guardianship of DeNisson, 197 Wash. 265, 84 P.2d 1024 (1938); see also Rustad v. Rustad, 61 Wn. 2d
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husband for expenses incurred for the wife's room and board, at least when
the creditor knew that the wife had commenced a divorce action and the
spouses were permanently separated. It is possible that dissolution of the
spouses' family relationship would not restrict the application of the family
expense statute on behalf of a creditor who continued a preexisting pattern
of extending credit or on behalf of a new creditor who knew nothing of the
lack of the family relationship. 622 However, the separate property agree-
ment cases623 arguably indicate that the subsequent creditor at least could
not successfully assert that the nonacting spouse was separately liable in
the absence of the family relationship, except on the basis of estoppel or
similar reasoning.
Whether the obligation falls within the statutory "expenses of the family
and the education of the children" will depend on the type of expense 624 and
on the situation of the particular family. Prior to the 1972 amendments, the
court had indicated that the husband's managing power gave him consid-
erable discretion in determining whether a doubtful acquisition should be
accepted as family expense. 625 That managing power now rests in either
176, 377 P.2d 414 (1963).
622. In Parsons v. Tracy, 127 Wash. 218, 220 P. 813 (1923), the husband was able to recover the
expenses of his wife's last illness from her estate despite a separate property agreement in which she
agreed not to make any demand for maintenance and support on the basis, in part, that the payment was
not voluntary. The court said, "As between Mr. and Mrs. Parsons, the relationship of husband and wife
had ceased by mutual agreement, but as to the public they were still husband and wife and as such, under
the statutes and decisions of this court, the husband was liable to pay these bills." Id. at 223, 220 P. at
814. No cases or statutes were cited by the court.
623. See supra notes 512-13 and accompanying text.
624. Roller v. Blodgett, 74 Wn. 2d 878,447 P.2d 601 (1968) (house rental); Yates v. Dohring, 24
Wn. 2d 877, 168 P.2d 404 (1946) (room and board); Werker v. Knox, 197 Wash. 453, 85 P.2d 1041
(1938) (clothing); In re Guardianship of DeNisson, 197 Wash. 265, 84 P.2d 1024 (1938) (ordinary
maintenance and support); Roberts v. Warness, 165 Wash. 266, 5 P.2d 495 (1931) (medical and surgical
care); Parsons v. Tracy, 127 Wash. 218,220 P. 813 (1923) (expenses of last illness); Strom v. Toklas, 78
Wash. 223, 138 P. 880 (1914) (house rental); Butterworth & Sons v. Teale, 54 Wash. 14, 102 P. 768
(1909) (perhaps funeral expenses); Russell v. Graumann, 40 Wash. 667, 82 P. 998 (1905) (expenses of
last illness); Hinson v. Hinson, 1 Wn. App. 348, 461 P.2d 560 (1969) (child support). See generally 41
AM. JuR. 2D Husband and Wife §§ 371-82 (1968).
The expenses for education of the children would seem in some families to include college expenses,
but the reduction of the age of majority to 18 may affect the result. Cleaver v. Cleaver, 10 Wn. App. 14,
516 P.2d 508 (1973) (trial court erroneously decreed support after age 18 to cover four years of
undergraduate college education).
Three other marriage dissolution cases indicate that in appropriate situations child support may be
required after the child reaches majority to provide a college education. Childers v. Childers, 89 Wn. 2d
592, 575 P.2d 201 (1978); In re Marriage of Gimlett, 95 Wn. 2d 699, 629 P.2d 450 (1981); In re
Marriage of Studebaker, 36 Wn. App. 815, 677 P.2d 789 (1984). The matter is complicated in these
cases by the provisions of the marriage dissolution act, but in Childers, particularly, it is recognized that
in some families a college education could fall within the scope of the family expense statute.
625. Bush & Lane Piano Co. v. Woodard, 103 Wash. 612, 175 P. 329 (1918), and Jones-Rosquist-
Killen Co. v. Nelson, 98 Wash. 539, 167 P. 1130 (1917), each involved purchase of a piano, in which
only separate liability against the wife was found, the husband not having authorized the purchase,
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spouse, with the result that the concern of the nonacting spouse will relate
to his or her potential separate liability rather than the ordinary previous
concern of the husband about both his separate and the community liability.
This will necessitate, in the doubtful areas, a focus on the appropriateness
of the purchase for the particular family, whether the asset has been used by
the family, whether a family expense statute has a broader sweep than a
"necessities" statute, and similar factors. 626
d. Effect of Living Separate and Apart
An awkward and undefined area of potential community liability exists
when the spouses have permanently separated, under the analysis in Part
III. C, 627 without eliminating the community property character of existing
assets. Obviously, the community property does not lose its character
merely by separation, and the necessary management of the community
property while the spouses are separated can create obligations. In Dizard
& Getty v. Damson,628 the wife had expressly authorized the husband to
continue as manager of the community business, and by implication, the
court held, to incur community debts. Therefore, the creditor could enforce
his claim against nonbusiness assets, formerly community property, which
were assigned to the wife in the subsequent divorce. If there were no
express authorization by the nonacting spouse to continue the community
business, there would be some force in the argument that the scope of the
acting spouse's power to incur community liabilities should be no greater
than required by the reasonable necessities of the situation; a creditor might
be able to reach only the assets actually "managed," for example, the
assets used in the business.
After a permanent separation, no community relationship exists between
the spouses to support a presumption of the community character of a debt
unrelated to the community property at hand. 629 Unless the nonacting
spouse could be bound by estoppel or on some similar basis, insulating the
community property held by that spouse would be reasonable, 630 even if it
directly or indirectly.
626. The problems are generally discussed in 41 AM. JUR. 2D Husband and Wife §§ 371-82
(1968).
627. See supra notes 98-117 and accompanying text.
628. 63 Wn. 2d 526, 387 P.2d 964 (1964).
629. Compare the effect of the separate property agreement on subsequent creditors, discussed
supra notes 499-513 and accompanying text.
630. The acting spouse could create only separate liability (except through managing the con-
tinuing community property). The community property held by the nonacting spouse probably would
become that spouse's separate property which would not thereby become reachable; the other com-
munity property would probably become the actor's separate property and thereby reachable by his (or
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should not be insulated from a "business" creditor. Some other pos-
sibilities have been discussed briefly elsewhere. 631
2. Antenuptial Obligations
As a general proposition, antenuptial obligations of either spouse, which
are necessarily separate obligations, cannot be enforced against the com-
munity property of the spouses, 632 or against the separate property of the
other spouse.633 Even the obligation of both which has been renewed after
their marriage cannot be enforced against their community property.634
This so-called "marital bankruptcy" discharge from antenuptial obliga-
tions has been narrowed in scope in three areas: (1) alimony and child
support; (2) federal tax liens imposed by federal supremacy reasoning; and
(3) expanded statutory vulnerability of postnuptial earnings and accumula-
tions.635
a. Alimony and Child Support
In Fisch v. Marler,636 the court identified the conflict between the
principle protecting community property from separate obligations and the
principle supporting enforcement of alimony and child support respon-
sibilities after a divorce. The court held the former principle was subordi-
nate to the latter; alimony and child support claims are enforceable by
garnishment of the husband's wages, after his remarriage, at least to the
extent that there will not be an inequitable invasion of the community
property rights of the new wife (and family). The court held that the trial
her) separate creditor even if it might have been unavailable to the creditor while it was community
property.
631. Cross, supra note 9, at 543-44.
632. Consider, for example, WASH. REv. CODE § 26.16.040 (1983), permitting enforcement
against community real estate only for community debts, and the inability of a separate creditor to reach
the debtor's half interest in community property. See also Snyderv. Stringer, 116 Wash. 131, 198 P. 733
(1921).
633. WASH. REv. CODE § 26.16.200 (1983).
634. Katz v. Judd, 108 Wash. 557, 185 P. 613 (1919). An obligation, like an asset, will retain the
character of its origin if it can be traced and there is nothing but renewals involved in the changes in
form. Some of the reasoning in the out-of-state obligation cases, which formerly might involve only
separate liability, could support abandonment of the rule of Katz, but in those cases the original debt
was incurred during marriage and thus a change of the Katz rule is not inevitable (or perhaps even
desirable). Contrast the reasoning of Escrow Serv. Co. v. Cressler, 59 Wn. 2d 38, 365 P.2d 760 (1961),
and the later analysis of Household Finance Corp. v. Smith, 70 Wn. 2d 401, 423 P.2d 621 (1967).
635. See the discussion of WASH. REV. CODE 26.16.200 (1983), infra notes 657-72 and accom-
panying text (Part VI.A.2.c).
636. 1 Wn. 2d 698, 97 P.2d 147 (1939).
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court "had power to exercise its discretion in allocating the garnished funds
according to the necessities of the parties concerned." 637
Subsequently, in Stafford v Stafford, 638 the court refused to recognize
unpaid alimony as a basis for a lien against community real property,
although apparently recognizing it as a lien upon community personal
property, noting the difference in the husband's managing power at that
time over personal and real property. This distinction had long been
abandoned639 and its revival in Stafford is unfortunate. The court, however,
also noted that the question of the lien quality of an award of lump sum
alimony was not before it; if, therefore, the Stafford case means merely that
the particular antenuptial obligation in that case will not have normal lien
quality against the community real property, it may be reasonable (but not
for the reason stated), and the case does not necessarily put community real
property beyond the equitable claims and considerations involved in the
Fisch case. The 1983 amendments to section 26.16.200 of the Revised
Code of Washington, discussed below in Part VI.A.2.c,640 partially remove
any insulation of real property.
The dissenting judge in Stafford suggested that the new wife merely had
married an "encumbered husband"-encumbered with alimony and child
support claims from his former marriage. Whether this is the position the
legislature and courts have now reached is not entirely clear. In Dillon v
Dillon641 and Verde v Verde, 642 the court held that the alimony obligation
fixed at a percentage of the former husband's income (as reported for
federal income tax purposes) was to be calculated without regard to its
community property character from the subsequent marriage; that is, the
entire community interest, and not just the husband's one-half share, was
subject to the claim. In Knittle v Knittle,643 Division I of the court of
appeals affirmed the husband's separate liability and community liability
for past due child support resulting from a former marriage but modified the
judgment in two ways:
It is limited to those community assets which are the result of appellant
husband's earnings and accumulations. It is further subject, upon a
showing of necessitous circumstances by his present wife, to such adjustment
637 Id. at 716, 97 P.2d at 155.
638. 10 Wn. 2d 649, 117 P.2d 753 (1941).
639. Schramm v. Steele, 97 Wash. 309, 166 P.2d 634 (1917). The overruling of Schramm in
deElche v. Jacobsen, 95 Wn. 2d 237 622 P.2d 835 (1980), as to tort liability, discussed infra notes
673-708 and accompanying text (Part VI.B), should not affect the point made in the text.
640. See infra notes 657-72 and accompanying text.
641. 34 Wn. 2d 12, 207 P.2d 752 (1949).
642. 78 Wn. 2d 206, 471 P.2d 84 (1970).
643. 2 Wn. App. 208, 467 P.2d 200 (1970).
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and allocation of the appellant's earnings and accumulations as may appear to
the trial court to be just and equitable.6 44
In Van Dyke v. Thompson, 645 the court affirmed the trial court's deter-
mination that the Department of Social and Health Services had no author-
ity to collect the wages of a noncustodial stepparent to satisfy the non-
custodial parent's obligation to support the child of a previous marriage. In
other words, the antenuptial obligation of child support was individual and
reached community property of the obligated person and the new spouse
only if the obligated spouse had acquired it. The contrary view expressed in
Hinson v. Hinson646 was disapproved as being too expansive a reading of
Fisch v. Marler.
The Van Dyke decision was probably the motivating force for a 1983
amendment of section 26.16.200, which may have narrowed the possible
effect of Fisch and eliminated the immunity of community real property
under Stafford. The amendment is discussed below.
b. Federal Tax Liens
The antenuptial obligation based on federal tax assessments falls into its
own category. Federal district court judges in Seattle have disagreed over
whether the "marital bankruptcy" rule is an inherent substantive incident
of community property ownership, to which Fisch v. Marler647 was a
particular and narrow exception, 648 or rather whether Fisch, on grounds of
public policy, adopted an exception to the marital bankruptcy rule broad
enough to include federal tax obligations. 649 Both judges agreed, however,
that the marital bankruptcy rule was not to be considered as a state-created
exemption against which a federal lien would prevail. Subsequently, the
reach of the federal tax lien was resolved by the federal court of appeals650
in favor of the federal government on two bases: (1) federal supremacy over
state community property law; and (2) the interpretation that a spouse had
sufficient "property" or "rights to property" 651 so that the community
property asset could be sold to enforce the federal tax lien and half the
proceeds of the sale applied to the antenuptial obligation.
644. Id. at 214, 467 P.2d at 204.
645. 95 Wn. 2d 726, 630 P.2d 420 (1981).
646. 1 Wn. App. 348, 461 P.2d 560 (1969).
647. 1 Wn. 2d 698, 97 P.2d 147 (1939).
648. Stone v. United States, 225 . Supp. 201 (W.D. Wash. 1963).
649. Draper v. United States, 243 F Supp. 563 (W.D. Wash. 1965).
650. United States v. Overman, 424 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir. 1970).
651. I.R.C. § 6321(1982).
Washington Law Review
As a result of those holdings in Draper v. United States652 and United
States v. Overman,653 permitting the federal government to reach the
debtor's half interest in community property, the problem of the character
of ownership of the half not reached by the federal government will arise.
The impossibility of fitting such an asset into the statutory definitions was
largely the basis of the early case 654 frustrating a separate creditor's attempt
to reach his debtor's half interest in the community property. While no case
directly answers the question of how the federally enforced involuntary
conversion will affect the spouses' ownership, courts may apply de-
Elche,655 where the court permitted enforcement of a separate tort judg-
ment against the spouse's half interest in community personal property. In
deElche656 the court said that the half interest not reached by the creditor
would continue to be community property, and the nondebtor spouse would
have a right of reimbursement protected by an equitable lien through which
the respective interests could be balanced at the termination of the com-
munity relationship.
c. Statutory Vulnerability of Postnuptial Earnings and Accumulations
Changes in 1969 and 1983 in section 26.16.200 of the Revised Code of
Washington 657 have significantly affected the scope of the "marital bank-
ruptcy" rule. In 1969 the legislature added two provisos to the statute,
thereby permitting some antenuptial obligations to be enforced against
subsequent community acquisitions of the debtor. The first proviso subjects
652. 243 F. Supp. 563 (W.D. Wash. 1965).
653. 424 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir. 1970).
654. Stockand v. Bartlett, 4 Wash. 730, 31 P. 24 (1892).
655. deElche v. Jacobsen, 95 Wn. 2d 236, 622 P.2d 835 (1980).
656. Discussed infra notes 673-708 and accompanying text (Part VIB).
657. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.200 (1983) provides:
Neither husband or wife is liable for the debts or liabilities of the other incurred before marriage,
nor for the separate debts of each other, nor is the rent or income of the separate property of either
liable for the separate debts of the other: Provided, That the earnings and accumulations of the
husband shall be available to the legal process of creditors for the satisfaction of debts incurred by
him prior to marriage, and the earnings and accumulations of the wife shall be available to the legal
process of creditors for the satisfaction of debts incurred by her prior to marriage. For the purpose
of this section, neither the husband nor the wife shall be construed to have any interest in the
earnings of the other: Provided further, That no separate debt, except a child support or mainte-
nance obligation, may be the basis of a claim against the earnings and accumulations of either a
husband or wife unless the same is reduced to judgment within three years of the marriage of the
parties. The obligatioo of a parent or stepparent to support a child may be collected out of the
parent's or stepparent's separate property, the parent's or stepparent's earnings and accumula-
tions, and the parent's or stepparent's share of community personal and real property. Funds in a
community bank account which can be identified as the earnings of the nonobligated spouse are
exempt from satisfaction of the child support obligation of the debtor spouse.
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the earnings and accumulations of the husband or wife to their respective
antenuptial debts. The varying phraseology in the proviso, however, poses
problems. Difficulties attending the involuntary division of community
property earnings, which can result from the federal tax lien cases dis-
cussed above, are avoided by the provision that the nondebtor spouse has no
interest in the earnings of the debtor spouse (an "encumbered spouse," in
effect). But nothing is said in this respect about accumulations, although
earnings and accumulations are made subject to antenuptial debts. Can
there be an involuntary division of accumulations? In addition, the provisos
do not cover "liabilities" but only "debts," while the basic statute speaks
in terms of "debts or liabilities," which may mean that the tort victim
receives no assistance under this proviso. As mentioned earlier, 658 the
distinction between debts and liabilities has been abandoned in some
situations. Some of these questions have been answered as will be noted
presently. Other complexities are detailed elsewhere. 659
The second proviso, requiring that the claim be reduced to judgment
within three years of the marriage, will in some cases nullify the advantage
supplied by the statute. An argument that the running of the three-year
period should be tolled by payments on the obligation after the marriage
was rejected in Watters v. Doud,660 since the provisos of the statute did not
create a period of time within which an action had to be brought, but rather
alleviated the harsh result of the marital bankruptcy rule merely by limiting
the general terms of the statute. In addition, the court stated that the lack of
knowledge of the debtor's marriage was irrelevant; there was no basis to
assert an estoppel nor duty to reveal, and failure to disclose the marriage
was not concealment.
The three-year period within which judgment must be entered may
precede the marriage. 661 Although the three-year period to judgment may
in light of court delays or congestion be a rather short period of time in
which to protect against "marital bankruptcy," a creditor whose judgment
qualifies will have the normal ten-year period662 after judgment to avoid the
usual immunity the marital bankruptcy concept affords. Thus, many ac-
quisitions of the judgment debtor may be reachable, particularly through
658. See supra text accompanying notes 553-57.
659. See Note, Community Property-AntenuptialDebts-Eliminating Immunity of Earnings and
Accumulations of Debtor Spouse, 45 WASH. L. REv. 191 (1970).
660. 92 Wn. 2d 317, 596 P.2d 280 (1979).
661. Casa del Rey v. Hart, 31Wn. App. 532,643 P.2d 900, review denied, 98 Wn. 2d 1006 (1982).
662. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 4.56.190-.210; 6.04.010 (1983). The enforcement process must be
fully completed within the ten years. See Ferry County Title & Escrow Co. v. Fogle's Garage, 4 Wn.
App. 874, 484 P.2d 458 (1971).
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tracing into the accumulations of the debtor spouse, which appears to be
permissible. 663
The effect of the two provisos on tort liability has been answered in part
by Caplan v. Sullivan664 in which suit for the antenuptial tort was started
before the marriage, but judgment was entered about ten months after the
marriage. The defendant's motion to quash the garnishment of his wages
was denied by the trial court. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the
community property could not be reached under the provisos because only
"debts" could be enforced under the proviso, and that "debt" normally
referred to contractual but not other obligations, but sometimes included
liquidated claims. Therefore, since at the time of the marriage the plain-
tiff's claim was neither contractual nor liquidated, plaintiff could not assert
rights under section 26.16.200. The court expressly noted that the pos-
sibility of relief under deElche v. Jacobsen665 was not before it. If judgment
in the tort action had been entered before the marriage there would remain
the question whether that creditor would be enforcing a "debt" or still be
outside the scope of the proviso. It seems probable to the author that the tort
judgment would merely be a "liability" and not enforceable under this
section because there is a sort of artificiality in extending a "debt" concept
in this way, and perhaps more importantly, deElche has reduced the
pressure to do so by the extension of tort liability to the tortfeasor's half
interest in community personal property. There are differences which are
important, however. Under the statute the requirement to reach judgment
within three years exists and otherwise only normal statutes of limitation
apply; under the statute the creditor can reach the whole of the community
property accumulated by the debtor spouse, whereas otherwise the creditor
can reach only the half interest, although apparently in any community
personal property.
The other major change in section 26.16.200 was made in 1983 when the
legislature modified the second proviso by excepting child support and
maintenance obligations from the requirement to reach judgment within
three years and added:
The obligation of a parent or stepparent to support a child may be collected
out of the parent's or stepparent's separate property, the parent's or step-
parent's earnings and accumulations, and the parent's or stepparent's share of
community personal and real property. Funds in a community bank account
663. In Casa del Rey v. Hart, 31 Wn. App. 532, 643 P.2d 900, review denied, 98 Wn. 2d 1006
(1982), there was remand to determine (among other things) whether certain real property was an
accumulation of the debtor spouse against which the creditor could execute. See also Vest v. Stanfield,
48 Wn. 2d 55, 290 P.2d 704 (1955).
664. 37 Wn. App. 289, 679 P.2d 949 (1984).
665. 95 Wn. 2d 237,622 P.2d 835 (1980). See the next part of this article for discussion of deElche.
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which can be identified as the earnings of the nonobligated spouse are exempt
from satisfaction of the child support obligation of the debtor spouse.666
The problems posed by these amendments involve the current applicability
of the Fisch v. Marler667 and Stafford v. Stafford668 cases and their
progeny.
First, it is clear that the maintenance and child support antenuptial claims
are not constrained by the judgment-within-three-years-of-marriage re-
quirements. This provision of the statute really does no more than recog-
nize that the previously identified exception to the marital bankruptcy rule
was not affected by the statutory diminution of that immunity.
Next, the child support obligation is identified as collectible out of the
separate property of the obligated spouse-this is obvious as there is
nothing in community property law that immunizes a spouse's separate
property from that spouse's obligations (however they may have arisen)-
and out of earnings and accumulations of the obligated spouse. This latter
source for collection may extend the Fisch rule by eliminating the consid-
eration given to the new spouse and family, but perhaps the stated equitable
factors will mean that it does not necessarily do so. It probably does
eliminate the Stafford immunity of community real property that can be
traced to the efforts of the obligated spouse.
Finally, the statute appears to adopt a modified version of Hinson v.
Hinson669 in that community personal and real property, apparently not
traceable to the debtor spouse, can be reached as to the half interest of the
debtor spouse, except for community funds in a bank account which can be
identified as the earnings of the nonobligated spouse. 670 This provision
essentially adopts the rule applied for federal obligations under the su-
premacy clause, discussed above in Part VI.A.2.b, 671 with the exception
only of wages (and the bank account traceable to them) of the nonobligated
spouse, and leaves intact the narrow holding of Van Dyke672 that the wages
of a noncustodial stepparent cannot be reached.
666. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.200 (1983).
667. 1 Wn. 2d 698, 97 P.2d 147 (1939).
668. 10 Wn. 2d 649, 117 P.2d 753 (1941).
669. 1 Wn. App. 348, 461 P.2d 560 (1969).
670. It seems to the author probable that garnishment of the wages of the nonobligated spouse is
still not available. A contrary rule would tend to make pointless or silly the stated immunity of such
funds in a community bank account.
671. See supra notes 647-56 and accompanying text.
672. 95 Wn. 2d 726, 630 P.2d 420 (1981).
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B. Tort Liability-In General
In deElche v. Jacobsen673 the court abandoned the longstanding rule of
indivisibility of community property and permitted enforcement of a sepa-
rate tort judgment against the tortfeasor spouse's half interest in community
personal property.674 In part, the reasoning was that the trend toward
finding community liability for a spouse's tort, through a broad interpreta-
tion of community "benefit," had yielded illogical, inconsistent and unjust
results which, apparently, can be reduced by a sounder analysis in identify-
ing the separate or community character of the tortious act. The holding
obviously calls for drawing the line between community and separate torts
in a new location to put more incidents on the separate side of the line.
Since the new location is uncertain, however, and all real and personal
community property must respond to a community tort, rather than only
half of the community personal property to a separate tort under deElche,
plaintiffs will still seek community liability even though the supporting
argument may be tenuous. The previous cases in which community liability
was found are therefore of continuing interest though deElche may have
undermined the authority of some of them. Accordingly they will be
discussed below after deElche's implications are considered.
In deElche, defendant husband had forcibly raped plaintiff who secured
a judgment against him separately. Since defendant and his wife had
executed a three-pronged community property agreement, 675 there was no
separate property the plaintiff could reach. The evolution of the previous
rule was summarized by the court, which noted that a distinction had been
drawn between the availability to the husband's separate creditor of com-
munity real and personal property on the basis of his limited or unrestricted
management power, respectively, over the two kinds of property, but that
the distinction had been terminated in Schramm v. Steele, 676 which held no
community property could be reached by the plaintiff who had a judgment
for the husband's separate tort. The early holding, which was that a separate
673. 95 Wn. 2d 237, 622 P.2d 835 (1980). The case is noted in Note, Community Property: Tort
Liability, 17 GONZ. L. REV. 165 (1981); Note, deElche v. Jacobsen: Recoveryfrom Community Property
for a Separate Tort Judgment, 6 U. PUGET SOUND L. REv. 139 (1982); Note, Community Property-
Washington Allows Separate Tort Recovery from Community Property, 57 WASH. L. REV. 211 (1981);
see also Comment, The Effect of the deElche Doctrine on Community Property in Washington, 19
GONZ. L. REV. 545 (1984).
674. In Milbradt v. Margaris, 103 Wn. 2d 337, 693 P.2d 78 (1985), the plaintiff in 1982 (after
deElche) successfully sought garnishment against one-half of defendant's wages on the judgment for
assault and battery entered in 1979 (before deElche). The tort was intentional; the marital community
was dismissed from the tort action after the plaintiff's case in chief, and no appeal was taken from that
dismissal. The trial court's conclusion that deElche should be applied retroactively was affirmed by the
supreme court.
675. For a discussion of such agreements, see supra notes 475-78 and accompanying text.
676. 97 Wash. 309, 166 P. 634 (1917).
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creditor could not reach the debtor's half interest in community real
property because the resulting property holding did not fit any established
category, thereby became applicable to community personal property.
Hence, until the deElche decision, the need for relief for tort victims
resulted in a great expansion of the concept of community benefit so that a
community liability could be found. Under deElche the separate tort
creditor can reach the half interest in community personal property if the
separate property of the tortfeasor spouse is insufficient. The court stated
there was adequate community personal property so there was no need to
decide whether there could be broader enforcement. Schramm was over-
ruled, and any question as to separate debts was expressly not decided. 677
The court addressed the resulting problem of the character of ownership
of the half interest not reached by the creditor and concluded it continued to
be community property, adding:
The nontort-feasor spouse will be protected however. If community property
is used to satisfy a separate judgment, there will arise a right to reimburse-
ment protected by an equitable lien, the same as in other cases where
community property is used to improve a separate estate. . . . Due to this
equitable lien, upon termination of the community relationship the nontort-
feasor spouse will hold as separate property the same amount as he or she
would have received if the separate tort judgment had not been satisfied out of
community property. This equitable lien will also protect the community pro
tanto from subsequent separate judgment creditors attempting to levy on the
remaining half of the property.678
The initial problem posed by the change in reasoning represented by
deElche is whether separate debts or other nontortious liabilities can be
enforced against the debtor's half interest in community personal property.
In Colorado National Bank v. Merlino,679 the court of appeals rejected the
assertion by the separate creditor that the husband's half interest in com-
munity property could be reached, declaring that deElche did not apply.
The obligation involved purchase of real property for which the wife's
joinder was required which may, but should not, affect the applicability of
the case in a transaction not involving real property. This certainly at least
suggests that involuntary division or partition of community property will
not be available for the ordinary separate creditor of a spouse, and the
difference in the abilities of the tort victim and the contract obligee to guard
against community property protections can justify the differences in
result. 680 It is interesting to note, however, that in arriving at the total
677. 95 Wn. 2d at 246 n.3, 622 P.2d at 840 n.3.
678. Id. at 246-47, 622 P.2d at 840.
679. 35 Wn. App. 610, 668 P.2d 1304, review denied, 100 Wn. 2d 1032 (1983).
680. See additional discussion supra text accompanying notes 560-67.
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immunity of community property from separate obligations the court in
Schramm (now overruled, as to result, at least) reasoned that a judgment for
a tort should be as much a debt as the judgment on a contract. 681
The deElche court carefully avoided the question of the availability of
community real property to the separate tort creditor. The early cases, as
indicated above, permitted the separate creditor to reach community per-
sonal property but not real property for the tort liability of the husband. The
explanation as stated by Judge Dunbar in 1890 was:
The statute provides the ways in which this property can be alienated: First,
the voluntary alienation by the husband and wife joining in the deed; second,
by making it responsive to certain demands, constituted liens by the statute;
and there is no other way contemplated. In fact, the very object of the law is to
prevent its alienation in any other way. It expressly provides that the husband
shall not sell, convey or encumber it, and he will not be allowed to do, by
indirection or fraud, that which he is directly prohibited from doing. The
practical result to the non-contracting spouse would be the same whether the
law allowed the other spouse to directly convey the property, or allowed the
title to pass through the medium of a sale on an execution flowing from a
judgment to which he, or she, was not a party. It is the results the law regards;
the modes are not important.682
There has been no significant change in the statute since it was held in
Brotton v. Langert that the community real property could not be
reached.683
Judge Dunbar's statement does not indicate there is to be a difference
dependent upon the nature of the liability which resulted in ajudgment, but
rather appears to explain that community real property is insulated against
all but the specified liens and community debts. It is possible to argue that
despite Judge Dunbar's analysis the statute addresses only voluntary obli-
gations directly or indirectly related to community real property and that
there is no provision about noncontractual liability. On this reasoning, the
681. Compare the analysis in Caplan v. Sullivan, 37 Wn. App. 289, 679 P.2d 949 (1984),
discussed supra in text accompanying note 664, in which the court concluded that an unliquidated tort
claim did not qualify as a debt for the purposes of WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.200 (1983).
682. Brotton v. Langert, I Wash. 73, 80, 23 P. 688, 689 (1890). It should be noted that the
judgment sought to be enforced against community real property in Brotton was for a separate tort under
the characterization then being made of "official capacity" torts.
683. Prior to the 1972 equal management changes, the statute on real property was WASH. REV.
CODE § 26.16.040, which combined the management and joinder provisions with the proviso con-
cerning susceptibility to identified liens. In 1972, the management and joinder provisions became
WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.030(3) (1983) and the lien language was preserved in WASH. REV. CODE
§ 26.16.040 (1983):
Community real estate shall be subject to the liens of mechanics and others for labor and materials
furnished in erecting structures and improvements thereon as provided by law in other cases, to
liens of judgments recovered for community debts, and to sale on execution issued thereon.
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deElche result could also be reached in enforcement by the tort victim
against the half interest of the tortfeasor spouse in the community real
property. From the standpoint of the tort victim the need to reach an interest
in real property may be just as great as to reach personal property, but such
a result would be, perhaps, more surprising than was the holding in
deElche. In Schramm the court reasoned there was no distinction to be
drawn between a tort judgment and a contract judgment. With that case
overruled by deElche, perhaps the court is prepared also to find that at least
for tort victims a distinction does exist so that a separate tort "debt" (i.e., a
tort liability reduced to judgment) can be enforced against the half interest
in community real property even though a separate contract "debt" cannot
be by reason of the statute.
The above-quoted reference in deElche to an equitable lien protection684
also poses interesting possibilities. As noted above in Part III.I.4,685 there
is some authority for concluding that the right of reimbursement/equitable
lien protection takes priority over an ordinary subsequent creditor. There
are three possible kinds of subsequent judgment creditors: separate-hus-
band, community, separate-wife. If we assume that the liability results
from the act of one spouse, rather than both, 68 6 apparently the subsequent
creditor of the tortfeasor spouse could reach only assets, if any, not reached
by the earlier creditor and thus might find none. The community creditor
apparently will be able to reach any community asset even though it is only
half its former size by reason of the execution on the half interest by the
earlier separate tort creditor. The separate tort creditor of the other spouse
apparently can reach the insulated half of assets previously partially
reached by the earlier tort creditor of the initial tortfeasor spouse, and a half
interest in other community property, if any. If the insulation of the half
interest is to be preserved, it seems probable that some clear tracing or
segregation will be required to avoid loss through commingling of the
protection intended against successive separate tort liabilities.
A different approach, probably requiring legislation, might be less
confusing: permit the victim of the separate tort to reach any asset acquired
or owned by the tortfeasor. Such a rule would eliminate the happenstance
that the victim's recovery depends upon the marital status of the tortfeasor
and, at least in a sense, avoid deElche's distortion of the item theory of
ownership of community property. This is what section 26.16.200 of the
684. "This equitable lien will also protect the community pro tanto from subsequent separate
judgment creditors attempting to levy on the remaining half of the property." deElche, 95 Wn. 2d at
247, 622 P.2d at 840.
685. See supra notes 304-14 and accompanying text.
686. If both created the liability, enforcement probably would be possible against all property
whether community or separate.
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Revised Code of Washington does in part for the antenuptial creditor, that
is, for the limited purpose of the creditor's protection, an asset is separate
property, in effect, totally reachable by the separate creditor. The rules
developed for the antenuptial liability for child support and maintenance
operate similarly, although in giving consideration to the needs of the
current spouse and family, not quite as drastically. The result in deElche
may have an unreasonable quality as compared to the suggested solution if
the reachable property was community by reason of conversion from the
separate property of the nontortfeasor spouse through a three-pronged
community property agreement. 687 The reimbursement to the non-
tortfeasor spouse for the half interest devoted to a noncommunity purpose
would be accomplished in the same manner under either approach. Of
course when the separate and community "accounts" are settled at dissolu-
tion of the marriage or the death of one spouse there may not be enough
property to accomplish the reimbursement, but that is just an unavoidable
risk created by a rule which prefers the claim of the tort victim to the
protection which the insulation of the community property gave. Judge
Horowitz' dissent in deElche forcefully points out these concerns.
Establishing community liability in the tort area was considerably sim-
plified by the gradual extension of community liability for the husband's
torts and the 1972 amendments giving equal management power to the
wife. These amendments make inappropriate earlier reasoning that com-
munity liability for the wife's tort depended upon the family expense statute
power, the family car doctrine, or her position as agent for the husband. 688
The deElche reasoning indicates that there will be a withdrawal from the
extremes of that extension of community liability in some situations not yet
clearly identified. The following discussion largely states the results ex-
pectable under the development prior to deElche with, in appropriate
situations, a comment on the possible effect of that case.
The tortfeasor spouse is separately subject to liability for his or her tort
and, as in the contractual obligation area, the usual question is whether
there is also community liability. The rule was generally stated that there is
community liability if the tortious act of the spouse is committed (1) in the
course of managing community property or (2) for the benefit of the marital
community. 689 Some indication of the extension of this rule is shown by the
statement of the test as involving "prosecution of the business of the
687. Cf Merriman v. Curl, 8 Wn. App. 894, 509 P.2d 765 (1973) (the wife's separate property
judgment for alienation of affections became community property through a community property
agreement, and lost its insulation from a community liability incurred by her husband).
688. See Pruzan, Community Property and Tort Liability in Washington, 23 WASH. L. REv. 259
(1948).
689. See id. for an analysis of these basic propositions.
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community" in LaFramboise v. Schmidt,690 in which the husband caused
community liability by taking indecent liberties with a child in the care of
him and his wife. There obviously would be some difficulty in saying that
the husband was managing community property at the time or that the act
was intended to benefit the marital community, although the employment
to care for the child was so intended. In this area the concept of "business"
is not narrow and the looseness of the test which the cases developed is
better identified as requiring that the spouse be engaged in some com-
munity errand, affair, or business at the time of the tort to establish
community liability.
The nonacting spouse ordinarily is not subject to separate liability unless
there would be joint responsibility if the two were unmarried. 691 The statute
is explicit; it was changed in 1972 from the insulation only of the husband
from liability for injuries committed by the wife to cross-insulation for both
spouses. 692
The basis of the community liability is said to lie in the principle of
respondeat superior, even though there is no principal or master in the
ordinary sense. 693 While there is greater difficulty in finding an intentional
tort than a negligent tort within the ambit of the principle, the tort com-
mitted while managing or protecting a community property asset will result
in community liability whether the act is negligent or intentional. 694
Except in a purely personal altercation, 695 or alienation of affection/
690. 42 Wn. 2d 198, 254 P.2d 485 (1953).
691. WASH. REv. CODE § 26.16.190 (1983). Prior to the 1972 amendments this section referred
only to injuries committed by the wife and insulated the husband, but not community property, from
liability. Werker v. Knox, 197 Wash. 453, 85 P.2d 1041 (1938). The statute now makes explicit the
insulation of separate property of the other spouse and covers injuries committed by either spouse. The
reasoning in Werker could support three-way liability, separate-husband, separate-wife, and com-
munity, though no separate liability against the husband was sought. Query whether § 26.16.190 would
negate this result.
692. WASH. REv. CODE § 26.16.190 (1983). The statute did not and does not insulate the com-
munity property, only the other spouse. See deElche v. Jacobsen, 95 Wn. 2d 237,622 P.2d 835 (1980);
Werker v. Knox, 197 Wash. 453, 85 P.2d 1041 (1938).
693. Note the rejection of the idea that there is an entity called the community in Bortle v. Osborne,
155 Wash. 585, 285 P. 425 (1930).
694. See, e.g., McHenry v. Short, 29 Wn. 2d 263, 186 P.2d 900 (1947) (willful, fatal beating in
ejecting decedent from community property land or in carrying out task as caretaker of a third person's
boat); Milne v. Kane, 64 Wash. 254, 116 P. 659 (1911) (negligence in operating a community property
taxi).
695. Verstraelen v. Kellog, 60 Wn. 2d 115, 372 P.2d 543 (1962); Smith v. Retallick, 48 Wn. 2d
360,293 P.2d 745 (1956); Newbury v. Remington, 184 Wash. 665, 52 P.2d 312 (1935). Two othercases,
Blais v. Phillips, 7 Wn. App. 815, 502 P.2d 1245 (1972) (assault in parking lot directly after, and as an
outgrowth of, a trial which concerned management of community property), and Benson v. Bush, 3
Wn. App. 777, 477 P.2d 929 (1970) (initially an altercation over the community dog), indicate the
"purely personal altercation" is not a broad category.
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criminal conversation conduct, 696 community liability was found in most
situations on the basis of either occurrence during a community activity or
community benefit. Even though properly speaking there is no presump-
tion that a tort creates community liability, the cases came close to estab-
lishing such a proposition. 697 The next paragraph reflects the broad scope of
community liability which developed.
Community liability has been imposed in a variety of factual situa-
tions. A continuing altercation initially related to community property
interests will impose community liability.698 An assault on a minor child
in the care of a husband and wife created community liability.699 Negli-
gent injury occurring during a spouse's recreational activity similarly
created community liability on the reasoning that the activity was bene-
ficial and contributed to the welfare of the community relationship.700 If
the tort, for example, conversion, could confer a direct property benefit
on the community, the basic community property presumption would
dictate that the asset acquired would be community property, and hence
the liability incurred in acquiring (or attempting to acquire) it would
be a community liability.701 Community liability attaches to tortious
acts committed in connection with employment by which community
funds are earned, whether or not the employment is as a public of-
ficial. 702
There are as yet no cases which help to locate the new division line
between separate and community torts, but perhaps there is a useful clue in
696. Aichlmayr v. Lynch, 6 Wn. App. 434, 493 P.2d 1026 (1972); see also Merriman v. Curl. 8
Wn. App. 894,509 P.2d 765 (1973); Schramm v. Steele, 97 Wash. 309, 166 P.634 (1917). In Wyman v.
Wallace, 94 Wn. 2d 99, 615 P.2d 452 (1980) (vacating a contrary holding in the same case, 91 Wn. 2d
317), the court abolished the action for alienation of a spouse's affection.
697. As was said in Werker v. Knox, 197 Wash. 453,456, 85 P.2d 1041, 1042 (1938), "IT]he trend
of the law has not been toward relieving the community from liability for the torts of its individual
members, but has been quite definitely in the direction of finding ways and means of imposing such
liabilities upon the community."
698. McHenry v. Short, 29 Wn. 2d 263, 186 P.2d 900 (1947); Blais v. Phillips, 7 Wn. App. 815.
502 P.2d 1245 (1972); Benson v. Bush, 3 Wn. App. 777, 477 P.2d 929 (1970).
699. LaFramboise v. Schmidt, 42 Wn. 2d 198, 254 P.2d 485 (1953).
700. Moffitt v. Krueger, II 'Wn. 2d 658, 120 P.2d 512 (1941); King v. Williams. 188 Wash. 350,62
P.2d 710 (1936).
701. Furniture Workers Local 1007 v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters, 6 Wn. 2d 654, 108 P.2d
651 (1940) (union officers distributed funds on disbanding local which plaintiffs, disapproving, argued
was tortious); Local 2618, Plywood Veneer Workers v. Taylor, 197 Wash. 515, 85 P.2d 1116 (1938):
DePhillips v. Neslin, 139 Wash. 51, 245 P. 749 (1926); Henrickson v. Smith, I I IWash. 82, 189 P. 550
(1920) (attorney kept funds received for client in settlement); McGregor v. Johnson. 58 Wash. 78, 107 P.
1049 (1910).
702. Kilcup v. McManus, 64 Wn. 2d 771, 394 P.2d 375 (1964) (false arrest by port commissioner/
deputy sheriff, thereby abandoning former community immunity as to "official capacity" torts); Disque
v. McCann, 58 Wn. 2d 65.360 P.2d 583 (1961) (defalcation as guardian); Jacobson v. Lawrence, 9 Wn.
App. 786, 514 P.2d 1396 (1973) (negligence of de facto executor in not securing fire insurance).
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the statement by Judge Pearson for the court of appeals in Edmonds v. Ashe:
"[W]e do not believe that acts of wrongdoing which give rise to community
liability on the benefit theory should include those which, from the per-
spective of a reasonable person, are unlikely to produce the desired con-
sequences. " 703
In FederatedAmerican Insurance Co. v. Strong,70 4 only separate liability
was found for the wife's purposeful ramming of other cars while driving the
community car with the husband's permission because the wife's pur-
poseful wrong is outside her agency authority.705 In addition only separate
liability was found in Farman v. Farman70 6 for harrassing telephone calls
by defendant to plaintiff (the husband's first wife) which started before and
continued after defendant married the husband.
In Edmonds or deElche a number of cases are mentioned as involving
tenuous reasoning or analysis difficult to correlate with the reasoning in
some other cases, including Blais v. Phillips, Benson v. Bush, LaFram-
boise v. Schmidt, McHenry v. Short, Moffitt v. Krueger, King v. Williams,
and Newbury v. Remington.70 7 Of these earlier cases, Newbury involves
voluntary acts having nothing to do directly with any community property
or community activity. Only separate liability was found and probably will
still be found. Blais and Benson were, in effect, continuations of activity
which was community in purpose. While no reasonable person could
expect a beneficial result to follow from the particular tortious acts, the
initial character of the conduct might be enough to characterize the par-
ticular tortious acts as community; hence no change should result from
applying a different standard. LaFramboise involved indecent liberties
taken during the care of a minor child; the reasoning that there was a
community enterprise being conducted during which the tort occurred
probably leaves the community liability intact. McHenry involved tortious
conduct either in ejecting a trespasser from community real property or as
703. 13 Wn. App. 690, 693, 537 P.2d 813, 814, review denied, 86 Wn. 2d 1001 (1975).
Plaintiff had filed a claim against the estate of Sam Ashe for injuries from multiple gunshot wounds.
The claim was rejected on the basis that the estate included no separate property of the deceased
tortfeasor which could be reached by the injured plaintiff. The conclusion that there was no community
liability for the tort was affirmed. Defendant widow had filed for divorce from Ashe. He sought
reconciliation and assistance of plaintiff, at whose home Ashe had arrived with a pistol and rifle. Ashe
called his wife and eventually announced he was going to hold the Edmondses hostage for his wife and
her parents. During a scuffle the pistol was discharged, injuring plaintiff. Ashe was killed by a shot from
someone outside.
704. 102 Wn. 2d 665, 689 P.2d 68 (1984).
705. It should be noted that the spouses were separated at the time so there should be no community
liability under MacKenzie v. Sellner, 58 Wn. 2d 101,361 P.2d 165 (1961), but no point is made of that in
the Strong opinion.
706. 25 Wn. App. 896, 611 P.2d 1314 (1980).
707. These cases are cited supra notes 695, 698-700.
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caretaker protecting the property of another person; the excessive force is
probably not enough to nullify the community character of the tort.
In King and Moffitt the torts were negligent. In both cases, in substance,
the community character was found from recreational activity of one
spouse concluded to be beneficial to the community relationship. If it is
accepted that recreational activity of a spouse is advantageous to the
community relationship (which does not appear to be an unreasonable
position) the author has some difficulty in finding that deElche will change
the line of division between separate and community torts in any substan-
tial degree.
It appears probable then, that deElche stands only for the proposition
that a separate tort creditor can reach the tortfeasor spouse's half interest in
community personal property and perhaps in community real property, in
those situations involving purely personal wrongs having no conceivable
connection with community property or affairs. If this is correct, the
distortion of long-standing concepts in Washington community property
law is likely to be more apparent than real-and to the author such
extraordinary distortion is tolerable given the need for some chance of
protection for the tort victim. Treating the tort defendant with only separate
liability as a single person might for the tort victim provide a cleaner,
simpler solution, although not necessarily protection as great. 70 8 It would,
in effect, make the tortfeasor's marriage neither a help nor a hindrance for
either the tort plaintiff or defendant.
The other means by which community liability was found, as set forth
below, continue to be important.
1. Family Car Doctrine
As noted in Werker v. Knox, 709 the ability of the tort judgment creditor to
reach community property has been enhanced by means of the family car
(or family purpose) doctrine: the owner of the car is held liable on an
agency theory for torts committed by the driver.710 Community liability
does not flow directly from the doctrine, but rather from the practical
circumstance that the family car usually is community property and the
doctrine ordinarily imposes liability on the owner.711 Because the character
of the liability resulting from application of the doctrine normally parallels
the character of the ownership of the car, 712 if neither spouse is the
708. Property acquired by the nontortfeasor spouse would not be available.
709. 197 Wash. 453, 457, 85 P.2d 1041, 1042 (1938).
710. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS 524-27 (5th ed. 1984).
711. Perhaps more accurately, the doctrine imposes liability on the supplier of the car for use for the
family purpose. See id.; see also Coffman v. McFadden, 68 Wn. 2d 954, 416 P.2d 99 (1966).
712. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 710, at 524-27.
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tortfeasor, for example, if their son is the tortfeasor, the liability will only
be community in the ordinary case of community property ownership of the
car.
7 13 The family car doctrine may also result in three-way liability
(separate-husband, community, and separate-wife). For example, the at-
tendant vicarious liability can be separate, if the car is separately owned by
one spouse, 714 community, if the errand during which the injury occurred is
community, and separate on the other spouse, if that spouse is the
tortfeasor.
A permanent separation, however, should prevent the doctrine's applica-
tion to impose community liability. In MacKenzie v. Sellner,7 15 the auto-
mobile involved in the accident had become the wife's separate property in
the property settlement made at the time of the permanent separation, so a
family car doctrine argument would not extend the liability to the com-
munity. The family car doctrine also ought not apply even if the community
property ownership of the car continued, because the permanent separation
would eliminate the possibility of there being a family purpose716 to be
served by the use of the car.
An automobile purchased for a son, who reimbursed the parent for car
payments, is not a family car; hence, the family car doctrine will not apply
to impose liability on the parents when there is no evidence the automobile
was used for the general use, pleasure, or convenience of the family.717
Unauthorized use by a "grounded" son does not impose the vicarious
liability of the doctrine. 718
2. Torts Related to Management of Property
Liability imposed on a property owner, for example, liability flowing
from a landowner's responsibility, will be community in character if the
property responsible for the injury is community property, even if neither
spouse has acted directly. Failure of the managing spouse to carry properly
the responsibility of managing community property should impose indi-
vidual, that is, separate, liability on the managing spouse. 719 Prior to the
713. Cf. Conley v. Moe, 7 Wn. 2d 355, 110 P.2d 172 (1941) (trustee in bankruptcy asserted a claim
based on judgment in a wrongful death action against the son, and against the husband and wife in a
community property sense only).
714. Hart v. Hogan, 173 Wash. 598, 24 P.2d 99 (1933).
715. 58 Wn. 2d 101, 361 P.2d 165 (1961).
716. Cf. Yates v. Dohring, 24 Wn. 2d 877, 168 P.2d 404 (1946), involving the family expense
statute. But, conceivably, a community purpose might be invoked as suggested above.
717. Hulse v. Driver, 11 Wn. App. 509, 524 P.2d 255 (1974).
718. Beaughan v. Losvar, 19 Wn. App. 593, 576 P.2d 451 (1978).
719. The respondeat superior reasoning inherently means the agent or servant is subject to liability
for which the principal or master is also subject to liability. See W. PROSSER & W. KEarON, supra note
710, § 69.
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extension of managing power to the wife by the 1972 amendments, in
Graham v. Radford720 the defendant wife was held not to be separately
liable through landowner's responsibility when a child was injured upon
coming in contact with a trash burner maintained on community real
property. Since any liability against either the husband's separate property
or the community property was barred by the plaintiff's failure to file a
claim during administration of his estate following his death, the action
could succeed only by establishing the wife's separate liability. The court
held the wife was responsible only in a community property sense as
landowner and affirmed the dismissal of the action. Because the wife had
no managing power at that time, the court's refusal to find her separately
liable was sound.
In this sort of situation, the effect of the 1972 amendments making each
spouse equal manager may be to impose three-way liability, that is, liability
on the community property and on the separate property of each spouse.
The court in Graham stated, "The property was owned by the community,
and the duty of maintenance was owed by the community. ,721 However, the
"community" can only perform through the act of a spouse, and arguably
the failure to act or exercise proper management imposes separate liability
upon the manager and liability upon the community through respondeat
superior. If neither spouse exercised proper management, there may be
liability imposed on both individually, that is, separately. There are no
cases indicating whether such separate liability of the spouses would be
joint, or joint and several.
That a tort related to separately owned property will create only separate
liability against the owner is reflected in Freehe v. Freehe.722 While Freehe
involved an interspousal tort, 723 a separate property-related tort against a
third party plaintiff would impose separate liability on the spouse owning
the property,724 and a persuasive argument can be made for community
liability on two bases if a spouse has mismanaged property: 725 (1) the
potential community benefit derivable from the spouse's labor bestowed on
the separately owned property;726 and (2) the proposition that tortious
720. 71 Wn. 2d 752, 431 P.2d 193 (1967).
721. Id. at 755, 431 P.2d at 194.
722. 81 Wn. 2d 183, 500 P.2d 771 (1972). The Freehe court abandoned the rule of interspousal
immunity.
723. In Manion v. Pardee, 79 Wn. 2d 1, 482 P.2d 767 (1971), interspousal immunity was assumed
but provided no bar for suit on a tort committed before the marriage, since while the case was on appeal,
the parties had divorced, thereby dissolving the immunity.
724. Perhaps joint and several liability, see Anderson v. Grandy, 154 Wash. 547,283 P. 186 (1929).
725. The argument is probably not applicable to Furuheim v. Floe, 188 Wash. 368, 62 P.2d 706
(1936), where husband's separate tort was found when he fought plaintiff over an agreement to pay for
surrender of separate property.
726. Consider the earnings and business profit cases supra notes 220-48, 269-314 and accom-
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conduct of community business or affairs creates community liability.727
3. Criminal Responsibility
Criminal responsibility normally results only in separate liability, but
monetary liability flowing from a crime ought to be community if the
"business" of the spouses is criminal and leads to liability. The court has
held that costs in a criminal proceeding against the husband for arson could
not be enforced against community property,728 but the extension of tort
liability to situations in which there is only a purpose to benefit or in which
there is no actual business benefit to the community729 may portend
community liability in some criminal situations. 730
4. Effect of Living Separate and Apart
If the spouses have permanently separated, under the analysis in Part
III.C,731 personal injury caused by one will create only separate liability732
in the actor because neither "community" benefit nor a community prop-
erty purpose connected with the tort can be found if the community
relationship no longer exists. If, however, the tort was committed in
connection with some continuing community property management re-
sponsibility, the reasoning in the debt cases733 would support a conclusion
of community tort liability.
C. Effect of a Tort or Contract Judgment Against One Spouse
Prior to the 1972 amendments, if the plaintiff sought to assert com-
munity liability for the tort of the wife, it was necessary to join the husband
in the action; ajudgment against the wife alone would not support enforce-
ment against community property.734 A judgment against the husband
panying text (Parts IH.G.J to 3, 1II.1).
727. Reflected, for example, in cases cited supra notes 690, 702.
728. Bergman v. State, 187 Wash. 622, 60 P.2d 699 (1936).
729. Cf. the recreational benefit cases cited supra note 700.
730. Thus, in Bergman v. State, 187 Wash. 622, 60 P.2d 699 (1936), the crime was committed in
pursuance of a purpose to secure insurance proceeds. Although the court refused community liability
because the crime was outside the scope of management, the respondeat superior principle may not be
that restrictive anymore, as later cases seem to establish. But cf. supra notes 703-06 and accompanying
text, and cases cited therein.
731. See supra notes 98-117 and accompanying text.
732. MacKenzie v. Sellner, 58 Wn. 2d 101,361 P.2d 165 (1961); see also Kerr v. Cochran, 65 Wn.
2d 211, 219-30, 396 P.2d 642, 647-53 (1964).
733. E.g., Dizard & Getty v. Damson, 63 Wn. 2d 526, 387 P.2d 964 (1964).
734. Dolan v. Baldridge, 165 Wash. 69, 4 P.2d 871 (1931).
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alone, whether based on his contract or tort, was held to be presumptively a
community liability on the basis that the cause of action arose from his act
done presumptively as manager of community property. 735 The 1972
amendments giving the wife equal managing power should mean that a
judgment against her alone for her contract or tort liability is likewise
presumptively a community liability.
If one spouse is not joined in the action establishing the basic liability,
that spouse (as the wife could under earlier law) should be able to challenge
the asserted community character of the liability when enforcement is
attempted or by bringing a quiet title action against an execution sale. 736
Properly speaking, there is no presumption that tort liability against only
one spouse is more than separate, 737 and a showing that a subsequent
judgment was based only on the tort of one spouse should theoretically put
the burden on the creditor to prove the community character of the judg-
ment. However, the ease with which community tort liability is now
established and the general presumption of the community character of a
judgment against either spouse may put the burden on the spouse challeng-
ing the community character of the judgment. The question of the character
of the liability in both tort and contract actions can be settled initially if both
spouses are joined738 or if the other spouse intervenes. 739
D. Effect of Death or Divorce on Previously Existing Tort or Contract
Liabilities
If the spouses divorce after a community tort or contract liability is
incurred, enforcement can be had against property held by either former
spouse which had been community property before the divorce, whether or
not separate liability was incurred by the spouse now holding the asset. 740 If
the nonobligated former spouse becomes the owner, any increase in value
of the former community property is, apparently, beyond the reach of the
community creditor, just as improvements or later separate payments
735. Merritt v. Newkirk, 155 Wash. 517, 285 P. 442 (1930); Woste v. Rugge, 68 Wash. 90, 122 P.
988 (1912).
736. See, e.g., Merritt v. Newkirk, 155 Wash. 517, 285 P. 442 (1930); Coles v. McNamara, 131
Wash. 691, 231 P. 28 (1924); Wilson v. Stone, 90 Wash. 365,156 P. 12 (1916); Woste v. Rugge, 68 Wash.
90, 122 P. 988 (1912).
737. Cf Killingsworth v. Keen, 89 Wash. 597, 154 P. 1096 (1916) (as to the wife); Strom v. Toklas,
78 Wash. 223, 138 P. 880 (1914) (as to the wife).
738. See, e.g., Anderson v. Burgoyne, 60 Wash. 511, 111 P. 777 (1910); McDonough v. Craig, 10
Wash. 239, 38 P. 1034 (1894).
739. E.g., Gund v. Parke, 15 Wash. 393, 46 P. 408 (1895).
740. Dizard & Getty v. Damson, 63 Wn. 2d 526,387 P.2d 964 (1964); Capital Nat'l Bank v. Johns,
170 Wash. 250, 16 P.2d 452 (1932); McLean v. Burginger, 100 Wash. 570, 171 P. 518 (1918).
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would not inure to the benefit of the creditor. The creditor is limited to the
net community equity at the time of dissolution of the marriage.741 The
result is appealing but the reasoning is not particularly persuasive. If the
asset merely appreciated, why should the creditor's protection not also
appreciate? In other words, as to the creditor, is not the asset still "com-
munity" property? Fixing the liability as between the spouses in the divorce
decree or the property settlement agreement does not have any binding
effect on the creditor.742 It is preferable, though perhaps not necessary, that
the creditor or injured party join both divorced spouses in any action if it is
based upon community liability.743 Any community managing power ob-
viously ceases at the divorce, so neither spouse thereafter can create rights
against the other.744
It is convenient to talk in terms of the community as if it were an entity745
and of "community property" in the estate of the decedent spouse. (Upon
the death of one of the spouses, however, the "entity" and the community
property relationship necessarily ends.) All of the former community
property is administered in the estate of the decedent, 746 and after adjust-
ment for obligations or causes of action then enforceable against com-
munity properties and adjustment for the respective positions the spouses
may have had through the "equitable lien" claim or otherwise, the net
community estate to be assigned to the decedent's and the survivor's
respective shares can be ascertained. If the surviving spouse succeeds to
the decedent's share, rather than becoming tenant in common with other
persons, 747 an accounting for the respective shares is not needed.
The immunity of community property to separate obligations disappears
741. WVatters v. Doud, 95 Wn. 2d 835,631 P.2d 369 (1981).
742. Farrow v. Ostrom, 16 Wn. 2d 547, 133 P.2d 974 (1943).
743. United States v. Elfer, 246 F.2d 941 (9th Cir. 1957); cf. Fitch v. National Bank of Commerce,
184 Wash. 294, 50 P.2d 910 (1935).
744. Such reasoning was set forth in Britt v. Damson, 334 F.2d 896 (9th Cir. 1964). Cf Griggs v.
Averbeck Realty, 92 Wn. 2d 576, 599 P.2d 1289 (1979) (default judgment against husband after the
divorce ineffective to reach former community property in wife's hands; she had had default judgment
set aside and prevailed on the merits, eliminating her liability and removing her "community property"
from the creditor's reach).
745. In Bortlev. Osborne, 155 Wash. 585, 285 P. 425 (1930), plaintiff argued that the tort cause of
action survived the death of the tortfeasor spouse because the "community" still existed, as reflected in
the administration of all community property interests upon the death of the tortfeasor; the court
rejected the argument, holding essentially there was no entity established by the community property
statutes, but even accepting the argument that there was, it ceased to exist when there no longer existed
both husband and wife. The survival of the cause of action has been accomplished by WASH. REV. CODE
§§ 4.20.045, .046 (1983). In re Estate of Schoenfeld, 56 Wn. 2d 197, 351 P.2d 935 (1960), clearly
involved "entity" reasoning but it is not essential to the result that community property must be devoted
to settlement of community debts before separate property is.
746. Ryan v. Ferguson, 3 Wash. 356, 28 P. 910 (1891); WASH. REv. CODE § 11.02.070 (1983).
747. See Schlarb v. Castaing, 50 Wash. 331, 97 P. 289 (1908).
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at the death of a spouse, 748 permitting separate obligations of the decedent
or surviving spouse to be enforced against their respective shares of the
former community property. If the decedent is separately liable on a claim,
such a claim may be barred, as may a community liability, by failure to
timely file within the probate nonclaim statute.749 If the claims are properly
asserted, the separate liabilities will not take precedence over community
liabilities, 750 but will be effective against any remaining part of the dece-
dent's net half of the former community property.751 If the obligation of the
decedent was both separate and community, the creditor's claim is to be
charged first against the community property being administered, without
a prorating on the basis of the size of the respective estates. 752
If the surviving spouse is separately liable on a claim, the creditor does
not have a claim recognizable in the administration of the community
estate, and therefore need not file any probate claim. The creditor subse-
quently may reach any assets formerly community property which become
the separate property of the debtor-survivor. This last proposition has also
been applied even though the creditor's claim was one which could have
been enforced against either the survivor's separate property or the com-
munity property, but was not asserted in the administration of the com-
munity estate occasioned by the death of the other spouse. 753
Individual liability for federal income taxes on community income
continues despite dissolution of the community relationship by death or
divorce. If a joint return is filed, each spouse is responsible for the whole
tax liability, and if no return is filed, each spouse is subject to liability for
one-half of the taxes owing. 754
748. ln re Estate of McHugh, 165 Wash. 123,4 P.2d 834(1931); Crawford v. Morris, 92 Wash. 288,
158 P 957 (1916); Columbia Nat'l Bank v. Embree, 2 Wash. 331,26 P. 257 (1891); Edmonds v. Ashe, 13
Wn. App. 690, 537 P.2d 813, review denied, 86 Wn. 2d 1001 (1975).
749. Ruth v. Dight, 75 Wn. 2d 660,453 P.2d 631(1969); Graham v. Radford, 71 Wn. 2d 752. 431
P.2d 193 (1967); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 11.40.010, .080 (1983).
750. ln re Estate of Schoenfeld, 56 Wn. 2d 197, 351 P.2d 935 (1960).
751. See cases cited supra note 748.
752. See lit re Estate of Schoenfeld, 56 Wn. 2d 197, 351 P.2d 935 (1960).
753. Roberts v. Warness, 165 Wash. 266, 5 P.2d 495 (1931); Rea v. Eslick, 87 Wash. 125, 151 P.
256 (1915). In Rea, the court pointed out there is no relationship of principal and surety between the
community estate and the separate estate. The proposition appears to be denied in Graham v. Radford.
71 Wn. 2d 752,431 P.2d 193 (1967), holding that failure to file a claim against the community estate, on
which fell liability for unsafe premises owned as community property, precluded assertion thereafter
against the survivor (the wife) on whom there was no liability in the separate property sense. The case
relied upon. Hennessey Funeral Home v. Dean, 64 Wn. 2d 985, 395 P.2d 493 (1964). concerns a
primary-secondary quality of liability of the estate and the survivor for funeral expenses. The court's
assertion in Grahan that barring of the community claim precluded enforcement of a separate
obligation, "'assuming there is ... separate liability on her part," 71 Wn. 2d at 756, 431 P.2d at 195, is
an unfortunate dictum.
754 United States v. Mitchell, 403 U.S. 190 (1971). The result in Washington should be the same.
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E. Out-of-State Creditors
The Washington court has reversed the long-standing inequitable rules
affecting obligations incurred in a noncommunity property state. 755 Under
prior reasoning, an obligation incurred in a noncommunity property state
was necessarily separate, because no law recognizing community property
existed in that state. Therefore, when the obligation was brought to Wash-
ington for enforcement, it retained its "separate" character and could not be
enforced against community property. This rule was rejected in Pacific
States Cut Stone Co. v. Goble.756 Washington law now provides protection
of the out-of-state creditor as nearly equivalent as possible to that which the
creditor would have under the applicable law of the other state.
757
In Pacific States Cut Stone, the husband's Oregon contract obligation
was enforced in Washington against all of the husband's acquisitions,
community as well as separate, but it could not be enforced against the
wife's acquisitions. Note that the wife's ordinary acquisitions in Oregon, a
common law state, would be her separate property and beyond the hus-
band's creditor's reach; but in Washington, her ordinary acquisitions would
be community property, and the husband's obligation would be enforceable
against the community property without regard to which spouse was the
acquirer. Thus, the results obtained under the rule of Pacific States Cut
Stone often will not be the same as those reached under exclusive Washing-
ton facts. Even if the applicable law comes from another community
property state, the result under Washington law will not necessarily be the
same as in a "local" transaction. For example, the husband's antenuptial
obligation in California can generally be enforced against community
property, whereas in Washington it may not. Thus, under the Pacific States
Cut Stone rule such a California obligation would be enforced in Washing-
ton differently than would a Washington obligation. 758 The conflict of laws
rules might bring still other unanticipated results. 7
59
These matters are discussed in DESKBOOK, supra note 142. See also supra notes 647-56 and accom-
panying text (Part VI.A.2.b).
755. Pacific States Cut Stone Co. v. Goble, 70 Wn. 2d 907, 425 P.2d 631 (1967).
756. Id.
757. No attempt is made here to discuss the conflict of laws rules to determine which state's law is
to be applied.
758. DeVore, Recent King County Decisions, VII SEATTLE-KING CouNTY B. BULL., Mar. 1967,
at 1.
759. Potlatch No. 1 Federal Credit Union v. Kennedy, 76 Wn. 2d 806, 459 P.2d 32 (1969)
(husband's suretyship liability incurred in Washington controlled by Washington law though principal
obligation incurred in Idaho: no community liability); Pacific Finance Corp. v. J. Ed Raymer Co., 68
Wn. 2d 211, 412 P.2d 120 (1966) (wife's guaranty contract does not bind her separate property: scope
controlled by Idaho law).
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In two recent cases the new rule came into play. Pacific Gamble Robinson
Co. v. Lapp760 involved the husband's personal obligation, incurred while
domiciled in Colorado, for a wholly owned corporation (owned before
marriage). On enforcement in Washington the court held the husband's
wages could be reached but the wife's, which were protected by Colorado
law, could not. In Colorado National Bank v. Merlino,761 the court held the
husband's obligation through contracting to buy real estate in Colorado
without the wife's participation created only his separate liability which
could not be enforced against the community property or the husband's
interest in it. The husband and the wife were at all times Washington
domiciliaries.
It may be that the Washington rule adopted in Pacific States Cut Stone, a
contract obligation case, will not be applied to out-of-state tort liabilities,
although the abandoned rule was applied to both kinds of obligations and
there is no sufficient reason to restrict the newly adopted rule solely to
contract problems.
VII. CONCLUSION
Except for the federal statutes essentially disapproving both the state and
federal courts' finding of preemption in the retirement rights area (which
might suggest to the courts that a more restricted reading of the supremacy
clause is desirable), statutory changes in the last dozen or so years have not
yet much surfaced in the appellate decisions. Rather, the substantial shifts
or modifications of the rules have been adopted by the judiciary without the
compulsion of legislation. The "source" doctrine, by which the character
of an asset is established by tracing to its source, has had refined application
in the cases concerning pension/retirement rights, term life insurance, and
personal injury recovery. What is "property" which must be considered
(and how it is to be considered) has had additional attention in the goodwill
and earning capacity cases. The relationship between ownership and other
rights of the spouses in the reimbursement/equitable lien area has been
before the courts with, in the author's opinion, some unfortunate and
confusing results. The immunity of community property to noncommunity
obligations and the indivisibility of community property have been dimin-
ished by statute and court decision.
760. 95 Wn. 2d 341, 622 P.2d 850 (1980).
761. 35 Wn. App. 610, 668 P.2d 1304, review denied, 100 Wn. 2d 1032 (1983).
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It has been a busy period, and many of the new positions also pose
unanswered problems. The question can fairly be raised whether the time
has come for a careful, total evaluation of the Washington community
property system leading, perhaps, to comprehensive statutes rather than the
skeletal, piecemeal coverage we now have. A further question is whether
the Uniform Marital Property Act, which provides, inter alia, for quasi-
community property and classifies all income during marriage as com-
munity, would supply the pattern for worthwhile answers for Washington's
future.
